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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive study of Edmund Burke’s representation of 
global religions throughout the general oeuvre of his writings and speeches. My objective is to 
advance the study of Burke by offering a critical account of his religious thought, as a critical 
imprint in his literature. In addition to situating Burke’s writing in the context of Enlightenment 
thought and eighteenth-century public life, I make a further contribution to the study of Burke’s 
literature by demonstrating how twentieth and twenty-first century theories of modernity can 
help to articulate Burke’s conception of religion. 
Studies that have categorically seated Burke in the context of ‘modernity’ (for example, 
from Terry Eagleton, Paddy Bullard, and Stephen K. White) treat him as a ‘politician’, as 
‘Edmund Burke the rhetorician’, or ‘as an aesthetician’.1 My thesis compliments these studies by 
filling the need to treat Burke as a multicultural quasi-religious thinker in the context of 
modernity. 
Studies that have treated Burke in a religious context (for example, from Conor Cruise 
O’Brien, Thomas H.D. Mahoney, Eamonn O’Flaherty, Elizabeth Lambert, J.C.D. Clark, Brian 
Young, Frederick Dryer, and others) have done so with the objective of understanding more 
about his personal religious convictions.
2
 Differing from such studies, I do not intend to unearth 
                                                 
1
 The parameters and characteristics of the term ‘modernity’ are defined later in the introduction to this thesis; 
Stephen K. White, Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics, (Maryland: USA, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1994), p. 2; Paddy Bullard, Edmund Burke and the Art of Rhetoric, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), p. 2; Terry Eagleton, Ideology of the Aesthetic, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 58. 
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 Conor Cruise O’Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke, 
(London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1992); Thomas H.D. Mahoney, Edmund Burke and Ireland, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960); Eamonn O’Flaherty, ‘Burke and the Catholic Question’, Eighteenth-Century Ireland / Iris 
an dá chultúr, 12, (1997), 7–27; Elizabeth Lambert, ‘Edmund Burke’s Religion’, English Language Notes, 32 
(1994), 19–28; J.C.D. Clark, ‘Religious Affiliation and Dynastic Allegiance in Eighteenth-Century England: 
Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine and Samuel Johnson’, English Literary History, 64 (1997), 1029–67; Brian Young, 
Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to Burke (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998); also F.P. Lock, ‘Burke and Religion’, in An Imaginative Whig: Reassessing the Life and 
Thought of Edmund Burke, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2005), ed. by Ian Crowe, pp. 35–58; and Ian 
 
 iii 
Burke’s true religious identity; rather, I intend to fill the need for a full-length study of Burke’s 
analysis of religion, as it appears in a literary context. There exists no monographic study of 
Burke’s conceptualization of global religions as translated through recent theories of modernity. 
This is the task set forth in this thesis. 
Most of the studies that acknowledge Burke in a religious context treat him in strictly 
Christ-centred terms, mostly to support reactionary-conservative interpretations (e.g., Francis 
Canavan, Bruce Frohnen, and Christopher Hitchens).
3
 I wish to examine political thinking about 
religion, beyond Christ-centred terms - his global conception of non-Christian, non-god-centred 
thinking. In doing so, this thesis is intended to present an interpretation of Burke that 
acknowledges the importance he placed on indigenous religious culture. To my mind, 
interpretations of Burke that emphasise his reactionary-conservatism also implicate him as being 
anti-modern. As I intend to explore Burke’s writings and speeches in the context of modernity, I 
believe it is only responsible to acknowledge these interpretations of him as a reactionary-
conservative. 
I use the work of J.G.A. Pocock, S.J. Barnett, Bruno Latour and others to establish a 
context of eighteenth-century modernity, or what was modern to Enlightenment minds.
4
 In 
addition, my critical analysis of Burke demonstrates how the same characteristics and themes 
associated with this eighteenth-century context of modernity are reflected in representations of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Crowe, Patriotism and Public Spirit: Edmund Burke and the Role of the Critic in Mid-18
th
 Century Britain, 
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
3
 Francis Canavan, ‘Edmund Burke: Christian Statesman’, Reflections, 1, (2003), [accessed 28 January 2009], (para. 
1 of 13); Bruce Frohnen, Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism The Legacy of Burke and Tocqueville, (Kansas, 
USA: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Christopher Hitchens, ‘Reactionary Prophet’, The Atlantic Monthly, 3 
(2004), 133–38, (p. 133). 
4
 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 5 vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999–2001), II, 
Narratives of Civil Government, V, Religion: the First Triumph; S.J. Barnett, The Enlightenment and Religion: the 
Myths of Modernity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 
trans. by Catherine Porter, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
 iv 
modernity that are more recent. I use twentieth and twenty-first century theories of modernity to 
enrich our understanding of Burke’s representation of religion. I deconstruct Burke’s 
representation of religion to suggest that it anticipates the various complexities communicated in 
studies of modernity (for example, from Zygmunt Bauman, Marshall Berman, and Paul Heelas, 
Phillip Blond, John Milbank, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault).
5
 Ultimately, my thesis 
validates Burke as an originator of modern (and contemporary) religious conceptualization, 
which transcends things such as nation, sect, and even good and evil. 
                                                 
5
 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts 
Into Air: The Experience Of Modernity, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982); Paul Heelas, Religion, Modernity, 
and Postmodernity, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); Phillip Blond, ‘The Primacy of Theology and the 
Question of Perception’, Ibid., pp. 285–313; John Milbank, ‘Sublimity: the Modern Transcendent’, in Ibid., pp. 258–
84; Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. by John D. Caputo, 
(USA: Fordham University Press, 1997); Michel Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1976), p. 81; also Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, ed. by Jeremy R. Carrette, (Manchester, 
UK: Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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Burke scholarship and the contribution of my thesis 
This thesis concerns Edmund Burke’s representation of religion as it is affected 
by eighteenth-century modernization. My study fills the need for a full-length enquiry 
into Burke’s religious thought, in general. There exists no comprehensive study of 
Burke’s conceptualization of eighteenth-century global religions as reflected in the 
concept of modernity. I intend to advance our understanding of Burke’s writings and 
speeches by offering this critical account of how Burke’s religious thought is represented 
in a wide range of his texts, reaching beyond questions surrounding his own religious 
identity. I situate my analysis of Burke’s religious conceptualization in the historical 
context of the eighteenth century. However, I further demonstrate how twentieth and 
twenty-first century theories of modernity can articulate the way religion is represented in 
Burke’s writings. 
Few recent contributions to Burke scholarship have avowedly seated his thought 
in the context of modernity (a term defined at length later in this introduction); those who 
do (e.g., Terry Eagleton, Paddy Bullard, and Stephen K. White) expertly examine the 
continuity between Burke’s politics and his aesthetic thought—not his global 
conceptualization of religious culture. This thesis is intended to fill that void. Further, 
some of these studies (e.g., Eagleton and White) perpetuate a reactionary-conservative 
interpretation of Burke. While these interpretations are respectively valid, my thesis is an 
effort to evince a counter-interpretation of Burke as progressive through the lens of his 
religious thought. It is important to note here that Burke was not a religious theorist; 
Frederick Dryer explains: 
2 
 
He [Burke] was not a high churchman in the seventeenth or the 
nineteenth-century sense of the word. Indeed, he was not a high 
churchman in any useful sense of the word. What he was in fact was a 
latitudinarian. His tradition of churchmanship was broad and low. Like 
other latitudinarians he was tolerant and open-minded in matters of 
dogmatic orthodoxy; he regarded matters of liturgical practice as questions 
of convenience and expediency. […] He looked upon all churches as 
merely human associations, administering a purely human jurisdiction.
6
 
While I will later discuss the complications of the latitudinarian label that Dryer affixes to 
Burke above, I wish to draw from Dryer’s passage here to illustrate that (although he was 
not a member of the clergy in the Anglican Church, a ‘high churchman’) the high volume 
of Burke’s thoughts on dogmatic orthodoxy, liturgical practice, and religious cultural 
identity found in his writings allows us to conceive of him as a religious thinker ‘in 
effect’ or ‘as it were’—a quasi-religious thinker.7 
Even fewer studies interpret Burke’s writing through the lens of his religious 
thought and how it figures with modernity as a concept. Studies that do ponder Burke and 
religion (like Dryer’s, quoted above) tend to focus only on unearthing his real religious 
identity, the questions about Catholicism surrounding Burke, and his writings concerning 
Ireland. Conor Cruise O’Brien, Christopher Hitchens, Thomas H.D. Mahoney, Eamonn 
O’Flaherty, and Frederick Dreyer all speculate heavily on Burke’s personal religious 
                                                 
6
 Frederick Dryer, ‘Burke’s Religion’, Studies in Burke and His Time, 17 (1976), 199–212, (p. 201). 
7
 ‘Originally applied in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century to those who, holding a de jure 
Episcopacy, opposed a comprehension or toleration of differences in church polity, and demanded the strict 
enforcement of the laws against Dissenters, and the passing of such additional measures as the Occasional 
Conformity Bill’, High Churchman; ‘classical Latin quasi as if, as it were, almost, practically’, circa 
fifteenth century, Oxford English Dictionary, ‘quasi’, <http://www.oed.com/>, [May 1st, 2013]. 
3 
 
conviction, and the potential influence of his Catholic connections: Hitchens follows 
O’Brien’s argument that Burke was near enough to ‘being a crypto-Catholic’; he too 
maintains that Burke was ‘probably a Catholic […]’.8 Brian Young also honours the work 
of O’Brien: 
The religion of Burke is indeed notoriously difficult to decipher, but 
Conor Cruise O’Brien is surely right to see in his notion of the Church 
something which absorbed both the Roman Catholicism which pervaded 
his upbringing and the Anglicanism which was a necessary part of his 
identity as a prominent politician in England.
9
 
Other scholars argue against this interpretation; J.C.D. Clark relocates the religious 
identities of Burke as paired with Samuel Johnson, in a study that suggests: ‘[…] if 
[Samuel] Johnson has been wrongly identified as a proto-Evangelical, Burke has equally 
been misplaced as a crypto-Catholic’.10 Clark, along with Dryer and Elizabeth Lambert, 
asserts ‘Burke’s Protestant Latitudinarianism’.11 While my thesis is an effort to engage 
with these (and more) valuable studies about Burke, the point I make here is that such 
speculation concerning Burke’s true religious identity is beyond the scope of this study. 
Such biographical enterprises, to my mind, risk fallacious appeals to probability. Rather, 
it is my objective to fill the need to understand Burke’s religious thought as a critical 
impression in the wide range of his literature. 
                                                 
8
 O’Brien, Melody, p. 44; Hitchens, p. 133. 
9
 Young, p. 71. 
10
 Clark, ‘Religious Affiliation’, p. 1029. 
11
 Clark, ‘Religious Affiliation’, p. 1037; Dryer, ‘Burke’s Religion’, p. 199, 201; Lambert, ‘Edmund 
Burke’s Religion’, p. 20. 
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The need to understand Burke’s religious thought (beyond his own convictions, 
beyond the Catholic question) is an enterprise only recently gaining greater attention. 
Perhaps the timeliness of my thesis is evinced in both Richard Bourke’s and Ian Harris’ 
contribution in the very recent Cambridge Companion to Burke.
12
 Portions of my thesis 
thematically resonate with portions of Bourke’s contribution, which mentions Burke’s 
trepidation over the ‘deistical Enlightenment’ as ushered in by Henry St. John the 
Viscount Bolingbroke and John Toland; Bourke writes of the onset of new scientific 
progress ‘at a cost of annihilating the legitimating principles of religion and society 
altogether’.13 I view my thesis as complementing Bourke’s enterprise by observing a 
rhetorical practice in Burke’s writing: protecting religious establishment by relying on 
themes antithetical to the legitimating principles of religion. For example, Bourke 
suggests that The Moralists, by Anthony Ashley-Cooper third earl of Shaftesbury, 
engages with ‘an unorthodox agenda readily associated with deism’.14 This observation 
resonates with an argument I make in Chapter 1, about Burke engaging with 
characteristics associated with deism and non-God-centred themes.
15
 Ian Harris also 
makes a valuable contribution to Burkean scholarship, in terms of conceiving of Burke’s 
religious conceptualization beyond Christ-centred religions. Harris acknowledges 
Burke’s writings and speeches on India, and further makes astute observations about 
Burke anticipating a ‘de-Christianisation [of France] that became more powerful as the 
                                                 
12
 The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke, ed. by David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
13
 Richard Bourke, ‘Burke, Enlightenment and Romanticism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Edmund 
Burke, ed. by David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
27–41, (pp. 29, 30). 
14
 Bourke, ‘Burke, Enlightenment and Romanticism’, p. 33. 
15
 Kelleen O’Connell, ‘Edmund Burke: Religion and 18th Century Modernity’, (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, King’s College London, 2012), pp. 109-21. 
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Revolution proceeded’.16 However, like most studies that acknowledge a religious 
context for Burke, Harris depicts him only in Christ-centred terms—as a Christian 
statesman, ‘deeply interested in Christianity and its importance for society’.17 Harris 
rightly posits that Burke’s ‘endorsement of other revealed religions does not imply that 
Burke forewent Christianity […]’.18 However, he then adds that Burke did not entertain 
‘relativism about religious truth’.19 He further argues that ‘Burke, in any case, was clear 
that the civilization, which had a Christian component, had produced at least some results 
that were superior to those found in India’.20 First, as Burke was not a high churchman, 
religious truth was not his agenda. Second, I will show in my thesis how Burke does 
entertain relativism about religious cultural legitimacy, which differs from Harris’ 
argument. In a further departure from Harris, I will also show (particularly, in Chapter 2) 
that, for Burke, a Christian component is not necessary to produce a moral civilization.
21
 
I also believe that my work complements Harris’ by examining Burke beyond the image 
of him as a Christian apologist, but rather as a multicultural quasi-religious thinker. 
In any case, Burke’s encounter with religion in a global context, has not yet 
received more than a share in a larger compendium of varying studies concerning Burke; 
I believe that Harris’ work, especially, has given momentum to (what we can now 
perceive as) an ongoing conversation about Burke’s religious thought—a conversation 
                                                 
16
 Ian Harris, ‘Burke and Religion’, in The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke, ed. 
by David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 92–103, (p. 101). 
17
 Ibid., p. 92. 
18
 Ibid., p. 99. 
19
 Ibid., p. 99. 
20
 Ibid., p. 99. 
21
 In Chapter 2, I point out Burke’s argument in the Hastings’ trial that explained the laws of morality were 
the same everywhere, O’Connell, p. 146; In the same chapter, I point out how Burke explains that non-
Anglican sects are just as equitable and religious as non-Anglican sects, p. 163.  
6 
 
that still begs elaboration. It is my intent to contribute to this conversation by offering 
elaborations on Burke’s global religious thought, in the full-length dimension of a 
doctoral thesis. For example, what about the ways in which his arguments resonate with 
(and, at times, rely on) characteristics of non-Christian themes, non-God-centred themes, 
with unholy themes, and even atheistic themes (which Harris observes Burke opposing)? 
I believe there is more to be said about the complexities in Burke’s literary representation 
of religion, especially as it is translated through twentieth and twenty-first century 
theories of modernity. 
Studies that treat Burke in a religious context do so strictly in Christian terms, 
generally in order to support reactionary-conservative interpretations of Burke, which 
tout him as the father of modern Conservatism, reacting against change in order to 
preserve ‘the conservative good life’.22 In this thesis, I offer an interpretation of Burke to 
counter those that emphasise his reactionary attributes. I demonstrate how Burke is not 
opposed to change; rather, the representation of his religious thought in his writing 
demonstrates malleability and modification as a means of conservation. 
Of course, it is known that Edmund Burke officially served in parliament as a 
Whig and as a member of the Anglican Church.
23
 Declarations of his personal position as 
a member of the Anglican Church are seen in such places as his 1779 letter to the 
Reverend John Erskine (discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this thesis): ‘I am by choice 
and by Taste, as well as by Education, a very attached member of the Establish[ed] 
                                                 
22
 Frohnen, p. 9. 
23
 Paul Langford, ‘Burke, Edmund (1729/30–97)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, 
January 19th, 2012. 
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Church of England.’24 His official position in parliament as a defender of the established 
Anglican tradition is evident in such instances as his vote against the revocation of 
clerical subscription—what Brian Young succinctly defines as the required belief in 
‘such man-made formulas as the Athanasian Creed and the Thirty-Nine Articles enforced 
on clergymen when taking orders, and on undergraduates either taking their degree (at 
Cambridge) or in order to matriculate (at Oxford)’.25 In the debate over clerical 
subscription in the House of Commons, on 6 February 1772, Burke stated: 
For my own part I am no friend to innovations in religion, when the 
people are not, in consequence of some religious abuse, much aggrieved. 
That was the case at the Reformation, and then would I have heartily 
concurred in the alteration at that time made, had I been a member of this 
house. But had I possessed a vote, when the directory was going to be 
established, I would have divided for the Common Prayer; and, had I lived 
when the Common-Prayer was re-established, I would have voted for the 
Directory. The reason is obvious, They were not essentially different, 




While the passage above could seem, initially, to be a reactionary statement against 
change, Burke also makes it clear that he advocates innovation in religion, if it is 
                                                 
24
 Edmund Burke, ‘Letter to Rev. John Erskine’, (April 1779), in Correspondence of the Right Honourable 
Edmund Burke Between the Year 1744 and the period of his decease in 1797, ed. by Charles William, Earl 
Fitzwilliam and Lieutenant General Sir Richard Bourke, K.C.B., 4 vols, (London: Francis and John 
Rivington, 1844), II, pp. 268–73, (p. 269). 
25
 Young, p. 21. 
26
 Edmund Burke, Speech on Clerical Subscription, in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: Party, 
Parliament and the American Crisis, 1766– 1774, ed. by Paul Langford et al., 9 vols, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), II, pp. 359–64, (p. 364). 
8 
 
needed—as in the Reformation. He admits that (had he been serving in parliament at the 
time) he would have voted in favour of the Directory of Worship in 1645, which made 
allowances for Puritan objections to the Book of Common Prayer, because its deviation 
was not so radical. Earlier in the speech, he had explained, ‘Our ancestors were neither so 
bigoted nor so ill informed as to leave no door open for reformation [...]’.27 Burke is, of 
course, defending Protestant reformation, but, more broadly, defending the preservation 
of the capacity for change and deviation in the conceptualization of religious 
establishment. 
 If in my thesis I were concerned with discerning Burke’s official religious 
affiliation, I would place arguments closely alongside J.C.D. Clark’s defence of Burke’s 
‘lifelong Whig identity’:28 
[…] Burke’s eirenic attitude to other denominations than the Church of 
England, of which he was formally a member, was not the result of a 
concealed attachment to Rome; rather, Burke’s relaxed approach to the 
Church of England’s claim about its ecclesiastical polity, his goodwill 
towards Protestant and Catholic Dissenters, and his functional rather than 
principled view (at least before the 1790s) of the legal defences of the 
Establishment, the famous trope of “Church and State”, were all part of 
Burke’s Protestant Latitudinarianism.29 
Burke declared, ‘I am attached to Christianity at large; much from conviction; more from 
affection […] I would risque a great deal to prevent its being extinguished anywhere or in 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. p. 360. 
28
 Clark, ‘Religious Affiliation’, p. 1035. 
29
 Ibid., p. 1037. 
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any of its shapes’.30 For the purposes of stating his official public religious identity, we 
can officially know that Burke was an Anglican Christian, moreover, a Protestant 
Latitudinarian. Frederick Dryer also provides a similar defence of this identity for Burke: 
His professions of Christianity were strong, persistent, and presumably, 
sincere. It does mean, however, that there was nothing peculiarly Catholic 
or high church in his faith. It means also that there was nothing distinctive 
or eccentric about his faith in the context of eighteenth-century public life. 
He was a latitudinarian in an age when latitudinarianism was the 




Studies such as Clark’s and Dryer’s, have made strong cases defending Burke’s Anglican 
Latitudinarian identity; however, the objective of my study is to highlight the 
characteristics beyond this identity—the non-traditional, multicultural, characteristics of 
Burke’s religious thought as is appears in his literature. I would like to offer an analysis 
of Burke that is more complex than simply categorizing him as Latitudinarian because it 
is the most accurate label available, and such a classification was conventional for men of 
his stratum. It is my objective to recognize the ways in which Burke’s representation of 
religions extends beyond traditional Anglican belief. If we consider the clerical 
subscription issue, as above, we see an argument motivated by obligation to the state, not 
religious truth and genuine religious belief. Dryer observes ‘[i]n the debate on the 
Feathers Tavern Petition of 1772, Burke upheld the obligation of Church of England 
                                                 
30
 Edmund Burke, The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. by Thomas Copeland, et al., 9 vols, 
(Cambridge and Chicago: Cambridge University Press), VI, p. 215. 
31
 Dryer, ‘Burke’s Religion’, p. 212. 
10 
 
Clergymen to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles’; he goes on to write, ‘Burke 
defended clerical subscription to the articles on considerations of secular contract and 
secular employment.’32 This is evident in Burke’s Speech on the Acts of Uniformity, 
February 6, 1772: 
If you will have a religion publicly practiced and publicly taught, you 
must have a power to say what that religious will be which you will 
protect and encourage, and to distinguish it by such marks and 
characteristics as you in your wisdom shall think fit.
33
 
We can perceive Burke’s representation of religious thought, then, following a secular 
logic, as opposed to genuine Anglican belief. Hence, the exploration of characteristics 
beyond Anglican belief in Burke’s representation of religion is valid. It also is valid to 
identify Latitudinarian toleration in Burke’s representation of religions and religious 
thought; as Dryer writes: ‘He [Burke] came to look upon all Christian churches as 
possessing equal merits in orthodoxy and authority. […] He thought the right of 
toleration could be extended to Jews, Muhammadans, and pagans.’34 However, I will 
explain later in the thesis how the representation of his religious thought in his writings 
extends beyond a Latitudinarian commitment to limited religious toleration of his time, to 
a multicultural commitment to religious diversity.
35
 I agree with Dryer when he observes, 
‘[w]hatever religion was favored by the state, its establishment in Burke’s mind owed 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., pp. 203, 204. 
33
 Edmund Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity, February 6, 1772, in The Writings and Speeches of 
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nothing to the truth of its tenets or to the authority of its clergy.’36 In fact, I would 
elaborate on this observation to argue that Burke’s religious thought communicates an 
imperial duty to embrace established religious cultures, and to legitimize any religion 
firmly anchored in culture. This, I believe, evinces his ability to think multiculturally; it 
does not evince Christ-centred, reactionary conservatism. 
No study of Burke allows his religious thought (the representation of it in his 
literature, specifically) to transcend traditional contexts, in order to translate its 
importance to more recent generations—allowing ‘that Burke’s writings transcend their 
various contexts, in terms of their themes and their importance to subsequent 
generations’.37 While I intend to contextualize Burke’s representation of religion in 
eighteenth-century public life, the above summary of a philosophical approach from 
David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole’s Cambridge Companion to Burke gives 
permission for new scholars, in a way, to allow Burke’s writing to transcend contexts that 
would restrict our application of Burke’s thought to the eighteenth century. To this end, I 
believe we can illuminate further Burke’s expanded, multicultural, quasi-religious 
thought through the analysis offered in twentieth and twenty-first century theories of 
modernity. My thesis is a deconstruction of Burke’s anti-exclusionary religious language 
to suggest that its eighteenth-century context anticipates certain concepts communicated 
in more recent depictions of modernity (i.e., Zygmunt Bauman, Marshall Berman, Paul 
Heelas, Terry Eagleton, Phillip Blond, John Milbank, Jacques Derrida, and Michel 
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Foucault): for example, the cultural conflict between indigenous religious identity and 
modern globalization, and the perpetual ossification and erosion of religious concepts and 
institutions. 
The earliest critical interpretations of the life and work of Edmund Burke were 
avowedly partisan. One of the first comprehensive studies of Burke appeared in 1798, 
when Charles McCormick published his Memoirs of the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke.
38
 While McCormick claims to be delivering an impartial overview of the 
achievements of an accomplished individual, the study is revealed as a rather blistering 
attack on Burke. In addition to accusing Burke of succumbing to fits of rage, it includes 
an accusation of Burke as a political apostate because of his opposition to the French 
Revolution and departure from Charles James Fox.
39
 
From the first moment of Mr. Burke’s apostacy, whenever he took 
occasion to mention any eminent advocate for civil or religious liberty, he 
seemed to foam at the mouth, and, in the transports of his rage and malice, 




                                                 
38
 Charles McCormick, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke Or an Impartial Review of His 
Private Life, His Public Conduct, His Speeches in Parliament, and the different productions of his pen, 
whether political or literary: interspersed with a variety of curious anecdotes, and extracts from his secret 
correspondence with some of the most distinguished characters in Europe (London: Lee and Hurst, 1798 
and recently reprinted by Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2010). 
39
 Later in this thesis, I will discuss how Burke and Fox diverge over their views regarding the French 
revolution, resulting in the split of the Whig party. L.G. Mitchell, ‘Fox, Charles James, (1749–1806)’, 




 McCormick, p. 347. 
13 
 
In the same year, Robert Bisset published The Life of Edmund Burke, 
Comprehending an Impartial Account of his Literary and Political Efforts (1798).
41
 
Differing from McCormick’s study, Bisset argues that—in communicating the truth 
about a life—‘A necessary constituent of authenticity is impartiality.’42 These two early 
studies serve as important signposts that point the direction in which the interpretation of 
Edmund Burke’s work has progressed through to present day. The question of Burke’s 
consistency (or inconsistency, if interpretations evince political apostasy—like 
McCormick’s) is one with which scholars still engage, over two hundred years later. 
Scholars including Terry Eagleton, Christopher Reid, and Francis O’Gorman all address 
a perceived shift from Burke’s ‘early Whig ideal of limited government to a later stress 
on the powers of state’, with the threat of the French Revolution.43 Eagleton writes: ‘he 
[Burke] lent his support to a wide range of repressive measures, which in the name of 
freedom transformed late-eighteenth-century Britain into a police state. […] Burke ‘urged 
the military crushing of France and the full-blooded restoration of the ancien régime’.44 
Reid also observes ‘a gradual slide in Burke’s thought from consent to coercion’.45 The 
question of Burke’s consistency often is linked with the image of Burke portrayed by 
McCormick above: as an enemy to civil and religious liberty. Many recent studies of 
Burke offer similar interpretations of Burke: as the reactionary father of Conservatism, 
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opposed to change. Russell Kirk is credited not only for chronicling the modern 
Conservative movement, but characterizes Burke as a philosophical founder of 
Conservatism.
46
 Francis Canavan also contributed greatly to the demonstration of 
Burke’s conservative ideological consistency through the ‘New Conservative’ abstraction 
of Burke’s thought.47 The residual effects of these interpretations of Burke as a 
reactionary are still apparent in studies that are more recent. Terry Eagleton describes 
Burke as ‘resolutely anti-Enlightenment’, and Stephen K. White emphasizes Burke’s 
‘reactionary excesses and blindness’ in his trepidations over the French Revolution; such 
studies perpetuate the interpretation of Burke as an enemy to religious and civil liberty.
48
 
Interpretations that label Burke as the ‘founder of modern Conservatism’ set a precedent 
that links modern and Conservatism, demanding the concepts be addressed in relation to 
one another when interpreting Burke.
 49
  While the concepts of modernity and 
Conservatism do not, as such, exclude or preclude one another, these interpretations 
contribute to an ultimate portrayal of Burke as anti-modern by emphasising his hostile 
reactions to change. Therefore, I am compelled to engage with interpretations of Burke’s 
Conservatism if I am to understand his work in the context of modernity. I wish to offer 
an interpretation of Burke that counterbalances the portrayal of Burke as an anti-modern 
reactionary. I do so by relying on the work of J.G.A. Pocock, S.J. Barnett, Bruno Latour 
and others to understand the generalisation of modernity in Burke’s time.50  
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I further argue that there is a consistency in Burke’s thinking, and it is to be found 
in his attitude to religion, which is informed by the early Enlightenment thought of 
Montesquieu, among other sources. In his Remarks on the Policy of the Allies (1793), 
Burke posits:  
There are some fundamental points in which nature never changes—but 
they are few and obvious, and belong rather to morals than to politics. But 
so far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are 




I believe that any perceived modifications made regarding political matters in Burke’s 
thinking reveal a consistency in his thinking about the religious instinct and its 
vicissitudes. 
Stephen K. White is correct in suggesting that interpretations of Burke are lacking 
in a comprehensive critical understanding of Burke’s analysis of modernity. Along with 
David P. Fidler and Jennifer Welsh, White looks at Burke’s political relevance during 
and after the Cold War.
52
 Like Eagleton, White is concerned with the political context of 
Burke’s thought, as ascertained through his language of ‘aesthetic-effective terms’.53 
The language I am referring to is an aesthetic one of the sublime and 
beautiful and of human affections or sentiments associated with them. […] 
I do think we fail to understand fully how he construed political modernity 
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Rather than wondering (as White does) about Burke’s analysis of political modernity, I 
wish to wonder about Burke’s analysis of religious modernity: Burke’s confrontation 
with modernity occurs conceptually on a global scale; there is a need to understand the 
centrality of religion in this confrontation. In this thesis, I demonstrate that attention to 
Burke’s religious language helps to remedy the lack of understanding when it comes to 
comprehending the sort of modernity Burke construed. Throughout Burke’s writing, his 
religious language promotes modernity in a way that undermines his anxiety toward it. I 
believe that eighteenth-century religious traditionalists preserve established religious 
concepts and institutions by demonstrating a compatibility with diversity: through 
welcoming a certain diversity, and softening the boundaries between differing religious 
identities, established religion survives the shifting sands of revolution and early 
globalization. 
Paddy Bullard and Jane Hodson also make close studies of Burke’s language and 
rhetorical language to understand his confrontation with political modernity. Bullard’s 
study presents a theory of Burke’s rhetoric: the ethos-driven ‘rhetoric of character’.55 
Bullard argues that the combination of rhetoric and character ‘can help us describe the 
function and the beauty of Burke’s writings’, suggesting that Burke’s conceptualization 
of character ‘offers a key to understanding the integrity of his political thought, and to the 
art of his rhetoric’.56 Bullard observes that Burke believes that effective means of 
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persuasion are through ‘the display of one’s own good character, the rhetoric of ethos’.57 
In terms of Burke utilizing language appropriate to the demands of a particular 
circumstance, Richard Bourke also argues that it is through Burke’s rhetoric of character 
that one can best understand Burke’s political purpose.58 Like so many other studies that 
emphasise a reactionary Burke, Hodson’s engagement with Burke chiefly is concerned 
with Reflections. In addition, like studies that view Burke as a rhetorician, Hodson 
explores ‘the relationship between political persuasion, literary style, and linguistic 
theory [as] it relates to the political viewpoint and rhetorical aims of its author’.59 
Hodson’s study clinically is focused on the function of language in the pamphlet war 
surrounding the French Revolution by drafting (e.g., tables on punctuation, polysyllabic 
injunctions, exclamations, questions, and dashes).
60
 I do not approach Burke’s thought, or 
his language, in this way. Nor do I propose a theory of Burke’s rhetoric. My thesis is not 
focused on character or beauty, nor engaged with questions surrounding effective oral 
deliberation in rhetoric.
61
 However, my thesis is intended to complement the work of 
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Many interpretations of Burke such as the ones above (e.g., from Eagleton, White, 
Bullard) approach him as an aesthetician and a rhetorician to draw connections expertly 
from his aesthetic language to his political theory. For White and Bullard, Burke’s 
‘aesthetic-affective language’ needs careful attention; and contributes much to 
understanding Burke’s political theory.63 For Eagleton too, Burke’s ‘aesthetics takes over 
something of the traditional function of rhetoric […] aesthetics for the early Burke is the 
theory, and the politics the practice’.64 Most scholarship, if it considers Burke’s language, 
looks at ‘a relation between aesthetic enquiry and political practice’.65 In The Ideology of 
the Aesthetic (1990), Eagleton’s main objective in his engagement with Burke is to link 
aesthetics to politics to argue the novelty of bourgeois aesthetics, and aesthetics as an art 
form, as emerging from the Enlightenment.
66
 Eagleton’s engagement with Burke is 
strictly ‘as an aesthetician’, contributing to the tradition of Romanticism as stemming 
from the Enlightenment.
67
 I wish to engage with Burke as a quasi-religious thinker of the 
Enlightenment. White offers a theory that may account for the increase in attention to 
aesthetic deliberation in the eighteenth century: 
[T]here existed no religious zeal comparable to that of the Puritans and 
others in the seventieth century. […] If this is true, then the rise of 
attentiveness of an aesthetic experience that seems to partake of the thrill 
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of epic political deeds and the profundity of religious conviction becomes 
perhaps a little more comprehensible.
68
 
In other words, eighteenth-century minds were left theorizing about the experience of 
religious revolution, rather than living it. I believe White underestimates the continual 
transformation of religious institutions and identities in the eighteenth century, and the 
enthusiasm surrounding the issue. Further, I believe there is room for understanding the 
religious context of the revolutions that characterize the eighteenth century (e.g., the 
American Revolution, the French Revolution); there is a scope for understanding the 
religious dimension to Burke’s language in his engagement with these events. 
I wish to elaborate on the way in which my study differs from others that seat 
Burke (however briefly) in a religious context. Ian Hampshire-Monk suggests that 
Burke’s fideistic favouring of emotion over reason perpetuated a political tradition of 
‘skepticism about the rational demonstrability of religious truths’, which was ‘at the heart 
of English Conservatism’.69 However, like Eagleton and White, Hampshire-Monk 
highlights Burke’s Conservatism. I believe that a nuanced focus on Burke’s multicultural 
conceptualization of global religions will allow us to construe more of Burke’s 
progressiveness, which is how this thesis is intended to complement the work of 
Hampshire-Monk. I do not intend to refute any claims made by Hampshire-Monk, but 
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only to engage with his work, and others, to raise fruitful questions, such as: What does 
Burke’s representation of religion in his writings and speeches reveal about the 
conceptualization of religion in modernity? 
Eagleton, Conor Cruise O’Brien, Thomas Mahoney, and Eamonn O’Flaherty have 
all grappled with Burke’s Catholic context; all of these scholars skilfully engage with 
issues surrounding Burke’s engagement with Catholic enfranchisement, and follow the 
issue as it plays out through the nineteenth century
70
 Scholars such as Seamus Deane and 
Luke Gibbons examine Burke’s understanding of the providential obligation(s) of the 
Anglican state toward non-Anglican colonial cultures.
71
 The studies that draw parallels 
between Burke’s approach to Catholic emancipation and freedom for the Hindus, for 
example, emphasise the influence of his Catholic roots when it comes to sympathy for 
non-Christian cultures. To my mind, it is highly speculative to suggest that Burke’s 
support for the Hindu people (during the events surrounding the Hastings trial and the 
affairs of the East India Trading Company) was simply displaced emotional attachment 
from his Catholic connections.
72
 Elizabeth Lambert supports this position in her study, 
questioning the validity of a Catholic identity for Burke. Lambert refutes O’Brien’s claim 
that Dr. Hussey (Roman Catholic Bishop of Waterford and Lismore) gave Burke the 
Catholic sacrament of last rites on his deathbed, by citing a letter from Edward Nagle 
(maternal relative to Burke) to French Laurence (friend to Burke and later, literary 
executor), written on 8 July 1797, which specifically outlines the ‘necessity of Dr. 
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Hussey’s keeping away’.73 Lambert also argues that there is little evidence to suggest that 
Jane (Burke’s wife) was a practicing Catholic during her marriage to Burke or even after 
his death.
74
 To use Jonathan Israel’s assessment, the radical Enlightenment ‘severed the 
roots of traditional European culture in the sacred, magic, kingship, and hierarchy, 
secularizing all institutions and ideas […] demolished legitimation of monarchy […]’.75 
Therefore, instead of wondering (like O’Brien, O’Flaherty, Mahoney, Lambert, and 
others) about the suspected influence of Burke’s Catholic roots, I wonder about the very 
attachment of roots within the Enlightenment—an era wherein the roots of religious 
cultures were severed, demolished, or at least disrupted. 
 In this thesis, I find a way to articulate the complexities of Burke’s religious 
conceptualization by reflecting it against recent theories of modernity. Eagleton suggests 
a similar reflection of Burke’s thought against a more recent theorist: ‘With Burke, then, 
we hover on the historical threshold of everything that Michel Foucault abhorred: a 
patient charting of the very depths of subjectivity, so that men and women may be the 
more dexterously inscribed with power.’76 Eagleton’s argument precedes Bullard’s, 
which also shows that Burke valued in-depth knowledge of the disposition and character 
of colonists, as a guide to an appropriate legislative approach, as a means to exercise 
power fairly and effectively. White draws a similar connection from Burke to modern 
thinkers: ‘One hears echoes of 20th century thinkers […] Heidegger, or Horkheimer, and 
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Adorno’.77 Expanding on this theoretical frame, I would like to suggest that with Burke’s 
thinking on religion, we stand on the threshold of what Zygmunt Bauman, Marshal 
Berman, Paul Heelas, and others describe as: the fluctuating condition of institutions (e.g. 
the church) and socially agreed upon concepts (e.g. the definition of religious identities) 
in the shifting sands of modernity. 
I also believe Eagleton’s assessment of the paradoxical nature of aesthetics can be 
applied to Burke’s religious language as a way of revealing its paradoxical nature: 
Aesthetics is thus always a contradictory, self-undoing sort of project, 
which in promoting the theoretical value of its object risks emptying it of 
exactly that specificity or ineffability, which was thought to rank among 
its most precious features. The very language which elevates art offers 
perpetually to undermine it.
78
 
Eagleton links Burke to Hume by deconstructing their conceptualization of law. At its 
source lies its capacity for negation: ‘The law is at once citizen and terrorist, the source of 
all order and the potential negation of it’.79 I will demonstrate how Burke’s 
conceptualization of religion can be deconstructed in the same manner: at its source lies 
its capacity to subvert and modify traditional conceptions of religion. The capacity for 
Burke’s conceptualization of religion to negate itself lies within a reliance on themes 
antithetical to his message. This sort of relationship in Burke’s rhetoric is reflective of the 
critical thinking about religious dogma in the eighteenth century. Brian Young explains 
the relationship between dogma and anti-dogmatism as characteristic of a conservative 
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enlightenment: ‘Antidogmatism needs a dogma against which to react […]’.80 Young 
later continues: 
The divines who promoted the cause of Protestant ‘liberty’ were uneasy 
about the more Catholic conceptions of Christianity [that they saw in the 
forced subscription to the Athanasian Creed and the Thirty-Nine Articles] 
which they felt to have long compromised the principles of Protestantism 
within the Church of England […]. It was dogmatism, the authorization of 
tradition and history as guarantees of religious truth, which these men 
resented […]. Antidogmatism is at least congruent with, and is in many 
respects a development of, that older tradition within the Restored church 
which has become known as ‘latitudinarianism’, and it was such men who 
promoted many of the principles of a conservative Enlightenment in which 




Burke’s vote to preserve clerical subscription does not oppose dogma; so, a 
Latitudinarian open-mindedness would perhaps not be an appropriate categorization of 
Burke’s stance on that issue. However, elsewhere in Burke’s writing, we will see his 
arguments for the preservation of established religious tradition engaging with, and even 
promoting, a dilution of religious dogma through open-mindedness to differing sects. 
This kind of convoluted rhetorical circumstance is characteristic of the Anglican Church 
of the eighteenth century; Young further explains: 
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The Church of England of the 1700s was a divided body, and its divisions 
had their political analogues in an age of increasing partisanship. […] The 
Whig clergy were themselves often divided over doctrine and discipline: 
controversy was endemic to Anglicanism in this period.
82
 
Therefore, as in this thesis I proceed to evince the paradoxical relationships in Burke’s 
rhetoric, between dogma and anti-dogma, between Established Religion and 
Freethinking, etc., we can know it as characteristic of the division and controversy in the 
eighteenth-century Church of England, and (what we can begin to understand as) 
Enlightenment modernity. Yet, like Eagleton (who compares Burke to Foucault) and 
White (who compares Burke to Heidegger), we can also recognize the signature of 
Burke’s thought in more recent theories of modernity. 
The Characteristics and Parameters of Eighteenth-century Modernity—A 
Framework for more recent Depictions of Modernity 
The prominence of religious language in Burke’s writing, as well as the 
prominence of religion as a subject matter in Burke’s writing, reveals a major oversight 
in our understanding of Burke. The neglect of Burke’s religious thought is curious, 
because his early publications as well as his engagement with events throughout his 
political career can be construed as being deeply based in religious context(s). David P. 
Fidler and Jennifer Welsh observe: ‘Burke’s struggle to reform British imperial policy in 
Ireland, America, and India was largely about getting the British government to respect 
diversity, whether in the form of the American national character, Irish Catholicism, or 
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traditional Indian culture.’83 The struggles that comprise the list of issues that sustained 
much of Burke’s attention throughout his political career are, indeed, struggles 
concerning cultural diversity. However, there is opportunity for understanding Burke’s 
approach to these struggles, alongside his early writings, in terms of respecting religious 
establishment and tradition. This is the objective of this thesis. 
Delineating parameters within which to define modernity as a concept or a 
condition bears discussion. Stephen K. White begins the timeline of political modernity 
for Burke in 1780, ushered in by the Gordon Riots; he views this event in particular as 
changing Burke’s opinion about the capacity for a populace to control their will.84 There 
may be some scholarly blindness in confining the emergence of political modernity to the 
1780s. Earlier events would have demonstrated to Burke the potential tyranny of an 
empowered, self-interested sect: when Burke was residing in Dublin as a secretary to the 
MP William Gerard Hamilton, he was horrified at the judicial murders committed in 
Munster, responding to the outbreak of peasant disturbances in 1761; some of Burke’s 
maternal relatives were also implicated in the disturbances.
85
 Events such as this as well 
as his familiarity with the oppressive Penal Laws in Ireland would have helped to 
cultivate anxiety about unbridled will in methods of governance. If we think in a religious 
context, there is evidence of this anxiety in Burke’s writing from the 1750s and 1760s, 
inasmuch as it displays a concern about the disintegration of established modes of 
governance (i.e. the church). Certainly, for Burke, the framework of modernity must 
reach back further than 1780.  
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J.G.A. Pocock provides an appropriate framework for appreciating what 
eighteenth-century minds understood to be modern. This will help us to contextualize 
Burke in the terms of his own time, and to recognize how the eighteenth-century 
interpretation relates to more recent interpretations of modernity. Describing ‘moderns’ 
breaking away from an ‘ancient and medieval past’, Pocock explains how eighteenth-
century minds, while they did not discount history between Romans and moderns, 
organised their history in this way: 
There was a highly usable ancient and medieval past in this culture 
debated between opposed civil and ecclesiastical persuasions. So indeed 
there was in France, debated between exponents of the théses royale and 
nobiliaire; but it is hard to find any cohering group of English philosophes 
aiming to write off everything between the Romans and the moderns as a 
millennium of unrelieved darkness. When the argument is put forward that 
English liberties are modern and not ancient, it is a move in the party 
polemic—typically a defence of the Walpolean regime—and resist on a 
thesis emerging from the interregnum of the previous century, of central 
importance in the development of a British philosophical history.
86
 
Pocock goes on to describe a ‘Bacon-Harrington-Fletcher thesis’; referring to the theories 
of Francis Bacon, James Harrington, and Andrew Fletcher, Pocock explains the 
replacement of feudal systems by commercial relations across Europe: 
The Bacon-Harrington-Fletcher thesis was potent among the paradigms 
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which the English had for organising their history, and it is important that 
nothing quite like it could be established among the actors in the Scottish 
or French history, because it became one of the building-blocks in the 
British construction of a “philosophic history” in the eighteenth century. It 
identified a “modern” history that had begun about 1500 and been 
renewed about 1700, and did so by means of a generalisation that operated 
in legal, military and social history at the same time, offering a prehistory 
and antithesis to the portrait of commercial, polite and enlightened 




Essentially, for Enlightenment minds, organising history ‘entailed a search for the origins 
of a post-feudal and post-ecclesiastical modernity’.88 In terms of organising a history of 
the established church, Pocock asserts, ‘Modern ecclesiastical history begins with the 
Reformation’.89 I believe Pocock’s version of modernity, as interpreted by eighteenth-
century minds, is the chief version of modernity with which Burke engages, and the 
version of modernity to which all other theories of modernity referred to in this thesis 
correspond: a post-feudal, post-Reformation construction begun in the sixteenth century, 
and renewed in the eighteenth century. Richard Bourke offers analysis that echoes 
Pocock’s construction above, and explains how it is specifically relevant to Burke: 
[…] enlightenment for Burke encompassed the progress of society through 
the expansion of commerce under the protection of law, the improvement 
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of morals under the government of Providence, and the liberalization of 
religion under the influence of science.
90
 
If the eighteenth-century understanding of a commercial enlightened modernity is the 
antithesis of its feudal prehistory, then it is relevant to Burke. For example, apropos to 
Bourke’s observation above, we will later see in Chapter 4 of this thesis how Burke 
diminishes cultural divisions between religious sects, whilst welcoming the influence of 
scientific enquiry; in Chapter 2, we will see how Burke advocates moral commercial 
globalization. Of course, Burke was not alone in understanding the momentum and 
progress of commerce and expansion (the breaking down of the old) between the ancient 
and the modern. Contemporaries such as David Hume referred to the momentum between 
ancient and modern; of economics, Hume’s Essays Moral, Political and Literary (1741–
42) is an observation of the ancient prudence of emperors (e.g., Augustus, Tiberius, 
Vespasian, Severus) and their ‘foresight, of saving great sums against any pubic 
exigency’ versus the modern economical convenience: ‘On the contrary, our modern 
expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to 
trust that posterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their ancestors […]’.91 Of 
manners, Hume writes in the same work ‘that ancient manners were more unfavourable 
than the modern […]’.92 J.G.A. Pocock observes David Hume’s acknowledgment of 
modernity as a concept or condition in this same dissertation; he refers to Hume situating 
the reader: 
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[…I]n the political nation formed by the Union of 1707 and currently 
governed by the powerful, tough by 1741 disintegrating, regime of Sir 
Robert Walpole. It is to the moral, political and literary problems of life 
under that regime, and after it, that the reader’s attention is drawn. They 
are the problems of a polite society, a polite society is conceived as 
modern (and indeed recent), and modernity is a historical problem which a 
history must be written to explain.
93
 
However, let us consider those theorists who engage with the historical problems (to use 
Pocock’s phrasing above) inherent in thinking of modernity as a condition or concept 
arising from the eighteenth century. Bruno Latour, for example, suggests that the rise of 
the scientific method in the eighteenth century engendered a habit of dividing intellectual 
landscapes into a construction of different disciplines, which has created only the illusion 
of modernity. (Latour observes the scientific efforts of Robert Boyle, which I also do in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis). Latour explains: ‘Modernity comes in as many versions as there 
are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the 
passage of time.’94 Latour also suggests that modernity ‘is much more than an illusion 
and much less than an essence. It is a force added to others that for a long time it had the 
power to represent, to accelerate, or to summarize—a power that it no longer entirely 
holds’.95 Therefore, there is difficulty in utilizing modernity as a category or label to 
wholly summarize or represent a mode of thought. However, when allowing Burke’s 
writing to transcend the boundaries of the eighteenth century, I believe we can combat 
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the dangers of being anachronistic by understanding modernity through terms in which 
Burke and other Enlightenment minds might have understood it—for example, evincing 
an eighteenth-century understanding of momentum between ancient and modern in 
Burke’s contemporary Hume (as above). I offer further understanding of the eighteenth-
century terms in which Burke might have understood modernity when I analyse Burke 
alongside Montesquieu and James Foster in Chapter 1, alongside Richard Price in 
Chapter 3, Joseph Priestley in Chapter 4, and many others throughout. Utilizing twentieth 
and twenty-first century theories of modernity to illuminate further Burke’s religious 
thought, means, to use S.J. Barnett’s conception of it, ‘living’ with anachronism: 
So, in the practice of historiography, rather than throw our hands up in 
horror at a long-recognized dilemma, we have little choice but to live with 
the problem of anachronism and try to remain aware of its dangers.
96
 
Barnett lists the problems inherent in interpreting enlightenment texts, which I believe 
justifies the use of theories beyond the context of the eighteenth century to assist the 
analysis of such texts: 
Another problem with interpreting historical texts is posed by the tactics 
sometimes used by eighteenth-century writers to disguise authorial 
identity, primary intentions or influences in order to avoid the undue 
attention of the censor. […] Thus, Enlightenment writers, wittingly or 
unwittingly, could consider a Christian text critical of certain proofs of 
Christianity—such as Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique—as 
therefore antichristian, written from a radical Christian perspective only in 
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order to avoid censure.
97
 
Edmund Burke’s habit of disguising authorial identity (which he did for his Vindication, 
for example) resonates with these eighteenth-century devices. The incorporation of 
theories beyond the eighteenth century helps to stabilize the issues (which Barnett 
indicated) inherent in analysing historical texts exhibiting Christian (and, unwittingly 
anti-Christian) characteristics. Moreover, the incorporation of more recent theories about 
modernity is not such a radical stretch. Most theorists of modernity in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries (including the theorists I follow in this thesis) measure the 
parameters of modernity in a way that is similar to the perception of modern by 
eighteenth-century minds—as demonstrated by Hume, and described by Pocock above: a 
construction of a history that separates pre-modern, ancient, feudal systems from the 
Reformation, and a modern commercial exigency. For example, Jonathan Israel follows 
these parameters; he measures the global ‘making of modernity’ as beginning during ‘the 
onset of Enlightenment, and the period 1680–1750 the more dramatic and decisive period 
of rethinking when the mental world of the west was revolutionized along rationalistic 
and secular lines’, which then resulted in ‘an upheaval which heralded the onset of the 
Enlightenment proper in the closing years of the [eighteenth] century’:98 
For if the Enlightenment marks the most dramatic step towards 
secularization and rationalization in Europe’s history, it does so no less in 
the wider history not just of western civilization but, arguably, of the 
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entire world. From this, it plainly follows, it was one of the most important 
shifts in the history of man.
99
 
Barnett also follows the ‘post-feudal and post-ecclesiastical’ parameters of the 
Enlightenment (again, using Pocock’s phrasing from above); further defining it as a 
‘modernizing’ period, measured partly by the secularization of government, religious 
attitudes, and (arguably) personal beliefs: 
As a “modernizing” period, the Enlightenment is said to have had some 
role in the general process of secularization, and the notion of the secular 
has almost come to embody the notion of modernity. […] One element is 
the secularization of government and social norms; another is the 
secularization of religious attitudes, for example the existence or 
widespread acceptance of the desirability of religious toleration. Another 
mode concerns that level of piety, belief itself. […] but there is no 
significant evidence of declining belief.
100
 
Jonathan Israel and Talal Asad respectively recognize the secularization of religion and 
government as marking modernization in the Enlightenment. Asad not only views 
secularization as central to modernity, but, like Israel, construes secularism as extending 
beyond western civilization, to a global scale, ‘applicable to non-Christian societies 
everywhere that have become modern’.101 Norman Sykes also approaches the religious 
modernization of the eighteenth century, but differs from Asad and Israel when he 
proposes modernity’s laicization of religion, rather its secularization: 
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The eighteenth century witnessed a steady and progressive laicisation of 
religion, which is the keynote of its ecclesiastical development. Hostile 
critics have preferred to describe the process as the secularisation of the 
Church; but it may be contended that the laicisation of religion is a more 
accurate phrase; for albeit the clerical order generally was characterised by 
a markedly unprofessional temper, the laity not only deemed themselves a 
proper and necessary part of the organisation of the Christian Church, but 
acted upon that persuasion with vigour and conviction.
102
 
Sykes suggests a scenario in which modernization in the eighteenth century entailed the 
laity assuming primary power over ecclesiastical order. Essentially, Israel, Barnett, Asad, 
and Sykes all refer to an outcome resulting in modification of religion’s representation in 
public life. I agree with Richard Bourke, who warns that when analysing modernity of the 
Enlightenment, we must be careful of ‘a secular teleology anxious to reduce 
enlightenment to the criticism of religion’.103 Knud Haakonssen also describes a 
proclivity for orienting an interpretation of modernity in the Enlightenment around an 
argument that ‘the Enlightenment was anti-Christian, anti-Church and at the point of 
sliding into irreligion and proto-atheism.’104 My thesis is an acknowledgement of 
Edmund Burke’s engagement with characteristics that are antithetical to the established 
Christian tradition (irreligion and proto-atheism); I will show how his representation of 
religion and the church symbiotically depend on characterizations of irreligion, anti-
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Church, and proto-atheism. However, I do not presumptuously posit (as Barnett warns 
above) a decline in his personal beliefs. The modernization of religious representation in 
the Enlightenment is not wholly secularization, or laicisation, or anti-Christian, or anti-
Church; Knud Haakonssen explains that the Enlightenment religious culture was chiefly 
concerned with staving off zealotry: 
[…T]the Enlightenment was first and foremost a movement to preserve 
civilised society against any resurgence of religious enthusiasm and 
superstition, that is to say of evangelical Protestantism and Counter 
Reformation Catholicism. Europe had only just escaped the barbarism of 
religious wars, especially civil wars, and the task of enlightened minds 




Haakonssen describes the religious culture of Burke’s time. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will 
show how Burke’s representation of indigenous (religious) cultures evinces a staving off 
of zealotry, which relates to the preservation of modern society that Haakonssen 
describes as characteristic of the Enlightenment. 
Zygmunt Bauman also defines modernity within the same post-feudalism 
parameters as the theorists mentioned above (e.g., Pocock, Israel, Barnett, and Sykes), 
and like Hume before them (as discussed above): he describes early modernity as an era 
in which solids ‘were already rusty, mushy, coming apart at the seams’.106 This erosion is 
not the ‘liquidity’ Bauman uses to describe post-modern contemporary life  ‘the form of 
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life currently practiced’.107 However, we can think of his description of early modernity 
as appropriate for understanding the relationship between humans and God (as well as 
humans and their God-centred institutions) as it evolved from ancient, feudal, pre-
Reformation to modern, commercial Enlightenment understanding. Essentially, the 
modern understanding of the cosmic relationship between humans and God is one 
wherein humans are put ‘in charge’.108 Bauman explains that this modern relationship 
stems from a modern understanding of evil, which differentiates between natural disaster 
and man-made evil; he cites Susan Naiman and Jean-Pierre Dupuy among scholars who 
indicate the 1755 the earthquake, fire, and high tide that destroyed Lisbon as responsible 
for humans being able to make this differentiation by the eighteenth century.
109
 Bauman 
further explains this modern relationship between humans and God: 
The evident profligacy of evil in the world could not be reconciled with 
the combination of benevolence and omnipotence imputed to the world’s 
maker and supreme manager. The contradiction could not be resolved; it 
could be only taken off the agenda by what Max Weber described as 
Ernüchterung (“disenchantment”) of Nature—which means derobing 
Nature of its divine disguise—and chose as the true birth-act of the 
“modern spirit”: that is, of the hubris grounded in the new “we can do it, 
we will do it” attitude of self-assurance and confidence. 110 
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According to Bauman, the breaking down of ancient relationships marks the birth of a 
modern spirit—in the case above, the breaking down of God’s ultimate power and 
humankind’s assertion of hubris. Bauman’s description of the modern assertion of hubris 
is relevant to the way in which Burke represents religious themes; we will see in Chapter 
4 how Burke worries about the political implications of humans attempting to acquire 
powers traditionally attributed to God. Ernst Cassirer writes: ‘If the Enlightenment begins 
by breaking down the older form of philosophical knowledge, the metaphysical systems, 
then Burke is located squarely within it’.111 I agree with Cassirer, and wish to 
complement his observation through the analysis presented in my thesis. For example, in 
this introduction, I will indicate Burke’s worry over the ancient doctrine of the Trinity; in 
Chapter 1, I examine Burke’s concern regarding the tradition of revealed religion at large. 
Bauman and Cassirer are not alone in interpreting the growth out of a post-sixteenth-
century, post-Reformation society as a breaking down of old traditions; for example, 
Marshall Berman asserts that the constructions of ‘seventeenth-century natural law 
collapse in the eighteenth century’.112 Berman describes the gradual spreading of 
empiricist modes of thought during the eighteenth century.
113
 He attributes this to figures 
of eighteenth-century Paris, such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, and explains how the 
modern problem of individualistic authenticity ‘emerged and developed out of problems 
central to Enlightenment’.114 Such an analysis of modernity relates to Burke: in Chapter 
1, I will show how Burke follows Montesquieu’s thinking on religion. Much scholarship 
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(such as the theories above) confidently places the emergence of modern problems and 
modern relationships (as they change between humans, God, and religious institutions) in 
the context of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the above analysis typically follows the 
generalisation Pocock describes, of what was modern to eighteenth-century minds.  
I believe we can further anchor Berman’s reference to a veritable collapse 
between the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century by providing some historical 
context. In the seventeenth century, the restoration of the English, Irish, and Scottish 
monarchies, facilitated in the Convention Parliament and the Cavalier Parliament 
(meeting from April to December 1660) brought about legislation that conceptually 
forced unity: the Clarendon Code and the Corporation Act (1661) and the Act of 
Uniformity (1662) preceded the 1688 revolution.
115
 Such enterprises ossified concepts, 
such as the Episcopal Polity of the Established Church. Legislative measures allowed for 
some degree of dissent: the Act of Toleration in 1689 allowed nonconformists to worship 
as long as dissenters were registered in the knowledge of the Anglican Church; however, 
heterodoxy was not officially tolerated—there was still a Blasphemy Act to come in 
1697, which made the public proclamation of any non-Trinitarian doctrine illegal.
116
 The 
public expression of any thought incongruous to Trinitarian Christian Doctrine, and the 
Thirty Nine Articles was officially forbidden until the Doctrine of the Trinity Act in 
1813; before this, conventicles (religious assemblies outside the Church of England) were 
restricted to five or less, and subject to fines (because of the Conventicles Acts 1664, 
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 In the eighteenth century, we see the state extending a measure of tolerance to 
Christian heterodoxy; the Feather’s Tavern Petition of 1772 was concerned with 
increased relief from subscription to Trinitarian doctrine and the Thirty-Nine Articles. As 
J.G.A. Pocock describes: 
[…F]or more than a century, the issue of the Trinity had been recognised 
as fundamental to the definition of the church’s authority and had given 
rise to debates in both politics and theology. Not without support from the 
less Trinitarian within the Church of England, some of those in Dissent 
from it had agitated not for relief but for actual repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts that excluded them from public office.
118
 
Edmund Burke defends the clerical obligations to the Church. In his 1772 Speech on the 
Acts of Uniformity, Burke argues: 
If you will have a religion publicly practices and publicly taught […] you 
must have a power to say what that religious will be which you will 
protect and encourage, and to distinguish it by such marks and 
characteristics as you in your wisdom shall think fit.
119
 
Frederick Dryer aptly summarizes Burke’s position on subscription: ‘On this 
understanding, burke defended clerical subscription to the articles on considerations of 
secular contract and secular employment.’120 We can understand Burke’s representation 
of religion, regarding this issue, as demoting genuine religious belief below the practical 
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necessity of the state and church. In his Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant 
Dissenters, Burke explains: ‘The cause of the Church of England […] is included in that 
of religion, not that of religion in the Church of England’.121 This is the way in which, as 
Dryer describes, Burke ‘looked upon all churches as merely human associations, 
administering a purely human jurisdiction’.122 However, by 1779, the Toleration Act had 
been amended to demote subscription to scripture and only penalties regarding property 
remained.
123
 We can construe this measured tolerance as a means of preserving the old 
religious concepts and institutions against the threat of their breaking down in the 
eighteenth century (as a result of the perceived threat of Deism, and the atheism of the 
French Revolution, for example). The measured welcoming of religious diversity in the 
effort to preserve religious establishment is unique to the sweeping repeals of penalties in 
the nineteenth century: in 1813 and 1829, limited relief for Unitarians and Catholics was 
passed. It is an opinion held among some scholars that the upheavals of the mid-
seventeenth century are responsible for the rise in freethinking, Theism, Deism, Atheism, 
Socinianism, and other forms of Christian heterodoxy, seen in the eighteenth century.
124
 
In the eighteenth century, many responded to the rising threat to established faith: in 
1705, Charles Gildon’s The Deist’s Manual (1705) carried a warning about the rise in 
criticism against the church as atheism in practice by those ‘[…] whose system is 
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Atheism in speculation [...]’.125 In 1711, the Archbishop, Bishops, and clergy of 
Canterbury draft A Representation of the Present State of Religion Among Us, with 
Regard to the Late Excessive Growth of Infidelity and Heresy and Prophaneness, which 
conveys the same anxiety that the concepts ossified by the events of the seventeenth 
century were under threat by the events of the eighteenth century. The French and 
American revolutions, the numerous restructurings of the Penal Laws in Ireland (e.g., the 
property acts of 1703 and 1709 preventing growth of land ownership, the 
Disenfranchising Act of 1728), and the conduct of the British East India Trading 
Company exploded conceptual boundaries of nationhood and religious cultural identity. 
These events conceptually undermined Britain’s capacity for imperial influence on a 
global scale. Edmund Burke’s responses to these threats are valuable, because of their 
global range—in writings and speeches, he responds to all of the events above, and more. 
His works, as they range across the globe and his lifetime, provide rich resources in terms 
of what they can reveal about religious culture in eighteenth-century modernity. 
As far as my approach to the range of Burke’s work, I attempt to engage with a 
variety of his major, minor, and unfinished publications, as well as a selection of his 
letters and speeches. Bullard wrestles with the questions inherent in analysing Burke’s 
work: whether the entirety of his parliamentary oratory should be taken into account; 
more than that, whether it should be taken into account alongside the printed 
publications; should we wonder about the effectiveness of his persuasion as seen in the 
reception of his writings, ‘or should we concentrate on internal evidence of his rhetorical 
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strategies drawn from the texts themselves’?126 The problems that surround Edmund 
Burke, his thought and his writings, are the very reasons scholars are compelled to keep 
returning to his work. He did not author a comprehensive treatise, elucidating a range of 
official theories; most of his published works were in the form of response to 
contemporary events and circumstances. The record of his parliamentary speeches is not 
without its flaws, only a fraction of them were transcribed, documented, and published 
with Burke’s consent; the majority received basic mention by other publications.127 To 
retain uniformity with regard to my textual sources, and focus the integrity of my 
arguments, I chiefly rely on the standard critical editions of Burke’s works available in 
the volumes of Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke edited by Paul Langford, et al., 
as well as the earlier Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke Between 
the Year 1744 and the period of his decease in 1797, edited by Charles William, Earl 
Fitzwilliam and Lieutenant General Sir Richard Bourke, K.C.B., and the original texts 
made available by Eighteenth Century Collections Online. My proclivity in this study 
leans in the direction of the last vexation Bullard lists: I will draw my evidence internally 
from the body of Burke’s texts themselves. My methodological approach originates in 
literary studies, through an interest in a philological close reading of Burke’s texts, not 
entirely removed from the deconstructionist theory of Jacque Derrida: ‘There is nothing 
outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors texte]’.128 My approach is 
deconstructionist in the following way: ‘Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing 
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all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure […]’.129 
That is to say, I utilize the structure of Burke’s defence of the traditional and the old to 
explore the duality of meaning in his texts, and the way his language subverts and 
contradicts itself. 
This thesis does not include an argument that Burke was exclusively a religious 
philosopher. Indeed, there is a danger in confining Burke’s thought to any exclusive 
category—as R.J. Vincent observes, ‘Burke did not count himself a theorist’.130 In fact, I 
believe that any definitive categorizations about Burke’s thinking run the risk of 
constraining his thought to conventions of religious theory; if I were to argue Burke 
definitively as a pluralist, universalist, latent-Catholic, latent-Deist, etc., my approach 
would be unfruitful. Any focused approach to Burke runs the risk of neglecting some 
aspect of Burke’s thinking; as William Hazlitt indicated in early approaches to Burke: ‘to 
do him justice, it would be necessary to quote all his works; the only specimen of Burke 
is, all that he wrote’.131 Because citing all that Burke has written is certainly beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the closest I can come to considering every word of Burke’s works is 
to attempt to offer a perspective about his work as it is regarded collectively. As no other 
comprehensive study has been an examination of the range of Burke’s work, exclusively, 
through the lens of his religious thinking, perhaps this thesis offers what is only the 
beginning of our understanding of Burke’s confrontation with religion in modernity. 
The procedure of my thesis 
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Proceeding chronologically through Burke’s oeuvre, Chapter 1, ‘Melting 
Religious Solidity: The Early Writings’, examines Burke’s writings from the 1750s: his 
Philosophical Enquiry Into Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757 and 1759) and 
his A Vindication of Natural Society (1756–57). In his early works, Burke’s treatment of 
religion prioritises general sacredness over specific doctrinal claims. This, I argue, carves 
a pathway for Burke’s subsequent treatment of religion throughout his writings. 
In the first section of this chapter, my primary focus will be Burke’s Vindication. 
Examining Burke’s Vindication against a historical framework of the evolution of 
religious concepts and institutions in the eighteenth century will enable me to understand 
the paradoxical implications of Burke’s use of irony. I argue that the account of religion 
that Burke offers in this early text replaces religion proper with religious instinct. I argue 
that this stance, not wholly unique to Burke, stems from early Enlightenment thought 
(specifically, Montesquieu), and the eighteenth-century anti-Deist polemic. However, I 
also argue that the language Burke employs in a veritable crusade to preserve established 
Christianity is pregnant with attributes contrary to the enterprise. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will argue that Burke’s emphasis on ‘awe’ 
in his Enquiry resonates with ideologies potentially antithetical to an Anglican 
message—for example, Deistic themes, non-God-centred themes, and even themes not 
associated with holiness (i.e. the profane). I argue that his expanded representation of awe 
(inclusive of religious and non-religious awe) presents a potential paradox underlying his 
texts that champion the Christian foundation. By suggesting that Burke’s argument for 
the preservation of solid institutions (e.g. established Christianity) is undermined by his 
rhetorical engagement with ideologies contrary to them, I demonstrate how Burke’s 
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language in these texts resonates with the modern condition described by Marshall 
Berman: ‘a world where everything is pregnant with its contrary’.132 In doing so, I intend 
to understand the way in which religious ideas are represented in Burke’s early texts in 
the context of eighteenth-century modernity, an era wherein—as Zygmunt Bauman 
suggests—solids ‘[…] were already rusty, mushy, coming apart at the seams […]’.133 I 
demonstrate how Burke’s representation of religious ideas prefigures conditions in 
modernity described by Terry Eagleton, Paul Heelas, Phillip Blond, and John Milbank. In 
doing so, I begin to reveal Burke as one of the originators of modern religious 
understanding. I argue that these two early publications in Burke’s oeuvre demonstrate 
the beginning of a slow (albeit sometimes unwitting) melting of religious solidity; they 
mark the beginning of Burke’s re-imagining of religion in the context of modernity. 
Chapter 2, ‘Religious culture struggle in the shifting sands of modernity: the 
writings on India and Ireland’, examines Burke’s writings from the 1770s and 1780s. 
With the objective of examining Burke’s anti-exclusionary approach to indigenous 
religious governance, Chapter 2 of my thesis first will be an examination of Burke’s 
Indian writings: his writings on India: Madras and Bengal (1774–85) and the Launching 
of the Hastings Impeachment (1786–88). I intend to show how, in these texts, Burke 
moves beyond a Latitudinarian commitment to limited religious toleration, as represented 
by the measurements of toleration contemporary to him. Toleration denotes a measure of 
forbearance and sufferance over something disapproved. I believe Burke’s thinking on 
religion transcends toleration. I believe Burke displays  something closer to 
multiculturalism—an embracing of difference. 
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Second, I show how Burke’s multicultural approach to indigenous religious 
governance in India resonates with his treatment of Catholic emancipation in his Irish 
writings: his Tracts relating to Popery Laws (1765), the Letter to Lord Kenmare (1782), 
his Letter To Sir Hercules Langrishe: The Roman Catholics Of Ireland (1792), and the 
Second letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question, (1795). I argue that the 
writings concerning Ireland and India display a very modern struggle to promote local 
cultural religious identities while shaping international polity. 
Finally, I will show that Burke’s religious language in these texts reveals some 
difficulties that resonate with the modern condition, in which concepts of cultural 
rootedness are destabilized. Scholars of modernity like Zygmunt Bauman and Jonathan 
Israel use the term Kulturkampf (literally, ‘culture struggle’) to discuss this kind of 
cultural complication particular to the modern condition.
134
 Bauman writes of a 
Kulturkampf of the Nation-state, a ‘state-supervised Kulturkampf'; Israel writes of a ‘vast 
Kulturkampf between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God, and the 
universe’.135 The writings in which Burke approaches imperial practice over indigenous 
religious governance both address and display a kulturkampf that resonates with both 
usages. I argue that in Burke the modern paradox is manifested: he struggles with 
reassembling that which is constantly disassembled. 
Departing from critical interpretations that insist on emphasizing Burke’s Catholic 
connections, his reactionary characteristics, or over-estimate his liberalism, I suggest that 
Burke’s emphasis on the primacy of the religious instinct over any particular religious 
dogma undermines such categorization. 
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  Chapter 3, ‘‘Profaning of the Sacred: Burke’s confrontation with the French 
Revolution, Reflections’, is an examination of Burke’s position on the rebellion in 
France. In keeping with following his chronological evolution, Chapter 3 of my thesis 
focuses on Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790); it secondarily leans 
on his Letter to a Member of the National Assembly (1791) and Thoughts on French 
Affairs (1791). There is a wealth of scholarship focusing on Burke’s political account(s) 
surrounding the French Revolution (as we will see from Richard Bourke, James Conniff, 
F.P. Lock, J.C.D. Clark, etc.).
136
 However, I believe that scholarly interpretations of 
Burke’s response to the French Revolution would benefit from more attention to his 
religious thought, and its silhouette against evolving modernity. My critical interpretation 
in this third chapter fills a need to understand more about his religious thinking in the 
above texts—beyond Burke’s own religious convictions. Mainly, my interpretation of the 
above texts engages with the idea that, when Burke comes to consider religious 
sacredness with regard to the events in France, he seems to acknowledge that the sacred 
harbours its opposite—the demonic, the sacrilegious. My focus on the demonic 
characteristic of Burke’s representation of religious themes confines my reading (chiefly) 
to the first part of Reflections. While my objective is to unearth the sacrilegious 
characteristics of this text, I do not wish to implicate the Reflections as an atheistic text. 
S.J. Barnett explains that the idea of an atheist underground movement in the 
Enlightenment holds little merit; therefore: 
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[…] a texts’ notoriety for atheism or atheistic tendencies should not be 
understood as a necessary indicator of its potential or actual influence, but 
rather or equally as an indicator of its highly unusual and unrepresentative 
nature, and as a product of fashionable scandal mongering.
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Barnett also explains that the reports of pervasive atheism were exaggerated; they were 
basically ‘scare mongering tactics of apologists, the enjoyment of scandal and the 
titillation of the forbidden […]’.138 I would like to suggest that Burke’s Reflections 
operates in this tradition: Burke is titillated by the evil characterization of his antagonists, 
and ventriloquizes the very evil he admonishes. I would like to elaborate on this 
observation made by Samuel Kenrick to Revd James Wodrow in a letter, dated 20–21 
April 1791: ‘I look upon Burke […] as co-operating with all his able antagonists in 
bringing forwards the great work of improvement.’139 Kenrick’s observation in the 
eighteenth century was thanks for advertising the cause of the rational dissenters (e.g. the 
Reverend Price), but also resonates with Burke’s rhetorical function of acting as 
ventriloquist for his antagonists. 
First, I will expand on the observation made by the editors of the Langford edition 
to the text, that Burke constructs a ‘diabolid’ of his enemies.140 I will first examine 
Reflections to highlight the way in which Burke exalts a theme of the demonic, and 
renders all Christian heterodoxy homogenous. The demonic has an overbearing presence 
in Burke’s Reflections alongside themes of holiness and sacredness. For this reason 
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(along with others), the second task of this chapter will be to argue against J.C.D. Clark’s 
interpretation of the Reflections, which suggests Burke’s Reflections does not evince 
outrage toward sacrilege, arguing Burkes ‘outrage at the seizure of the goods of the 
French church was outrage at theft, not sacrilege’.141 I counter Clark on this point: I 
believe the outrage Burke expresses over the encroachment upon religious sacredness is 
central to Burke’s commentary in the Reflections, his Letter to a Member, and his 
Thoughts on French Affairs.
142
 However, I believe his defence of religious sacredness 
reveals a provocative dimension in his conceptualization of religion—wherein the 
permanency of ‘holiness’ shares equal importance with the permanency of the 
‘profane’.143 The third task of this chapter is to demonstrate the themes of darkness and 
evil underlying Burke’s defence against sacrilege in the Reflections, along with his Letter 
to a Member and his Thoughts on French Affairs. I then argue against interpretations of 
Burke’s Reflections as reactionary (from J.W. Burrow, Russell Kirk, Terry Eagleton, 
Stephen K. White, Bruce Frohnen, and others) by highlighting his value of change (as 
evidenced through the lens of his religious thought)—change being antithetical to 
reactionary-Conservatism. 
144
 I argue against these interpretations by demonstrating the 
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progressiveness of Burke’s religious thinking in the Reflections: for example, he reveals 
the version of religious tolerance upheld by the Revolutionary Society and the National 
Assembly to be exclusive and, therefore, tyrannous. 
Finally, I demonstrate how this irreligious dimension in Burke’s representation of 
religion resonates with twentieth-century theories of modernity. Burke’s engagement 
with dark, demonic themes in the defence of the sacred reveals a paradox akin to the 
modern ‘profaning of the sacred’, coined by Karl Marx and applied to modernism by 
Zygmunt Bauman.
145
 I argue that Burke’s religious conception resonates with 
deconstructionist conceptualizations of religion as trans-religious, or religion without 
religion (as we shall see from Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault).
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Chapter 4, ‘Burke and science: Letter to a Noble Lord and Letters on a Regicide 
Peace’, is an examination of the very late writings in Burke’s life, wherein I consider 
Burke’s confrontation with scientific development in Enlightenment modernity and what 
that reveals about his religious thinking. The Burke I wish to explore in this final chapter 
is facing the frenzied pace of evolving modernity. Specifically in his Letter to a Noble 
Lord (1796) and his Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796, 1797), Burke addresses the rapid 
erosion of ossified concepts and establishments by referring to differing branches of 
science as a metaphor.
147
 Simon Schaffer offers valuable insight on Burke’s confrontation 
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with science in his Letter to a Noble Lord, and what it reveals about the role of ‘genius’ 
in the Enlightenment.
148
 I believe I can complement Schaffer’s work offering additional 
context to Burke’s references to science in his Letter to a Noble Lord as well as in his 
Letters on a Regicide Peace; further, my contribution will offer an interpretation of what 
these references reveal about Burke’s thinking on religion. 
First, I grapple with the problems inherent in placing Burke in a scientific context. 
Second, I focus on Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord; I delve into the context of Burke’s 
application of various scientific metaphors. I observe how Burke’s references align him 
with classical scientific pathology against the new sect of experimenters who perpetuate 
thinking that is destructive to religious establishment. Then, I argue that the way in which 
Burke criticizes an emerging culture of scientific experimenters (in the same text, as well 
as his Letters on a Regicide Peace) reveals a conception of religion that resonates with 
twenty-first century theorists of modernity. In particular, Mark. C. Taylor interprets 
religion in modernity through an early branch of science: alchemy. Taylor writes that 
alchemy ‘burns away polluting differences and returns the many to the one in which they 
all originate’.149 Historically, as a precursor to the science of chemistry, alchemy is ‘the 
branch of study and practical craft in the medieval and early renaissance period 
concerned with the nature and transformation of physical substances […]’; figuratively, 
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alchemy can mean: ‘to treat, produce, or transform by (or as if by) alchemy […]’.150 
However, more importantly for understanding Burke’s thinking on religion when he 
encounters science, alchemy (like Taylor’s description, which refers to religion in 
modernity) finds or renders a common element from differing elements. I argue that 
Burke’s conception of religion resonates with theories of religion in modernity that refer 
to alchemy to describe the condition of modern religions—for example, we will see him 
refer to the strength in an ‘aggregate’ of faiths, ‘[a]t bottom, these are all the same’ all 
‘derived from the same sources’.151 
I then explain the way in which Letters on a Regicide Peace do not communicate 
an opposition to science, but rather an opposition to the sort of thinking that disavows 
repercussions through humanity for the sake of experiment—the misuse of scientific 
thinking. Finally, I demonstrate how translating Burke’s religious conceptualization 
through the concept of alchemy appropriates his religious thinking in the context of 
modernity. I believe that we can think of Burke as conceptually contributing to what 




Ultimately, my thesis is a re-imagination of Burke as a contributor to modern 
religious conceptualization, which transcends things such as nation, sect, and even good 
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and evil. I wish to offer an interpretation of Burke as an open-minded proponent of 
change and adaptability, where his representation of religion is concerned. I believe this 
interpretation of Burke, through his representation of religion, counterbalances 
interpretations of him as the reactionary father of Conservatism. 
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Ch. 1: ‘Melting Religious Solidity: The Early Writings’ 
Introduction 
The first chapter of my thesis is an interpretation of Burke’s early writings: his A 
Vindication of Natural Society (1756–57) his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 
our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), and his Account of the European 
Settlements in America (written with William Burke, published in 1757). My 
interpretation of these early writings fills the need to understand Burke’s religious 
thought in these texts, in the context of Enlightenment modernity. Those critical 
interpretations of these early texts that do lightly broach a religious context for Burke’s 
thinking (as we shall see from Francis Canavan, Bruce Frohnen, Terry Eagleton, Ian 
Hampshire-Monk, and Stephen K. White), do so in a way that enrols Burke in anti-
progressive, anti-Enlightenment, anti-modern, Christ-centred thought—each respectively 
contributing to the branding of Burke as the reactionary founder of modern 
Conservatism. I believe the reason for Burke’s reactionary branding comes from a lack of 
attention to his expanded conceptualization of global religious practice, and a lack of 
attention to his conceptual relativism about religious cultural legitimacy—of non-Christ-
centred religions, and even non-God-centred thinking. My reading of these early texts is 
intended to remedy this lack of attention. 
First, I will outline a framework of theories on modernity, which I argue aptly 
articulates the complexities in Burke’s religious representations. I believe the vocabulary 
of David Hume, J.G.A. Pocock, Zygmunt Bauman, Marshall Berman, John D. Carlson 
and Erik C. Owens helps define the conception of modernity and religious culture in the 
Enlightenment era. I argue that these early publications in Burke’s oeuvre demonstrate 
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the beginning of a slow (albeit sometimes unwitting) melting of religious solidity in order 
to adapt to the changing context of modernity. I then make a case for the need to think of 
Burke beyond the narrow view of him as a Christ-centred Conservative. For example, 
Francis Canavan portrays Edmund Burke as a ‘Christian Statesman’, and argue that 
Burke would have solved any religious division in his family (between his Catholic 
mother and Protestant father) ‘by minimizing the theological differences among various 
Christian churches’.153 I argue that such narrow interpretations of Burke as only a 
Christian-Conservative thinker underestimate his engagement with non-Christ-centred 
thinking, and his minimization of the role of a Godhead in religious legitimacy (before he 
becomes a statesman, incidentally). Also before looking closely at the early writings, I 
will give some biographical and historical context to the publication of the texts. 
The first text I will examine is Burke’s Vindication, in which I observe the way 
Burke begins to promote religion as a general necessity. I argue that Burke’s 
representation of religion in his Vindication values it in terms of social utility and a 
legitimacy relative to indigenous culture first and genuine religious belief and doctrinal 
claims second. This, I will show, paves the way for what will become the basis of 
Burke’s subsequent representation of religion throughout his writings: the demotion of 
religious difference, and the expansion of the conceptions surrounding religion. I argue 
this by evincing Burke as an upholder of early Enlightenment thought, by demonstrating 
that his conceptualization of religion in the Vindication follows that of Charles de 
Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Other critical interpretations of Burke have located the 
roots of his political thought, or his thinking on history, in the work of Montesquieu (as 
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we shall see from C.P. Courtney and Ian McBride). However, I wish to argue that we can 
also locate Burke’s early thinking on religion in the work of Montesquieu. 
I will then examine Burke’s Enquiry. While many studies have expertly analysed 
the Enquiry for its aesthetic and political thinking (as we will see from Terry Eagleton, 
Paddy Bullard, and Richard Bourke), few analyse the text for the value of Burke’s 
religious thinking. Some (like Bourke) even argue against focusing on the text in a 
religious context. To complement, yet differ from, these interpretations, I wish to 
understand the way religious ideas are represented in this text. In the Enquiry, I argue that 
Burke engages with thinking that is antithetical to Christ-centred Protestant thinking (e.g., 
Deistic, non-Christian, and even non-God-centred thinking). I argue that any God-centred 
or Christ-centred message is reliant on (and, perhaps subverted by) his expanded 
representation of God, his shades of Deism, and his softening of boundaries between (to 
use Burke’s terminology) ‘the sacred and profane’.154 For the purposes of this thesis, we 
will understand ‘sacred’ to mean consecrated or ‘dedicated to some religious purpose’, 
and ‘profane’ to mean ‘unconsecrated, secular’.155 I will also show that, in the Enquiry, 
we can (like the Vindication) see a demotion of genuine religious belief, and further see a 
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removal of a Godhead as a necessity altogether. I argue that these characteristics of 
expanded religious thinking begin to show evidence of Burke’s progressiveness, and even 
his openness to non-Christian thinking. 
 I then argue that the condition of Burke’s conception of religion is reflective of 
the modernization of religious conception in the Enlightenment era (e.g., the rise of 
Deism and Christian-heterodox thinking; notions of God expanded until rendering the 
notion unnecessary). I further argue that we can understand the condition of Burke’s 
religious conception in these early texts by articulating it through the vocabulary of 
theorists of modernity, such as: Marshall Berman, Terry Eagleton, Paul Heelas, Phillip 
Blond, and John Milbank. 
 Finally, I turn to Burke’s Account, a text in which I argue we can see an even 
more expanded conception of religion(s). In the Account, I argue that Burke 
acknowledges the relative cultural legitimacy of non-Christian religions, and an even 
more expanded representation of God than we see in the Enquiry. Ultimately, I argue that 
these early texts demonstrate how Burke’s conception of religion begins to soften 
religious particularities. I argue that the way in which religious ideas are represented in 




The Framework of modernity; understanding Burke beyond Christ-centred 
Conservatism; some background for the publications 
 In the introduction to this thesis, through the work of J.G.A. Pocock, I defined the 
parameters of modernity in terms of historical perception for eighteenth-century minds. 
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In the interest of fortifying this version of modernity that serves my analysis of Burke, I 
will now elaborate on what theorists (those contemporary to Burke, those who write 
about Burke, and those who write on modernity at large) assert as the conditions of 
modernity. If we look again at Hume’s Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, we see a 
number of conditions he ascribes to modern times. Where religious conceptualization is 
concerned, he writes about the difference in religious zealotry from ancient to modern 
times: 
Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than parties 
of religion; but in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and 




The religious zealotry found in the modernity of the eighteenth century (Hume’s and 
Burke’s time) is far more furious than found in ancient sects of philosophy. We will see 
later (in Chapters 2 and 3) how Burke denounces this same zealotry of modern times. 
Above, Hume suggests that factions of religion are more dangerous than factions arising 
from interest. Pocock engages with a different passage from Hume’s Essays, wherein 
Hume explains political parties founded on interest and speculation as a feature of 
modern times: 
Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known 
only to modern times, and are, perhaps the most extraordinary and 
unaccountable phenomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs.
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In Chapter 3, we will also see how Burke denounces the modern feature of parties 
founded on abstract speculation. However, for now, it is worth pausing to know what 
Pocock warns about the above passage: 
In reading this sentence, we must beware of the persistent ambiguities of 
the term “modern”. If we take it in its Enlightened and post-ecclesiastical 
sense, “abstract speculative principle”, will seem to denote ideologies of 
political, social and historical belief, the new fanaticism which Burke was 
to denounce in Reflections on the Revolution in France. […] But to 
understand what he [Hume] was saying in 1741–2, it may be necessary to 
resort to the older usage which employed ‘modern’ to denote the post-
ancient […].159 
This agrees with the parameters of modernity set up in the introduction: modern indicates 
post-ancient. Pocock explains why, as in the passage above, Hume recognizes post-
ancient features such as zealous religious factions as dangerous: 
We have collided suddenly with the deepest challenge posed to itself by 
the Enlightened mind. On the one hand, Hume is proclaiming its belief 
that differences in religious dispute are utterly without consequences for 
practical behaviours, because they are about propositions which are not 
merely insoluble, not merely unintelligible, but consequently about 
nothing at all. […] On the other hand, like it or not, ‘modern’ human 
beings do divide on the basis of these convictions. […] Given the axiom 
that religious distinctions are utterly without meaning [according to 
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Hume], it has to be explained why human beings continue to invest them 
with meaning, […] There is possible social pathology, an explanation of 
how human minds become obsessed with the unmeaning.
160
 
When I analyse Burke’s Vindication in this chapter (and also later in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis), I will suggest that there is something anti-foundational, or deconstructionist, in 
his defence of religious establishment: protecting religious establishment from enquiry 
that would deconstruct it, is to become obsessed with its unmeaning; to attack the 
enemies of religious establishment is to give a voice to the enemies; to so fervently 
announce the need to protect religious establishment is to admit its precarious, easily 
disintegrated, nature. From Hume and Pocock above, we can understand a framework of 
complexity and paradox in religious conception as being characteristic of the modern 
Enlightenment mind. I argue that the signature of this paradox in the Enlightenment mind 
is also found in more recent theories on modernity. Marshall Berman’s conceptualization 
of modernity, for example, exhibits the same kind of challenge to the modern mind as 
Hume and Pocock do above: 
To be modern is to live a life of paradox and contradiction. […] It is to be 
both revolutionary and conservative: alive to new possibilities for 
experience and adventure, frightened by the nihilistic depths to which so 
many modern adventures lead, longing to create and to hold on to 
something real even as everything melts. We might even say that to be 
fully modern it to be anti-modern […] it has been impossible to grasp and 
embrace the modern world’s potentialities without loathing and fighting 
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against some of its most palpable realities. […] the deepest modern 
seriousness must express itself through irony.
161
 
Berman’s summary contributes to the formation of a framework of modernity, from 
which I draw a vocabulary to interpret Burke’s Enlightenment mind. For example, in this 
chapter I will demonstrate that Burke’s representation of religion is traditional (arguably, 
anti-modern) in his fear of the potential anarchic tyrannous depths of sects less 
prohibitive of reason (e.g., Deism and Atheism). Yet, Burke’s representation is modern, 
inasmuch as he is alive to expanded conceptualizations of God and the relative cultural 
legitimacy of non-Christian sects. Burke also communicates his deepest, most serious, 
concerns about modernity as Berman describes above—through irony.  
It is fair to use Berman’s work to enrich our understanding of Burke in the context 
of modernity. There are instances wherein he uses same post-feudal, post-ancient 
generalisation to conceive of modernity; therefore, we can conceive of Berman as 
agreeing with the precedent of eighteenth-century modernity established (through Hume 
and Pocock) in the introduction. Berman describes a sort of crescendo of modernity, 
beginning in the sixteenth century and renewing in the eighteenth century: 
[F]rom the start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, 
people were just beginning to experience modern life […] Our second 
phase begins with the great revolutionary wave of the 1790s. With the 
French Revolution and its reverberations, a great modern public abruptly 
and dramatically comes to life. This public shares the feeling of living in a 
revolutionary age, an age that generates explosive upheavals in every 
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dimension of personal, social and political life.
162
 
Jonathan Israel describes a similar crescendo: in 1650–80, he points to a ‘transition or 
crisis of European mind’; he then suggests a ‘mental world revolutionized’ by 1680-
1750.
163
 The dimensions of Berman’s analysis of modern life include religion: ‘Modern 
environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of 
class and nationality, or religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to 
unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity […]’.164 Indeed, I think 
the dimension of religion most aptly exemplifies the paradoxical nature of modernity: the 
sacred is subverted by the profane, diffused into a secular conceptualization by demoting 
the importance of genuine religious belief. This chapter will demonstrate this modern 
paradox in Burke’s early writing, through his understanding that, for its own interest, a 
state should not impinge on religious sacredness. John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens 
capture the particular paradoxical unity of early modernity: 
[W]orries over the commingling of church and state; trepidation about 
oppressive theocracies and militant fundamentalisms; and worst-case 
scenarios—of crusades or wars of religion […] These were the ghastly 
spirits that modern secular politics, beginning in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, so arduously sought to exorcise.
165
 
Essentially, Carlson and Owens explain that the steps taken to avoid the religious warfare 
and oppression that characterized the medieval era could be construed as the 
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secularization of politics, or the germination of the fracture between religion and politics. 
Whereas in the medieval archetype of sovereignty religion is the unifying 
principle of political authority, in the modern archetype religion is 
understood to be a divisive and destructive force among political 
communities. […] The religiopolitical unity of medieval Christendom, 
though never complete, fractured decisively by the early sixteenth century 
with the emergence of the Protestant Reformation […] Religious freedom 
and the effort to throw off religious coercion became central to the 
formation of separate states whose citizens were free to believe and 
practice the state’s religion.166 
This analysis of the condition of religion in modernity from Carlson and Owens follows 
the same post-ancient, post-feudal generalisation used by the other theorists above, and 
(according to Pocock) Enlightenment minds: medieval unity (while tolerant of measured 
religious differences within Trinitarian Christianity) was drawn from the sovereign 
principle of political authority; the unity of post-Reformation modernity is different, 
inasmuch as it is drawn from the sovereign freedom to be dis-unified, the sovereignty of 
one’s right to ‘throw off religious coercion’. This follows Hume’s theory that religious 
fracturing is a feature of modernity. 
The encapsulation of the modern sacred cultivated by Carlson and Owens is 
useful for framing a discussion about the modern sacred, as it will be conceived of for 
Burke in this chapter, and throughout my thesis: 
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In various moments and movements, the sacred refers to that which is 
holy, sublime, universal, or true […] Yet the sacred rarely is severed 
entirely from earthly concerns; ethical and religious norms of belief and 
conduct usually flow outward, placing upon believers a sense of awe or a 




This brings us back to Berman’s modernity. Berman observes that Marx (in his 
Communist Manifesto) confronts ‘this realm [modernity] with mixed emotions, awe and 
elation fused with a sense of horror’.168 This chapter will show that Burke’s 
conceptualization of ‘awe’ is characteristic of this condition of modernity—described by 
Carlson, Owens, and Berman (Marx), above: awe drawn from both holy and profane 
sources can be (relatively) legitimate, and therefore, sacred. 
 Another condition of modernity that we find in agreement in older theories of 
modernity (circa nineteenth century), as well as more recent ones (circa twentieth 
century), is the idea of solidity in the conception of social frameworks. For a nineteenth-
century example, let us consider Alexis de Tocqueville’s interpretation of the ancien 
regime: 
The nobility had been the first class in the kingdom, and had enjoyed 
undisputed greatness for so many centuries, that it had acquired a high-
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mindedness, a self-reliance, a sense of responsibility, which rendered it the 
most solid portion of the social frame.
169
 
Below, Zygmunt Bauman carries de Tocqueville’s observation into the twentieth century: 
When reading de Tocqueville’s Ancien Régime, one might wonder in 
addition to what extent the “found solids” were resented, condemned and 
earmarked for liquefaction for the reason that they were already rusty, 
mushy, coming apart at the seams and altogether unreliable. Modern times 
found the pre-modern solids in a fairly advanced state of disintegration 
[…] The first solids to be melted and the first sacreds to be profaned were 
traditional loyalties, customary rights and obligations which bound hands 
and feet, hindered moves and cramped enterprise.
170
 
Bauman focuses on the melting of solid concepts and institutions in the context of 
economics.
171
 I believe we can also conceive of the profaning of traditional loyalties and 
customary rights in a religious context. We shall see throughout this thesis how Burke 
laments the destruction of the (to use de Tocqueville’s words) ‘solid portion of the social 
frame’, which I argue refers not only to the nobility and the ancien regime, but religious 
establishment as well. 
When thinking about the state of solid institutions in eighteenth-century 
modernity, Bruce Frohnen also looks to de Tocqueville, as paired with Burke, to outline 
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‘arguments for the conservative good life’.172 Frohnen acknowledges a religious context 
in Burke’s thought. However, like Stephen K. White and Jane Hodson, Frohnen limits 
this appreciation to Burke’s confrontation with the French Revolution. Moreover, 
Frohnen’s engagement with Burke’s thought in a religious context is limited to only a 
Christian context; like Canavan, Frohnen makes the virtue of Christian subordination to 
God’s will synonymous with concepts of anti-Enlightenment Conservatism.173 Indeed, 
Frohnen’s main objective concerns situating Burke as the ‘founder of modern 
Conservatism’.174 Frohnen’s study of Conservatism (as stemming from Burke and de 
Tocqueville) is aligned with other works that evince Burke’s anti-Enlightenment 
Conservatism through utilitarian interpretations: John MacCunn, sees Burke as 
anticipating the Conservative Utilitarianism of Bentham; Alfred Cobban also sees Burke 
as a utilitarian; Lewis Namier examines Burke’s reactionary qualities in terms of a 
utilitarian response from an out-of-power politician trying to retain political standing.
175
 
Even authors who recognize Burke’s liberal potentiality, still focus on him as a founding 
pillar of Conservatism: Fredrick A. Dreyer observes Burke following a ‘Lockean 
framework’ in terms of respecting the state as an institution with limited power, but still 
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emphasises Burke as a Conservative, in contrast with John Locke as a liberal.
176
 
Interpreting Burke as a Conservative, of course, is valid; however, if we understand 
Conservatism as resisting change (as is common, and as we will see Frohnen does), then I 
argue more credit needs to be given to Burke’s openness toward malleability and 
change.
177
 Frohnen pairs Burke with de Tocqueville, heavily emphasizing the 
Conservative leanings of both figures by appropriating their political thought into neo-
Conservatism. Essentially, the Conservative ‘good life’ is achieved by submitting to 
God’s will; this, Frohnen explains is virtue: 
To act rightly, to do as God wills in one’s own life, is to act virtuously. 
But one cannot judge by the light of one’s independent reason what it is to 
act rightly. One needs the guidance of revelation (most prominently the 
Ten Commandments and the golden rule) […].178 
Frohnen enrols Burke in Christ-centred Conservative thinking; if we accept a very narrow 
view of Burke’s thinking on religion, this classification fits—it was established in the 
introduction that Burke was a Christian, and this chapter will address how Burke does 
believe that one’s capacity for reason is, in a way, providential. However, such a narrow 
view ignores the expanded, generalized way in which Burke represents religious themes; 
it neglects Burke’s engagement with non-Christian and non-God-centred ideologies, 
which this thesis is intended to highlight.  
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Frohnen cites the observations of Leo Strauss and Eric Voeglin to convey the 
travesty of modernity: ‘Both men observed that the birth and progress of modernity have 
been characterized by two interdependent developments: the emergence of a view of 
politics as the pursuit of secular salvation (the achievement of a materially defined 
paradise on earth) and the concomitant loss of transcendent standards and goals.’179 
According to Frohnen, this hedonism is linked with political atheism; it resulted from 
eighteenth-century prophets (e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau), and was perpetuated by ‘its 
Marxian progeny’.180 Discussing Burke’s position on the influence of Jacobinism and 
political atheism, brought on the by the French Revolution, Frohnen explains: 
‘Government, for Burke, should support the more capable guardians of human nature: 
tradition, manners, prejudice, and the greatest embodiment of all three—religion.’181 This 
is true; however, the way in which Burke promotes the preservation of a religious 
foundation exhibits a paradoxical compliance with the more progressive ideologies of the 
time, those less prohibitive to reason (e.g. Deism). Further, his prioritization of a religious 
foundation is not limited to the established church or the ancien régime; it is a principle 
that expands to non-Christian sects, and manifests in his early writings—not just the 
Reflections. Beginning with his Vindication, I will unearth Burke’s paradoxical 
assimilation of religions antithetical to Christ-centred Conservatism. 
Because of the proximity and quick succession of Burke’s early publications, 
there is not much evidence to contradict thinking about Burke formulating the ideas that 
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supply the Vindication, the Enquiry, and the Account, at or around the same time—as a 
teenager, maybe even a younger teenager than some scholars suggest (e.g., J.T. 
Boulton).
182
 Burke started at Trinity College, Dublin on 14 April 1744, at the age of 
fifteen. (This followed his education at a Quaker boarding school in county Kildare from 
1741–44). We know that part of Burke’s reading as a student would have included 
Longinus’s work on the sublime.183 Longinus’ Peri Hypsous was translated by Nicholas 
Boileau, and made available in 1712; thus, making the emergence of aesthetic theory an 
eighteenth-century novelty.
184
 In the early part of 1747, he writes to his friend Richard 
Shackleton about his difficulty in procuring the text: ‘I could not get e’er a second-hand 
Longinus, but rather than you should want it I bought a new one.’185 Therefore, it is 
conceivable to see Burke thinking about the themes of his Enquiry as early as eighteen, 
for a possible ten years before it was published on 21 April 1757—rather than the seven 
years J.T. Boulton suggests.
186
 Burke would not embark on a political career until 1759, 
as a secretary to William Hamilton, (MP for Pontefract in Yorkshire), but we can think 
about Burke conceiving of the ideas on governance, authority, power and terror, which 
manifest themselves in his early writings, earlier than Stephen K. White suggests. White 
suggests that the Gordon riots, 1780, would have inspired Burke’s thinking about 
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authority and terror; however, during his time as a student, Burke would have been aware 
of the student riot on the Black Dog prison in Dublin, 21 May 1747.
187
 We can further 
think about Burke’s time as a student at Trinity as a very active literary period: the 
literary Club, the College Historical Society (of which Burke was a part) was founded in 
the same year (1747). The next year, on 28 January, Burke launched the Reformer—a 
literary magazine edited (and probably wholly written) by Burke.
188
 Essentially, his 
literary activity during this period conceivably accounts for the rapid appearance of three 
publications in such a short period. He had met his publisher, Robert Dodsley, in 1752; in 
1756, the Vindication was published (anonymously), and then followed his Account of 
the European Settlements in America (with William Burke) in 1757, and his Enquiry 
(also anonymously) a week later. The chronological closeness of these writings warrants 
their treatment together in this first chapter, it also validates the drawing of thematic 
parallels between these texts. (Incidentally, it was also during this same period, in 1750, 
that he met his wife, Jane Nugent; they were married in the same year that his Enquiry 
was published—just one month before, in March of 1757). 
Having delineated that short historical context, many scholars, nevertheless, have 
observed, ‘There is a dearth of information on Burke during the early 1750s. He appears 
to have suffered some sort of mental breakdown, from which he was nursed back to 
health in the home of a physician named Christopher Nugent [father of his wife, Jane],’ 
so, in a biographical sense, there is not much possible beyond speculation.
189
 So, why 
return to these early texts repeatedly? I believe that approaching these early writings 
                                                 
187
 Samuels, p. 142–45. 
188
 Boulton, Burke’s Enquiry, p. xx; O’Brien, p. 36. 
189
 White, p. 9, O’Brien, p. 22. 
70 
 
again through the lens of religious context can help to remedy the dearth of what we do 
not know about Burke’s thinking (especially what is absent from the young Burke’s 
thinking—what Conor Cruise O’Brien called ‘the missing years’); further, understanding 
Burke’s conception of religion from his early writings can lend to our understanding of 
the conception of religion in Enlightenment modernity. 
Vindication: Demotion of genuine belief in God 
Ian Hampshire-Monk suggests that by the mid-eighteenth century, the threat of 
Catholicism in opposition to the established church was giving way to the increasing 
danger of ‘atheists and rational Deists’.190 Tracing a timeline of particular events into the 
century can support such a claim. Beginning with the 1688 Protestant victory of the 
Glorious Revolution, the decline of Jacobitism in particular is marked throughout the 
century with a series of failed attempts at reclaiming the throne: 1715, 1719, 1745, the 
defeat of Charles Edward Stuart (Bonnie Prince Charlie, who tried to regain absolute 
monarchy in Scotland), and finally the 1746 Jacobite defeat at Culloden. In the example 
of the 1746 defeat, the Jacobite forces were chiefly comprised of Catholic clans from the 
Scottish Highlands; this illustrates the abatement of a force that was largely Catholic in 
its composition. 
The analysis of Deism as a movement or denomination is a point of dispute 
among scholars—much like the existence of modernity as a concept or a phenomenon. 
S.J. Barnett acknowledges a measure of validity for Deism as a mode of thought 
appearing in some historical sense: 
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The first hint of deism in the historical record is to be found in sixteenth-
century Lyon. In 1563 Pierre Viret, a close colleague of the Protestant 
reformer Calvin, wrote the Instruction Chrétienne, in which he described 
various freethinkers who needed to be combated. Amongst them Viret 
mentioned those “qui s’appelent deists, d’un mot tout nouveau” (“who call 
themselves deists, a completely new word”) and his description of them 
heavily emphasized their lack of religion.
191
 
I agree with Justin Champion who, like Hampshire-monk, accepts ‘[t]he intellectual 
manifestations of this disenchantment of the world […]’ as a Deist movement.192 In terms 
of this ‘movement’ being a threat, there is also disagreement. Roy Porter argues that 
Deists were numerous, but enjoyed general social acceptance.
193
 This leads to Barnett’s 
trepidation about acknowledging Deist thought as an actual movement; while there may 
be evidence of Deist thought in existence, Barnett posits the following: ‘It can be 
asserted, however, that in any meaningful definition of the term, beyond the virtual 
reality of history books, the deist movement never existed.’194 There is, perhaps, validity 
in pointing to the publication of Deistic texts, like John Toland’s Christianity not 
Mysterious (1696), as evidencing a rise in freethinking. Toland’s work not only 
introduced the application of reason to the interpretation of biblical doctrines, but also 
questioned the very divinity (and, therefore, the implicit validity) of biblical doctrines: 
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What we discours’d of Reason before, and Revelation now, being duly 
weigh’d, all the Doctrines and Precepts of the New Testament (if it be 




Anglican Clergyman Jonas Proast denounced Toland’s work as heresy, and American 
Christian Theologian John Edwards denounced it as ‘poisonous Socinianism, the enemy 
of true revelation and of ecclesiastical organization’.196 A publication in this same year by 
Whig Minister William Stephens, An Account of the Growth of Deism in England (1696), 
warned that the rise of Deism presented a threat to the established church equal to, or 
perhaps greater, than that of Catholicism.
197
 A few years later, Charles Gildon’s The 
Deist’s Manual (1705) carried the warning further by classifying the rise in criticism of 
the church as atheism in practice by those ‘[…] whose system is Atheism in speculation 
[...]’.198 In 1720, Cornelius Nary set out his objections to ‘Modern Libertins, Deists, 
Atheists and Pre-Adamites’ of the age in his New History of the World.199 The 
assessments presented by Stephens, Gildon, and Nary validate perceiving a particular 
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eighteenth-century climate of concern over the rise in thinking subversive to Christian 
establishment. We can further construe that defenders of the established church worried 
about various forms of dissent offering a potentially attractive benefit: freedom from 
restrictive doctrine. As Brian Young explains:   
The dilution of antidogmatism in the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century followed on the defection of some of its younger contingent to the 
new denomination of Unitarianism […] it was the doctrine of the Trinity 
which was gradually sacrificed by some in favour of intellectual clarity 
and philosophical rather than theological respectability.
200
 
Generally synonymous with Intellectual Unitarianism is the term rational dissent, Knud 
Haakonssen explains: ‘Rational Dissent meant the rejection of Calvanism and the denial 
of the necessity of spiritual regeneration.’201 
The particular form of dissent with which this chapter is chiefly concerned is 
Deism; Barnett expertly provides an appropriate definition of Deism which will help to 
recognize Deistic characteristics in Burke’s representation of religious thought later in 
this chapter: 
Deism, diverse in form and thus difficult to define, has generally been 
accepted as entailing belief in God an even of post mortem rewards and 
punishments. It was, however, a God usually remote from everyday 
human concerns. Deists thus dismissed the need for any mediation 
between humanity and divinity in the form of the Church and dismissed 
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the Church’s claimed mediation as self-interested fraud. This sort of view 
was understood as a potential threat not only to Christianity, but also to the 
established social order, for Christian teachings and the Church were 
widely acknowledged as the broad foundation for morality and law.
202
 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, recognizing characteristics antithetical to 
Burke’s Anglican Christianity does not negate it. Indeed, as Barnett describes, the 
framework for most eighteenth-century radical dissenters was still built around 
Christianity: 
In eighteenth-century Europe, this framework was almost exclusively 
Christian in origin and orientation. Christian ethics underpinned most of 
the laws, mores and cultural practices of day-to-day life. […] It is not 
surprising, then, despite often exhibiting the most trenchant 
anticlericalism, that many radicals and desists continued to subscribe to 
some sort of Christianity or religion exemplified by elements found in the 
Old or New Testament. […] Unfortunately, this is a wide-range of 
religious thought, and its marked degrees of adherence to Christianity or 
Christian concepts, has still not been adequately acknowledged by many 
historians […].203 
So, while scholarship has not yet charted an official hierarchy of the degrees of adherence 
to Christianity, and how they are marked in proximity to traditional Anglicanism, we can 
assume—for Burke—that the mode of thought measured farthest from Anglicanism is, 
conceivably, closer to atheism, and therefore less favourable. This would have been his 
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official position, and where he marks a boundary of unbelief. In his 1772 Speech on the 
Acts of Uniformity, Burke argued in favour of reformation early in the speech, saying 
those who ‘are commonly averse to all reformation’ are ‘those who loll at their ease in 
high dignities’.204 Yet, he also declared later in his 1773 Speech on a Bill for the Relief of 
Protestant Dissenters: ‘The most horrid and cruel blow that can be offered to civil society 
is through atheism.’205 Ultimately, we will later see (in Chapter 2) how his mark of 
religious toleration measures a good distance away from traditional Anglicanism. R.K. 
Webb explains that the roots of dissent from the Anglican Church, which: 
[…] can be found on St Bartholomew’s Day, 24, August 1662, when, as a 
result of the Act of Uniformity of the previous April, more than nine 
hundred clergymen, dons and schoolmasters in England and Wales were 
ejected from their posts for their conscientious refusal to give entire and 
unfeigned assent to everything contained in the Book of Common Prayer 
[…]’.206 
However, tracing the various forms of dissent that sprouted from this event is 
problematic, because of the various degrees of personal adherence to the traditional 
church. Haakonssen explains:  
The problem with these definitions is that they exclude a large number of 
English Dissenters who found it eminently possible to adopt an 
Enlightenment agenda very similar to that of the mainstream clerical 
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modernism of the establishment without committing themselves to quite 




Perhaps then, we can think of the various forms of dissent as falling under this common 
religious denominator that Haakonssen provides: 
Most important, perhaps, was a broadly based rational religion 
characterised by a determination to combine reason and faith and by a will 
to tolerate different ways of doing so. It was a spirit generous enough to 
appeal not only to a wide latitudinarian spectrum of the Established 
Church and, by the middle of the eighteenth century, to most 
Presbyterians, but also to many Congregationalists and Baptists […] 
Rational religion was, in other words, a modus vivendi in the broad field 
between High-Church Anglicanism, orthodox or evangelical Dissent and 
deism. The important point is that this common religious denominator was 
only made possible by the divisions it tried to straddle.
208
 
While we will see that, in his 1756 Vindication, Burke criticised the practice of rational 
religion to apply reason to personal religious faith. The Vindication was written in 
response to Henry St. John the Viscount Bolingbroke’s posthumously-published essays, 
in which notions like Natural Religion were promoted (e.g., Concerning the Nature, 
Extent, and Reality of Human Knowledge; Containing Some Reflection on the Folly and 
Presumption of Philosophers Especially in Matters of First Philosophy: On the Partial 
Attempts that have been made to reform the abuses of Human Reason, all published 
                                                 
207
 Haakonssen, ‘Enlightened Dissent: an introduction’, p. 5. 
208
 Ibid., p. 5. 
77 
 
posthumously in 1754 as The Philosophical Writings of the Late Henry St. John Viscount 
Bolingbroke). Bolingbroke’s writings exemplified the rise in written scrutiny against the 
religious foundations of civil government. However, we will also see in his later writings 
(in Chapter 4) how Burke promotes what Haakonssen describes above—a veritable 
common denominator of relative cultural legitimacy between various religious sects. 
Barnett verifies ‘[t]hat there were fears of the encroachment of such potentially anti-
establishment heterodoxy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’; however, he goes 
on to explain that, despite this fear, the value of religious diversity was understood: 
[…] diverse religious divides were common and were of course 
understood by many of the elite as potentially inimical to the well-being of 
the state and the social order. Yet, paradoxically, almost all those radical 
in religion or politics also recognized the vital role of the Church in 
preserving the status quo.
209
 
The condition of religious diversity in eighteenth-century (wherein it was feared, but 
deemed necessary) is part of the framework of modernity within which we can 
contextualize Burke’s representation of global religions. We can also contextualize 
Burke’s tactics in defending the Church (and the status quo) within this framework. 
Hampshire-Monk suggests that as Deism and ‘Atheism, or arguments which were held to 
employ it, became more strident and confident […]’, Anglicans deployed devices to 
undermine the position of Freethinking.
210
 Paul Langford also believes that eighteenth-
century Christian heterodoxy provoked a counter-vogue of Biblical orthodoxy: ‘The 
evangelical revival had its origin in a period when conventional religion was under threat 
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from fashionable deism.’211 Langford explains the social importance the established 
church had to English society in the eighteenth century: 
The Church had an obvious function as the appendage of a relatively 
liberal, decentralized State, and the preserve of a landed class which had a 
strong hold on the political institutions of the day.
212
 
Langford’s description of the Church’s social value contributes to understanding the 
desire to defend it as an institution. Burke’s Vindication conceivably participates in the 
backlash both Langford and Hampshire-Monk observe—a defence of ‘everything most 
excellent and venerable’ (i.e. religious authority).213 Hampshire-Monk argues that 
Burke’s defence against natural religion, the Vindication, employs secular characteristics: 
‘the most characteristic skeptical epistemological arguments used by Burke in support of 
his conservatism are secular adaptations of those deployed by Anglicans against the 
Deists.’214 Hampshire-Monk suggests that Burke perpetuates a political tradition of 
scepticism about Reason’s application to religious themes, which is ‘at the heart of 
English Conservatism’.215 Hampshire-Monk’s argument is similar to Frohnen’s, in its 
enrolment of Burke’s religious perspective in anti-Enlightenment Conservatism: 
Hampshire-Monk views Burke’s secular adaptations as supporting his Conservatism. Yet, 
if we consider Conservatism as a shield against change, or progressiveness, (as Frohnen 
                                                 
211
 Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727 – 1783, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), p. 235. 
212
 Ibid., p. 263. 
213
 Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society, in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: The 
early writings, ed. by T.O. McLoughlin, Paul Langford, James, T. Boulton, and William B. Todd, 9 vols, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), I, pp. 129–84, (p. 135). 
214
 Hampshire-Monk, ‘Skeptical Conservatism’, p. 259.  
215
 Ibid., pp. 248, 235; The OED defines Fideism as: ‘Reliance on faith alone rather than scientific 







does), I argue that Burke’s secular adaptations, alongside other adaptations antithetical to 
Christ-centred Protestant thinking (e.g., Deistic, non-Christian adaptations), support 
Burke’s progressiveness. Further, I will show that Burke’s adaptations to progressiveness 
are evident not just in his Vindication, but the Enquiry and the Account as well. These 
texts reveal a demotion of genuine religious belief, and even a removal of a Godhead 
altogether. Burke’s Account, especially, demonstrates how Burke begins to conceptualize 
ideas surrounding religious practice in a global sense. 
The first passage I would like to consider is the preface to Vindication, added to 
the reprinted 1757 edition. The preface was added in light of a genuineness perceived 
underneath Burke’s criticism of government (i.e. religion). The preface was added for the 
purposes of clarifying the Vindication as an ironic satire of ‘the same Method of Attack 
by which some Men have assaulted Revealed Religion […]’.216 Burke would have 
wanted to distance himself from any social stigma pointing towards a genuine criticism 
of the Church. The Blasphemy Act of 1698 dictated that any individual who denied the 
existence of the one true Christian God, the inherent idea of the trinity, or the divine 
authority of the scripture, could be punished by censorship, imprisonment, or even (in 
one reported case) hanging: Thomas Aikenhead of Edinburgh was hanged in 1697 for 
criticizing the gospel.
217
 However, questions surrounding the roles of religion and civil 
government, as well as the conversation about toleration, were ongoing throughout the 
eighteenth century. For example, Ian McBride writes on some examples of sermons given 
on religious toleration for Catholics and the role of the state: John Abernethy’s sermon 
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Persecution contrary to Christianity (23 October 1735), like Edward Synge’s sermon ten 
years before (The case of Toleration Consider’d with Respect Both to Religion and Civil 
Government: In a Sermon Preach’d in St. Andrew’s Dublin, 23 October 1725), ‘rested on 
a redefinition of popery to include any state intervention in matters of conscience’.218 
Therefore, the intrusion of the reason of the state in matters of religious feeling or instinct 
is still volatile when Burke publishes his Vindication, and the later added preface in 1757. 
Burke’s preface explains the need to protect certain foundations of society from reason: 
There is an Air of Plausibility which accompanies vulgar Reasonings and 
Notions taken from the beaten Circle of ordinary Experience, that is 
admirably suited to the narrow Capacities of some, and to the Laziness of 
others […] when we must seek in a profound Subject, not only for 
Arguments, but for new Materials of Argument, their Measures and their 
Method of Arrangement; when we must go out of the Sphere of our 
ordinary Ideas […] this we must do, or we do nothing, whenever we 
examine the Result of a Reason which is not our own. Even in Matters 
which are, as it were, just within our Reach, what would become of the 
World if the Practice of all moral Duties, and the Foundations of Society, 




When he asks about the fate of the ‘Foundations of Society’, Burke confesses his 
worry about the scrutiny brought on by the application of reason to revealed religion. He 
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insinuates that the presumptuous application of reason to such a ‘profound Subject’ 
would jeopardize ‘the Practice of all moral Duties’ (i.e., religious practice). Burke 
suggests that the use of reason restricts the capacity for contemplation outside of the 
sphere of ordinary ideas. Indeed, it is the empirical evidence of religious experience 
outside of the sphere of ordinary ideas upon which the Anglican defence depended. 
Hampshire-Monk explains: ‘The success of their position hinged on […] the limits of 
reason in religious matters and the need to maintain the integrity of the sensory and 
textual evidence on which Christianity or Christian dogma was based.’220 
Of course, Burke does not mean to completely discount reason; like David Hume, 
he simply views reason as a less effective way to motivate impulses and desires; in his 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Hume writes: ‘Reason, being cool 
and disengaged, is no motive to actions […] Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain […] 
becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition.’221 
Boulton writes, ‘Burke, of course, follow(s) in a great tradition in holding his 
sensationalist philosophy: the dependence of the mind, for its ideas, on the senses was 
fundamental to the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume’.222 Boulton’s observation 
precedes others from Frohnen, Terry Eagleton, Paddy Bullard, and James Conniff that 
similarly link Hume and Burke in their argument for sensory sourced knowledge.
223
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These studies chiefly focus on Burke’s later writings to observe the aesthetic source of 
manners and laws—behaviour being guided ‘from the surface inward’.224 
Ultimately, Burke’s preface shapes an argument to leave the religious 
‘foundations of society’ and their ‘moral practices’ undisturbed by reason. In doing so, 
Burke is conceivably promoting the preservation of religious practice, feeling, or 
instinct—by suggesting that the reason behind religious practice be left undemonstrated. 
By assigning this importance to the preservation of religious practice, Burke sets a 
precedent that demotes the importance of genuineness behind religious belief. 
Like Hampshire-Monk, Paul Langford finds that Anglicans developed a 
consistent set of methods for deflecting threats to the established church; once used 
against Catholicism, and witchcraft, in the eighteenth century, these methods deflected 
the rising forms of freethinking (e.g., Natural Religion and Deism): ‘The resources of 
polite society were increasingly deployed against popular superstition.’225 Threats that 
were once considered valid to the established church, and punished by hanging, were 
now dismissed as frauds. For example, witchcraft was largely dismissed as a crime of 
thievery and deception (by the Witchcraft Act of 1736). The threat of Catholicism was 
once deflected by illustrating the absurdity of Catholic maxims, such as the actual 
presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.226 Burke attempts to illustrate the absurdity of 
Bolingbroke’s arguments for Natural Religion through ironic imitation: reductio ad 
absurdum. At the very beginning of his defence, Burke explains that by demonstrating 
the absurdity of rhetorical engines in the criticism of government, he demonstrates the 
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absurdity of the rhetorical argument against Established Religion: ‘the same Engines 
which were employed for the Destruction of Religion, might be employed with equal 
Success for the Subversion of Government […].’227 Burke’s use of irony to convey the 
seriousness of his concern resonates with Berman’s description of modernity, wherein 
‘the deepest modern seriousness must express itself through irony’.228 
Langford’s edition of Burke’s Vindication wagers that Burke’s readers 
immediately recognized it as an attack on Bolingbroke, not Freethinkers in general.
229
 
Perhaps this is a hasty assertion, considering that, at the time of Burke’s response, 
Bolingbroke was not only dead, but the work with which Burke took so much issue was 
not even published while Bolingbroke was living. In addition, if there was an Anglican 
backlash against the rising threat of freethinking, an attack aimed at the general threat 
seems more logical than a personal attack against one deceased proponent of freethinking 
(Bolingbroke).
230
 It is more likely to consider the possibility that Burke indeed, was 
attacking the rising threat of Christian heterodoxy in general. Langford explains that 
defenders of the Anglican Church opportunistically deployed resources to bolster support 
for their sacred tradition; he draws an example of this opportunistic deployment with the 
story of William Romaine and Thomas Sherlock. Romaine and Sherlock were two 
Evangelical revivalists who seized the opportunity of the London earthquakes of 1750 to 
urge the people ‘to reform their moral conduct before divine punishment was visited on 
them’.231 Without the aid of natural disaster, of course, Burke’s Vindication can also be 
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viewed as opportunistic. In a sense, Burke seized the opportunity of Bolingbroke’s 
published works to promote the preservation of religious foundation. The global standing 
of the English democratic monarchy is based in the religious foundation of divine 
ascendancy, as denoted in Declaration of Right (under William III and Mary II in 1689). 
As Frohnen observes, ‘The Petition of Right, habeas corpus, and the very rule of law 
would be swept away should the legitimacy of their royal originators be denied.’232 
When it comes to the preservation of religious establishment, we can locate 
Burke’s methods in that of in Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Others, like 
C.P. Courtney, have observed Montesquieu’s influence on Burke and his approach to 
history and political thought.
233
 Ian McBride suggests that Burke’s grasp on ‘humanity 
only understood in terms of the specific social environmental conditions of each nation 
[…]’ comes from Montesquieu.234 I argue that Burke also follows Montesquieu when it 
comes to thinking about religion more broadly. 
I argue that the modus operandi of Burke’s Vindication (to demonstrate the 
necessity of religion by translating it into the sphere of civil law) is made visible when 
examined next to Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws (De l'esprit des lois), 1748. For 
example, the utility of religion that Burke stresses in his Vindication resonates with the 
same maxim expressed in Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws. Montesquieu advises that ‘[…] 
it is extremely useful for them [‘the human race’] to believe the existence of a God. From 
the idea of his non-existance, immediately follows that of our independence; or, if we 
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cannot conceive this idea, that of disobedience’.235 Burke echoes Montesquieu’s fear of 
independence and disobedience in the Vindication excerpt quoted earlier.
236
 The answer 
to Burke’s anxiety is tyranny: in Burke’s view, the tyranny of individualism is staved off 
by a religious structure. If the means of staving off disobedience—the Church—
demanded reason, it might be discredited. Discrediting the Church means discrediting the 
monarchy, because if there is no deity personally involved in humankind’s political 
actions, a monarchy founded on divine ascendancy becomes invalid. Therefore, Burke 
imitates Montesquieu’s techniques in defending the only hope of maintaining social 
stability: established religion. In doing so, Burke’s Vindication sets a precedent that 
values religion in terms of social utility first and genuine religious belief second, which 
follows a conceptually secular logic, if the need for belief in God is demoted. Brian 
Young explains that Burke’s contemporary Josiah Tucker, a Welsh churchman, also 
thought that Burke did not have any genuine religious interest in preserving the 
established church, only political interest.
237
 Religious belief that is so consciously aware 
of its importance to a national cultural foundation is—conceivably— secular. 
 The logical construction of Montesquieu’s technique in his Spirit of Laws 
introduces the juxtaposition of civil laws and religious laws in order to illustrate 
absurdity, which Burke later copies in his Vindication. Montesquieu writes, ‘To say that 
religion is not a restraining motive, because it does not always restrain is equally absurd 
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as to say, that the civil laws are not a restraining motive.’238 The universal assumption in 
Montesquieu’s logic is that civil laws have the capacity to restrain; to assume the contrary 
would be absurd. Montesquieu’s logic unfolds in this way: universal knowledge 
stipulates civil laws possess the capacity to restrain; to assume the contrary would be a 
logical absurdity; religious laws possess restraining powers comparable to that of civil 
laws; therefore, to assume that religious laws do not possess the capacity to restrain 
would be equally as absurd as to assume that civil laws do not have the capacity to 
restrain. Burke traces his defence in his Vindication from Montesquieu’s juxtaposition of 
civil and religious authority. The universal assumption in the Vindication is the necessity 
of civil laws for social restraint; to argue for the absence of civil laws would be absurd. 
Burke employs that same ‘engine’ of absurdity against natural religion. 
Continuing on the path of Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, the satirical nature of 
Burke’s Vindication also is apparent in the execution of the absurd argument. For 
example, Montesquieu warns: 
It is a false way of reasoning against religion, to collect in a large work a 
long detail of the evils it has produced, if we do not give at the same time 
an enumeration of the advantages which have followed from it. Were I to 
relate all the evils that have arisen in the world from civil laws, from 
monarchy, and from republican government, I might tell of frightful 
things.’239 
From this illustration of weakness, Burke takes his cue: the Vindication is, indeed, as 
Montesquieu warns, ‘large work’ ‘reasoning against religion’—addressed with the 
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‘engine’s’ of natural law, of course. Therefore, his satirical attack on natural law is 
actually a ‘long detail of evils it [religion] has produced.’ In an effort to demonstrate the 
absurdity of reasoning against government (i.e. religion), Burke provides a long 
enumeration of all of the frightful things that have resulted from civil law. Montesquieu’s 
closing example is how one-sided, and monotonous, an argument that simply listed ‘the 
evils that have arisen in the world from civil laws, from monarchy [… etc.]. Montesquieu 
warns that such an argument might tell of frightful things, but it would still be a ‘false 
way of reasoning,’ in its fallacious appeals to emotion, consequence, even novelty. In 
short, Burke executes his reductio ad absurdum tactic—which is characteristic of the 
Anglican defence against Deism—by following a model that bears striking similarity to 
that of Montesquieu’s. The irony lies within Burke’s demonstration of the very weakness 
of the freethinking argument defined in Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws. Burke 
demonstrates Montesquieu’s flaw in the anti-religious argument when he ‘relates all the 
evils that have arisen in the world from civil laws’: 
‘The Babylonian, Assyrian, Median, and Persian Monarchies must have 
poured out Seas of Blood in their Formation, and in their Destruction’.240 
[…] 
‘The Struggle between the Macedonians and Greeks, and before that, the 
Disputes of the Greek Commonwealths among themselves, for unprofitable 
Superiority, from one of the bloodiest Scenes in History.’241 
[…] 
‘You will find every Page of its History dyed in Blood, and blotted and 
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confounded by Tumults, Rebellions, Massacres, Assassinations, 
Proscriptions, and a Series of Horror […]’242 
Burke is being rather facetious when he continues the list of atrocities: ‘Let us pass by the 
Wars, and the Consequences of them, which wasted Grecia-Magna, before the Roman 
Power prevailed in that Part of Italy. They are perhaps exaggerated; therefore I shall only 
rate them at one Million.’243 The joke is, of course, that ‘one Million’ is not an un-
exaggerated number. Thus, Burke illustrates the weakness and absurdity in this form of 
argument, which Montesquieu had already explained in his Spirit of Laws. 
Montesquieu refers to ‘the human race’ when he contends, ‘it is extremely useful 
for them to believe the existence of a God. From the idea of his non-existence, 
immediately follows that of our independence; or, if we cannot conceive this idea, that of 
disobedience’.244 Montesquieu’s rather pragmatic perspective about the precept of 
religion’s belief in a God manifests as a major pillar in Burke’s defence of the sacred. 
Montesquieu’s model of religious pragmatism offered in his Spirit of Laws is as follows: 
The question is not to know whether it would be better that a certain man, 
or a certain people, had no religion, than to abuse what they have; but to 
know which is the least evil, that religion be sometimes abused, or that 
there be no such restraint as religion on mankind.
245
 
Montesquieu poses the question: ‘What is worse—a world in which religion provides 
social stability, but is sometimes abused, or a world without religious restraint of any 
kind?’. Clearly, Montesquieu values the restraining powers of religion on humankind—
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valuing religion in terms of social utility first and genuine religious belief second. Again, 
such a conscious acknowledgment of the cultural necessity of religious belief renders it—
in a way—secular. 
 Burke’s imitation of Montesquieu’s religious pragmatism is most evidently 
exemplified through his perspective on war. Above, Montesquieu acknowledges that (like 
war, or civil law) religion might be responsible for some evils in society, but submits that 
the occasional abuse of religion is far more acceptable that a world without religious 
restraint. Burke shares Montesquieu’s view by translating it into the sphere of civil law. 
In his Vindication, Burke lists the horrible evils of government, but ultimately resolves 
that a society with no civil law (i.e. no religion) is worse: 
But suppose we were inclined to make the most ample Concessions; let us 
concede Athens, Rome, Carthage, and two or three more of the antient, 
and as many of the modern Commonwealths, to have been, or to be free 
and happy, and to owe their Freedom and Happiness to their political 
Constitution. Yet allowing all this, what Defence does this make for 
artificial Society in general, that these inconsiderable Spots of the Globe 
have for some short Space of Time stood as Exceptions to a Charge so 
general? But when we call these Governments free, or concede that their 




Burke questions whether the social prosperity of a people, who ‘owe their Freedom and 
Happiness’ to an artificial society, is worth potential bloodshed. Essentially, Burke is 
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asking the same question as Montesquieu did: ‘What is worse—a world in which civil 
law (i.e., religion) sometimes results in war, or a world without civil law (i.e., religion) or 
restraint of any kind?’. In the end, social utility wins: a religion that pacifies the human 
race is far more preferable than a society without religious restraint. 
Another of Burke’s Montesquieu imitations comes with his use of the image of 
the prince. (In other essays, we can conceive of Burke translating this as his the Ideal or 
Fine Gentleman).
247
 Both Montesquieu and Burke use the image of the lone monarch—in 
terms of religion restraining the despotic tendencies of a monarch. With regard to Burke’s 
Vindication, the image of the lone monarch manifests when he explains: ‘War […] ought 
to be the only Study of a Prince […]’.248 Burke places Sesostris toward the beginning in a 
list of lone monarchs throughout history, and their tyrannical tendencies: 
All Empires have been cemented in Blood. […] There were Conquerers, 
and Conquests, in those Days; and consequently, all that Devastation, by 
which they are formed, and all that Oppression by which they are 
maintained. We know little of Sesostris, but that he led out of Egypt an 
Army of above 700,000 Men; that he over-ran the Mediterranean Coast 
[…]the Losses of the Conqueror, may amount to a Million of Deaths, and 
then we shall see this Conqueror, the oldest we have on the Records of 
History, (though, as we have observed before, the Chronology of these 
remote Times is extremely uncertain) opening the Scene by a Destruction 
of at least one Million of his Species, unprovoked but by his Ambition, 
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without any Motives but Pride, Cruelty, and Madness […]ut solely to 
make so many People, in so distant Countries, feel experimentally, how 
severe a Scourge Providence intends for the human Race, when he gives 
one Man the Power over many, and arms his naturally impotent, and 
feeble Rage, with the Hands of Millions, who know no common Principle 
of Action, but a blind Obedience to the Passions of their Ruler.
249
 
Fitting in this analysis of monarchs into his appeal to preserve established religion is 
meant to bolster his illustration of religion’s power to restrain. Burke’s image of a lone 
monarch (Sesostris, ‘one Man [with] the Power over many’), is resonant of 
Montesquieu’s description of the King of France in his Persian Letters (1721). 
Montesquieu explains that the king’s power over his people is only restrained by an even 
more powerful magician: ‘The magician is called the Pope: sometimes he makes him 
believe that the bread which he drinks is not bread, or that the wine that he drinks is not 
wine, and a thousand other things of the same nature.’250 Rather than demonstrating the 
restraining power that one individual (the pope) may have over another, Montesquieu is 
illustrating the wider concept of religion’s power over potentially tyrannical monarchs. 
The power of the lone monarch (like Sesostris) can be restrained by religion. Granted, 
Montesquieu is referring to the Catholic Church, which recalls the anti-Catholic absurdity 
tactics of the pro-Anglican defence above. Ultimately, however, Montesquieu reveals his 
understanding of the arbitrary nature of religion and the psychological pull it has over 
people, the masses and their leaders. The resonances of Montesquieu’s thought 
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surrounding God and religion in Burke’s thought on the same proves his reliance on, and 
approval of, this strand of early Enlightenment thought. Further, locating Burke’s 
religious thinking in line with Montesquieu’s demonstrates his demotion of genuine 
religious belief; which begins to show how Burke adapts to more progressive ideologies 
wherein a Godhead is less relevant. I will now argue that a further decrease in the 
relevancy (or necessity) of a Godhead is seen in Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). In the Enquiry, we can also see 
the way in which Burke adopts another of the devices ‘deployed by the Anglicans against 
the Deists’: promoting sensory evidence, or sentiment, over reason. I will also argue that 
Enquiry dissolves conceptual boundaries between sacred and profane by promoting a 
generalized concept of awe. 
Enquiry: Diluting and removing the concept of God; Burke’s compliance with 
Christian heterodox thinking 
Many studies have expertly analysed Burke’s Enquiry to argue him as an 
aesthetician and a rhetorician. Paddy Bullard believes that the Enquiry ‘is “rhetorical” 
insofar as it focuses on everyday evidence of how language moves people. […] its 
approach is practical and utilitarian’.251 Terry Eagleton too believes that Burke’s ‘theory’ 
on aesthetics is a theory on the ‘function of rhetoric’.252 Some studies also view the 
Enquiry as Burke’s understanding of the psychology of the human mind.253 However, 
little is said about Burke’s Enquiry revealing something about Burke’s religious thinking 
(especially as it confronts modernity). While Richard Bourke also treats Burke as an 
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aesthetician, he mentions Burke’s Enquiry as contributing to the understanding of 
aesthetic ‘responses to religion’; however, he insists upon the treatise as being strictly 
concerned with ‘the foundations of aesthetic psychology’—not ideas surrounding 
religion.
254
 Bourke warns that it is a mistake to categorize it as being strictly a political or 
theological work, but admits that it ‘has implications for both politics and religion’.255 
We may know theology as, ‘the study or science which treats God, […] and His relations 
with man and the universe’.256 Bullard too does not think of the Enquiry in theological 
terms, but if theology entails the manner in which one conceives of God, Burke does 
wonder about this.
257
 While it is true that Burke wonders about the human capacity to 
conceive of God, because of the limitations of reason in matters outside the ‘Sphere of 
our ordinary Ideas’, he makes a case for the use of God as an example of conceiving of 
the sublime.
258
 Below, Burke is hesitant about using God as an example of this source of 
the sublime, but admits that it is just too appropriate an example to avoid: 
I purposely avoided when I first considered this subject, to introduce the 
idea of that great and tremendous being, as an example in an argument so 
light as this; though it frequently occurred to me, not as an objection to, 
but as a strong confirmation of my notions in this matter.
259
 
Therefore, I believe there is more to be said about the way in which Burke conceptualizes 
ideas surrounding religion, including the idea of God, in his Enquiry. Moreover, there is 
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more to be said about the expanded way in which Burke treats these ideas in the text. I 
agree with the case made by Eagleton: that the sublime cannot be discussed without the 
concept of God: 
It is worth nothing, incidentally, that there may be something distinctively 
Irish about Burke’s enthusiasm for sublimity. For if the sublime is that 
which beggars description and baffles representation, then the ultimate 
name for it is God […].260 
In other words, a way to conceive of this amorphous concept of the sublime that can 
easily elude human understanding is to render all things sublime into a general concept 
called God. God is an indiscernible concept that can be translated for the inadequate 
human mind as ‘the sublime’.261 Eagleton qualifies the ‘Irishness’ of this concept with a 
mention of ‘the greatest medieval Irish philosopher, John Scottus Eriugena. Eriugena also 
believes that God is beyond human understanding, and transcends determinacy, ‘and that 
there exists in humanity a kind of non-definitive or indeterminate knowledge by which 
we can unite non-dominatively with the world’.262 Therefore, all things incomprehensible 
by human reason are rendered into a general category of the sublime, which subverts the 
dominative power inherent in a Deity. My reading of Burke’s Enquiry expands on 
Bourke’s and Eagleton’s: I further argue that a conceptualization of God that transcends 
definition and denomination softens the determinacy of religious boundaries. Ultimately, 
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Bourke’s reading of the Enquiry, like Eagleton’s and so many others, is an exercise in 
linking Burke’s aesthetic thinking to his politics: ‘in order to understand the relations 
between aesthetics and politics in Burke’s writings, the primary components of the 
relationship have to be separately analysed before their combined significance can be 
properly understood’.263 I wish, rather, to understand the relations between Burke’s 
representation of religion and modernity. I wish to offer a more nuanced reading of how 
‘he [Burke] underlined the significance of the pleasures of the imagination in 
consolidating spiritual and secular relationships’ in the Enquiry, and other early 
writings.
264
 Bourke suggests here that Burke’s representation of the sacred versus the 
secular collapses ‘all affective relations into matters of taste’.265 I think the implications 
here are more than just a matter of taste; I believe that Burke occasionally blends sacred 
and secular as a matter of comprehending, adapting, and salvaging ideas surrounding 
religion and God in the face of increasingly freethinking and secularized modernity. 
Bourke says that the neo-classical appropriation of Longinus was meant ‘to serve as a 
defence of the enthusiasm underlying religion which the spirit of scepticism could pervert 
[…]’.266 Bourke recognises Anglican coping mechanisms in Burke’s re-appropriation of 
Longinus’ sublime; which resonates with Langford’s and Hampshire-Monk’s recognition 
of defences against ideologies subversive to established Christianity. I argue that Burke’s 
appropriation of the traditional sublime resonates with Deistic, and non-God-centred 
thinking, rather than supports Christian enthusiasm. I believe that Burke’s expanded 
notion of God in the concept of the sublime, along with the blurring of boundaries 
                                                 
263
 Bourke, ‘Pity and Fear’, p. 29. 
264
 Ibid., p. 2. 
265
 Ibid., p. 13. 
266
 Ibid., p. 13. 
96 
 
between sacred and profane, reveals to us that Burke understood the necessity for ideas 
surrounding God and religious practice to be adaptable in order to withstand the de-
ossification of eighteenth-century religious thought. 
 We know that the purpose of Burke’s Enquiry is to differentiate between the 
concepts of the sublime and the beautiful; Burke writes ‘the ideas of the sublime and the 
beautiful stand on foundations so different, that it is hard, I had almost said impossible, to 
think of reconciling them in the same object’.267 Burke’s Enquiry can be placed in 
historical line with other studies of emotions, e.g., Marin Cureau de la Chambre’s 
Caractères des passions (1640), or The Art to Know Men (1650). John Locke’s, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1694) treats humanity in individual terms; Burke 
treats humanity in group terms, he validates the moralistic treatment of groups. We can 
even look to works like Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a 
Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651) as anticipating the themes of social 
contract theory and the necessity of religion in Burke’s early writings. However, drawing 
comparisons between these thinkers here presents difficulties, inasmuch as Burke’s 
Enquiry is an investigational work rather than a formal statement of his philosophies; 
unlike Locke, Hume, and Hobbes, Burke did not author comprehensive work on his 
theories and philosophies (e.g. in the form of a treatise).
268
 We further know that Burke’s 
engagement with the notion of the sublime places him in a historical line with Longinus, 
and others, for example Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of 
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Beauty and Virtue (1725), and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions 
(1728).
269
 Other eighteenth-century minds, Joseph Addison and John Bailee, engage with 
sublimity by referring to it as greatness ordained by God; Burke’s thinking on the 
sublime’s physiological sources set his interpretation apart from theirs.270 James Conniff, 
like Eagleton and Bullard, links Burke to Hume and Locke in his forensic approach to the 
biological or physiological sources of aesthetic sublime experience: ‘Locke saw the 
question as one of biological structure. God, in his wisdom, has made man to operate a 
certain way. In so doing, man not only brings pleasure to himself, but also works God’s 
will.’271 Boulton comments on the frequent use of passages from Genesis in the 
eighteenth century to convey the sublime: for example, ‘God said, Let there be Light 
[…]’.272 Boulton observes that ‘Burke is one of the few writers [on the sublime] who 
ignore it’.273 I think Burke’s conceptualization of a profane (or secular) sublime lends 
something to understanding the expanded aspects of Burke’s representation of God and 
religious boundaries. 
While Burke’s Enquiry is not an ironic justification for established religion, like 
the Vindication, it too conceptually works toward the Anglican defence agenda by 
outlining the power and social utility of empirical, and sensory, evidence—upon which 
the religious defence depends. The link from Burke’s polemical Vindication to his 
philosophical Enquiry becomes clear with some additional insight from Hampshire-
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Monk. Hampshire Monk asserts that the success of the Anglican defence against Deism 
depended on promoting ‘[…] certain epistemological and hermeneutical issues having to 
do with the limits of reason in religious matters […]’.274 Eagleton, Bourke, Bullard, and 
others have viewed the Enquiry as a dissertation outlining the value of the sensory 
experience, and conversely the limitations of reason, but his Vindication too warned 
readers about the limitations of reason in the consideration of a ‘profound Subject’, such 
as established religion, and concepts inherent to that subject, (e.g., God).
275
 To protect 
religion from the scrutiny of reason, the Anglican defence made use of what Hampshire-
Monk calls, ‘[…] fideistic religious discourse […]’.276 Fideism refers to interpretation, 
‘according to which all (or some) knowledge depends upon faith or revelation, and reason 
[…] is to be disregarded’.277 Fideistic thinking is evident in the distance Burke puts 
between reason and religion throughout the Vindication and the Enquiry.
278
 
The following excerpt from the Enquiry demonstrates an attempt to illustrate the 
weakness of reason in comparison with other sensory forces of the mind that can discern 
things outside the ‘Sphere of our ordinary Ideas’. 
That great chain of causes, which linking one to another even to the throne 
of God himself, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours. When we 
go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things we go 
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out of our depth. All we do after that is but a giant struggle that shows we 
are in an element which does not belong to us.
279
 
Discussing the interpretation of causes—particularly, those linked to God—Burke warns 
that any effort made ‘beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things’ extends past 
mankind’s ‘element’. In other words, humankind’s capacity for religious interpretation 
does not extend beyond the immediate sensory experience. 
Burke’s Enquiry also defines the inferiority of reason in reckoning feelings: ‘I 
should imagine, that the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so 
extensive as it is commonly believed.’280 There is a perception of Burke’s confrontation 
with modernity as being chiefly concerned with the loss of feelings, as perceived through 
aesthetics and sensory experience. Marshall Berman mentions Burke as one figure for 
whom modernity brings, ‘the development of industry as a radical negation of the 
development of feeling.’281 However, it is important to acknowledge that Burke also sees 
the value of reason: ‘But as many of the works of imagination are not confined to the 
representation of sensible object, nor to the efforts upon the passions, but extend 
themselves to the manners […] they come within the province of the judgement, which is 
improved by attention and by the habit of reasoning’.282 Burke’s definition of reason is an 
Anglican one; it is a ‘guide’ implanted into humankind by ‘Providence’: 
‘[w]e are indebted for all our Miseries to our Distrust of that Guide, which 
Providence thought sufficient for our Condition, our own natural Reason, 
                                                 
279
 Burke, Enquiry, in Writings, I, p. 283. 
280
 Ibid., p. 221. 
281
 Marshall Berman, p. 45. 
282
 Burke, Enquiry, Writings, I, p. 206. 
100 
 
which rejecting both in human and divine Things, we have given our 
Necks to the Yoke of political and theological Slavery’.283 
Humankind cannot ignore the guide supplied to it by providence: reason. Burke argues 
that rejection of reason in things divine and non-divine would resign humankind to the 
slavery of that which would rationalize emotion: theology and politics. Burke prizes the 
mind’s capacity to produce imagination and sentiment, and simply warns against a 
complete submission to reason. His Vindication describes reason in terms of a yoke that 
restricts contemplation outside of the ‘Sphere of our ordinary Ideas’. The continuation of 
that maxim in his Enquiry demonstrates a distance between reason and faith that can only 
be described as fideistic. 
William Hazlitt’s ‘On the Character of Burke’ (1807) expands on Burke’s 
predilection for the use of emotions in social governance: 
He knew that the rules that form the basis of private morality are not 
founded in reason, this is, in the abstract properties of those things which 
are the subjects of them, but in the nature of man, and his capacity of 
being affected by certain things from habit, from imagination and 
sentiment, as well as from reason.
284
 
Hazlitt explains Burke’s understanding that society must be governed upon the principles 
with which man is familiar in his private life. The most effective of these principles ‘are 
not founded [solely] in reason,’ but also from ‘imagination and sentiment.’ Burke is not 
for the dismissal of reason. He is, however, against the dismissal of imagination and 
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sentiment. Erring on the side of sentiment is a well-known feature of the eighteenth 
century. Langford explains that if there was an Anglican backlash against the rise of 
Deism, then ‘[s]entiment was intimately connected with the reviving […] the 
believers.’285 Langford summarizes the development of sentiment during the 
Enlightenment, in a way that appropriately encompasses Burke’s method: 
In France the sentimental tradition quickly became associated with the 
secularism of the French Enlightenment. But English secularism was a 
weaker force by far, and the English contribution to the use of sentiment 
was to turn it into a tool of piety rather than paganism.
286
 
Langford indicates an eighteenth-century trend that linked the English use of sentiment 
with religious objectives. Exemplified in the literature of the time, novels such as Samuel 
Richardson’s Pamela (1740), or Charles Shadwell’s play Irish Hospitality (1720), utilize 
sentiment to illustrate the ever-triumphant power of religious virtue. In both stories, the 
religious virtue of the main character is rewarded.
287
 Indeed, both works share a subtitle 
that incontrovertibly illustrates this trend: Virtue Rewarded. 
Langford’s assessment above is especially applicable to Burke’s writing. For 
France, the eighteenth-century trend of sentimentality manifested in radical factions that 
utilized sentiment to fuel the flames of social discontent. In essence, the use of sentiment 
eventually led to the secular movements of the French Revolution. Conversely, the trend 
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of sentimentality in England manifested as a religious device used against the threat of 
freethinking. For England, ‘sentiment was intimately connected with’ the mobilization of 
a religious revival—as a means to elicit sympathy.288 We can construe Burke’s use of 
sentiment as being compliant with the English use that Langford describes above—as a 
‘tool of piety’.289 
Burke’s Enquiry demonstrates an intricate understanding of sympathy—devoting 
three sections of the dissertation to the subject: ‘[…] sympathy must be considered as a 
sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in 
many respects as he is affected […]’.290 
Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the passion 
which animates us to it, is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some 
kind, let the subject matter be what it will; and as our Creator has designed 
we should be united by the bond of sympathy.
291
 
Essentially, the animator of humankind’s motivation to act on purpose is sympathy; all 
men are united in this bond. Burke treats the concept of awe in similar terms in his 
Enquiry: it is instilled in leaders; it pacifies and unifies men. The definition of awe and 
the various degrees of astonishment that Burke outlines in his Enquiry involves the 
process of terror through the senses: 
[…] a mode of terror is the exercise of the finer parts of the system; and of 
a certain mode of pain be of such a nature as to act upon the eye or the ear, 
as they are the most delicate organs, the affection approaches more nearly 
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to that which has a mental cause […] the highest degree I call 
astonishment; the subordinate degrees are awe, reverence, and respect 
[…].292 
I will argue that Burke’s analysis of awe is a generalized one that transcends boundaries 
between secular and sacred; it not only softens religious definition, but also argues a 
secular sublime akin to the sublimity seen in theories of modernity. 
The eighteenth-century definition of ‘awe’ is strikingly similar to Burke’s analysis 
‘of the passion caused by the sublime’ in his Enquiry: 
The feeling of solemn and reverential wonder, tinged with latent fear, 




In line with the definition above, Burke argues that awe comes from a fear or reverence 
produced by the perception of the sublime; which, Burke explains, is some version of 
power. Section V of Enquiry, on ‘Power’, begins: 
Besides these things which directly suggest the idea of danger, and those 
which produce a similar effect from a mechanical cause, I know of 
nothing sublime which is not some modification of power.
294
 
Burke goes on to blend divine and non-divine sources of awe, which comes from a 
perception of power. He asks the reader to consider the terror felt resulting from a 
powerful animal: 
                                                 
292
 Ibid., pp. 288–89. 
293
 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘awe’, c. 1757-1846, <http://www.oed.com/>, [April 1st, 2010]. 
294
 Burke, Enquiry, Writings, I, p. 236. 
104 
 
Look at a man, or any other animal of prodigious strength, and what is 
your idea before reflection? Is it that this strength will be subservient to 
you, to your case, to your pleasure, to your interest in any sense? No; the 
emotion you feel is, lest this enormous strength should be employed to the 
purposes of rapine destruction. That power derives all its sublimity from 
the terror with which it is generally accompanied.
295
 
Burke calls on examples of powerful animals that engender terror from their power, such 
as the Ox, Bull, Horse, Panther, and Rhinoceros. He further writes that that same source 
of the sublime in one’s perception of power is seen in monarchs: ‘The power which arises 
from institution in kings and commanders, has the same connection with terror. 
Sovereigns are frequently addressed with the title of dread majesty.’296 He then links 
these non-divine sources of sublime power with the sublime power perceived in the 
concept of God: ‘I know some people are of opinion, that no awe, no degree of terror, 
accompanies the idea of power, and have hazarded to affirm, that we can contemplate the 
idea of God himself without any such emotion.’297 In this way, Burke begins to 
dedifferentiate between sacred and profane (or secular) sublime. 
Burke cites divine, or deity-based, sources of awe: ‘In the scripture, wherever 
God is represented as appearing or speaking, every thing terrible in nature is called up to 
heighten the awe and solemnity of the divine presence. The Psalms, and the prophetical 
books are crouded with instances of this kind.’298 In the section on ‘Power’, Burke writes 
about the Biblical expression of fear, or awe, as seen in Psalm 139, he quotes: ‘fearfully 
                                                 
295
 Ibid., p. 236. 
296
 Ibid., p. 238. 
297
 Ibid., p. 238. 
298
 Ibid., p. 240. 
105 
 
and wonderfully am I made’.299 Burke suggests that the decidedly Christian awe is the 
same sort of awe in non-Christian texts: ‘An heathan poet has a sentiment of a similar 
nature’.300 Essentially, a poet conveying a sense of awe wherein God does not play a role 
is the same sense of awe as we see in Psalm 139. This is the demotion of religious belief, 
and the blending of religious boundaries. Burke continues to blur distinction between the 
sacred and the profane (or secular): 
It were endless to enumerate all the passages both in the sacred and 
profane writers, which establish the general sentiment of mankind, 
concerning the inseparable union of a sacred and reverential awe, with our 
ideas of the divinity. Hence the common maxim, primos in orbe deos fecit 
timor [in the first world the gods did fear]. This maxim may be, as I 
believe it is, false with regard to the origin of religion.
301
 
The boundaries between sacred and profane are softened in a ‘general sentiment’; a union 
of ‘awe’ makes them both sacred. If fear did not account for the origin of religion, then 
we can assume he thinks it was something like necessity. Nevertheless, the general 
sentiment of fear (or awe), which is present in both sacred and profane writers, is likened 
to the fear of the pre-Christian world felt for their gods. This perception of God(s) and 
religion is quite expanded, in the validation of Pre-Christian and Pagan awe. 
 Another way in which Burke engages with characteristics conceptually subversive 
to the one true God of Conservative revealed religion is the expanded, generalized way in 
which he refers to God: 
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I say then, that whilst we consider the Godhead merely as he is an object 
of the understanding, which forms a complex idea of power, wisdom, 
justice, goodness, all stretched to a degree far exceeding the bounds of our 
comprehension, whilst we consider the divinity in this refined and 




A sentence later, Burke continues: 
Thus when we contemplate the Deity, his attributes and their operation 
coming united on the mind, form a sort of sensible image, and as such are 
capable of affecting the imagination. Now though in a just idea of the 
Deity, perhaps none of his attributes are predominant, yet to our 
imagination, his power is by far the most striking.
303
 
Burke’s references to God throughout his Enquiry are expanded and obscured: ‘the 
Deity’, the Creator’, and especially ‘Godhead’. The idea of God is diluted to a 
generalized sacred concept. Burke’s diffused conceptualization of God resonates with 
themes antithetical to Protestant Christianity. For example, we can construe the Deistic 
resonance in Burke’s expanded concept of a Godhead, or Deity. 
Leslie Stephen’s grasp of eighteenth-century dissent and Deism helps to recognize 
this resonance. Stephen’s study is a discussion of ‘The Essence of Christianity’, in which 
established Christianity is identified through the exacting of certain prescribed articles, 
such as: ‘[…] a profession of belief in the Athanasian Creed, the Thirty Nine Articles, or 
the Westminster Confession […]’; whereas, the Deism professed by the likes of Locke 
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and Toland retains only a core belief in God.
304
 Stephen writes that Locke’s ‘Constructive 
Deism’ views any addition to this core belief (e.g., the articles of the Church) as 
‘illusory’.305 This definition of Deism resonates with Barnett’s (discussed above): 
‘entailing belief in God’, but dismissing all presumptions of Church authority as fraud.306 
While Deism shares a foundation in Christianity, it does not promote its prescribed 
articles of revelation. Instead, as Stephen explains, ‘[t]he passage from Christianity to 
Deism involves the attempt to banish mystery from theology, and to replace the God of 
revelation by the God of mathematical demonstration’.307 Stephen also explains that the 
definition of Locke’s and Toland’s ‘pure Deism’ ‘leaves speculations as to the nature of 
the Deity’; rather, the definition is ascertained through Deism’s rejection of the articles 
exacted by the Church.
308
 Therefore, it is valid to recognize Burke’s representation of 
God in universal terms (as opposed to doctrinal terms, as represented in the articles of 
revelation) as exhibiting Deistic qualities. 
 Burke explains the shared sacredness between pre-Christian and Christian 
religions, fear: 
It is on this principle that true religion has, and must have, so large a 
mixture of salutary fear; and that false religions have generally nothing 
else but fear to support them. Before the christian religion had, as it were, 
humanized the idea of the divinity and brought it somewhat nearer to us, 
there was very little said of the love of God. […] any man is able to attain 
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an entire love and devotion to the Deity, will easily perceive, that it is not 




Presumably, when Burke refers to Christianity’s humanization of divinity, he means the 
introduction of a humanized figure in Jesus; before Jesus, love had little to do with man’s 
understanding of God and religion. There is, of course, much value in exploring Burke’s 
thoughts on love and affection; Eagleton, Frohnen, and Bourke all highlight the 
importance of love and affection in Burke’s conceptualization of law and social stability. 
The Enquiry explains that pity comes from love and affection: ‘pity is a passion 
accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection’.310 Bourke 
acknowledges pity as one side of a ‘definite antithesis’ within which a variety of sensory 
responses are contained (fear is the other side of the antithesis).
311
 Frohnen observes the 
centralization of affection for the ancien régime.
312
 Bourke’s and Frohnen’s interpretation 
follows Eagleton’s, which joins Burke together with Hume and Shaftesbury in the ‘law of 
the Heart’: laws stem from manners, which stem from aesthetic experience; hence, laws 
come from the heart.
313
 However, when it comes to understanding Burke’s ideas 
surrounding religion, perhaps fear is more useful: according to Burke’s assertion above, 
love is not the natural response when we think of God; the natural response is fear, or 
awe. 
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Burke’s definition of awe suggests that man’s eschatological understanding is 
physiological, perceived by delicate organs such as the eye and ear. Other eighteenth-
century texts support the theory that a subjective, sensory, experience serves as empirical 
proof for the existence of God. In short, any awe-striking experience conceivably 
provides proof of God’s existence. According to James Foster’s essay The Usefulness, 
Truth, and Excellency of the Christian Revelation Defended (1731), an awe-striking 
sensory experience could provide sufficient evidence for convincing an Atheist of God’s 
existence: 
I very much question whether an atheist may not, by means of it, be 
convinced even of the being of a God. […] I believe, if we consider how 
much more strongly human nature is wrought upon by sensible proofs, 
than by a traditional account of things, we shall make no difficulty of 
allowing, that ‘tis very possible, if he had this evidence, he might entertain 
very different thoughts of them.
314
 
Foster suggests that the sheer amount of sensory evidence in the world for God’s 
existence is so abundant, that the level of difficulty in encouraging an atheist to consider 
it is low. The example he provides is the sensory experience of any miracle in nature. 
Upon viewing such a miracle, Foster suggests that a nonbeliever would be struck with 
awe, and therefore convinced of the existence of God. This is so, as awe dissipates the 
capacity for thought (i.e. reason). According to Burke’s Enquiry, ‘[n]o passion so 
effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear […]’.315 In 
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other words, Foster is describing the same approach used by the Anglican defence, and 
purported by Burke: to find empirical evidence for the existence of God (and therefore 
the necessity of the Church) in sensory experience. The most powerful sensory 
experience is awe. 
Unfolding the logic of Foster’s defence will help to recognize the Deistic 
characteristics in Burke’s Enquiry. Foster writes of empirical sensory experience sourced 
from a general Deity, and even nature—not the one true God: 
Let us suppose then, that he actually saw very great miracles wrought; that 
he had opportunities of examining them carefully; and that he was fully 
convinced upon the most diligent search, that they were all the known 
powers of nature, and contrary to the established course of things, and 
consequently was sure, not only that they were not juggling tricks, but that 
he was not imposed on by one who knew better than himself, the secret 
and invisible operation of natural causes…I will not take upon me to say, 
that these things are impossible to be accounted for, if there be not an 
infinite mind, the creator and governor of the universe, or consequently, 
that they are, strictly speaking, a demonstration of the existence of a Deity; 
but may they not have this effect upon him, to make him grave and 
considerate? May he not conclude, upon seeing such extraordinary 
appearances, that ‘tis at least worth his while to think a little whether there 
be a God, and whether there be any thing in religion, or no? The surprise 
and awe, with which men are naturally stuck at such great and unexpected 
events, has a tendency to correct the levity of their minds, which leads to 
111 
 
an utter dissipation of thought […].316 
Foster admits that perhaps the ‘powers of nature’ might not be the result of ‘an infinite 
mind’ or a ‘creator and governor of the universe’. His point lies in the possibility that the 
sensory effect of these ‘powers of nature’ could have such an effect on a nonbeliever to 
encourage him at least to consider the possibility that they might be resultant of a Deity. 
As above, Burke’s Enquiry comes to suggest a similar possibility: that subjects in nature 
can strike awe into a beholder, and effectively rob the mind of its powers of reason. 
 In both Foster and Burke, divine awe is subverted by the inclusion of non-divine, 
or secular, awe. For example, Burke describes the sense of awe a young person might feel 
toward figures of authority: ‘young persons little acquainted with the world, and who 
have not been used to approach men in power, are commonly struck with an awe which 
takes away the free use of their faculties’.317 Extending this religious or divine sense of 
awe to non-divine or worldly things, such as persons, and even nature, paradoxically 
undermines divine awe, or God-sourced awe, or at least the scriptural necessity of awe. 
Another example of this subversion is seen when Burke addresses the sublimity of nature 
in his Enquiry: he declares ‘night more sublime than day […]’, and a bright mountain less 
sublime than a dark one.
318
 This resonates with the more general and rather deistic idea 
that God acts through the laws of nature.
319
 In short, if both God and worldly things 
(profane poets) can produce awe, then the necessity to preserve established traditional 
ideas surrounding religion decreases. 
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 John Leland—a Presbyterian Minister, who catalogued Deists and Freethinkers of 
the eighteenth century—offers a standard definition of eighteenth-century Deism. 
According to Leland, Deism regards God ‘[…] with a sacred awe and reverence of him as 
the wise and righteous Governor of the world […].’320 The Deistic description of God is 
similar to the same notions of awe and reverence denoted by Burke in his Enquiry. J. 
C.D. Clark’s view of eighteenth-century Christian heterodoxy helps to recognize the 
shades of heterodoxy in Enquiry. In the eighteenth century, forms of heterodoxy (e.g., 
Natural Religion, Deism, atheism) generally fell under a ‘common label of  
“freethinkers” ’.321 Specifically, the term Deism was ‘[…] used to cover many different 
positions, may be approximately identified as an epistemological scepticism about 
revelation and an appeal to “natural religion” fundamentally to simplify the content of 
revealed theology’.322 Clark further describes the main objective of eighteenth-century 
Deism: 
Deism professed to find confirmation in the major items of belief held in 
common between all religions; it derived a flexible piety, or a disguised 
atheism, from the evidence of nature […].323 
Conceivably, if Burke’s Enquiry promotes a rather Deistic idea that God and nature strike 
awe ‘in common’, and further that empirical evidence of awe can be found in the 
‘evidence of nature’ or ‘powers of nature’, then the particularities of religious definition 
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begin to melt. Manifestations of ideologies that are deistically or religiously obscuring or 
diffusive conceptually subvert the themes of a God and religion. 
Jonathan Israel describes religiously subversive manifestations; versions of Deism 
and Atheism struggle against traditional religious ideas: 
Sporadically, especially in France and Italy, various manifestations of 
clandestine atheistic and deistic traditions reaching back via such authors 
as Bodin, Bruno, and Guilo Cesare Vanini, the alleged ‘atheist’ burned at 
the stake in Toulouse in 1619, and then through earlier Italian thinkers, 
notably Machiavelli and Pompanazzi, to ancient Roman and Greece, 
appeared, albeit usually in the veiled, camouflaged manner of the 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century libertines. This form of 
intellectual dissent, termed libertinisme érudit, still an appreciable force in 
the late seventeenth century, sought to mask, but simultaneously to 
disseminate, views opposed to prevailing theological and metaphysical 
orthodoxies by presenting opinions and quotations culled mostly from 
classical authors in innovative and seditious ways, paying particular 
attention to sceptical, irreverent, and atheistic sources such as Lucian, 




In short, religious modernity is marked by manifestations of ideologies that subvert 
religion, or ideologies that diffuse or disintegrate religious boundaries. The Epicurean 
example above rings with claims made by Paddy Bullard, who argues the Epicurean 
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characteristics of Burke’s Enquiry. Bullard refers to the passage in the Enquiry wherein 
Burke wonders about the satisfaction of the anatomist versus the ordinary man in the 
perception of the human body.
325
 Bullard argues, ‘so long as we take the Philosophical 
Enquiry on its own modest terms, we can say there is something characteristically 
Epicurean in the dilemma. […] [its] emphasis on the functions of basic sensory 
inclination is distinctively Epicurean’.326 The ‘dilemma’ is essentially between a 
physiological and a divine appreciation of anatomy. Bullard defines Burke’s Epicurean 
characteristics as inherited from seventeenth-century Epicureanism; he refers to Jonathan 
Swift’s patron, Sir William Temple, whose dissertation on gardening argues that it is 
prideful for man to attempt to understand nature.
327
 
John Dennis helps us to construe Epicureanism as being, antithetical to 
Established Religion, and therefore, thematically similar to other ideologies subversive to 
the ossified church: 
For after the death of Socrates, there started up several Sects of 
Philosophers, as the Cyrenaicks, Cynicks, Peripateticks, Epicureans, 
Sceptics, some of them immediately, but all within a hundred and fifty 
years, who were all of them mortal Enemies, not only to the Grecian 
Revelation, but to the Revealed Religion in general.
328
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Bullard explains: ‘It [Epicureanism] would divert scholarly inquiry away from the moral, 
the miraculous, the eschatological and the incorporeal, towards the visible, physical 
world and its living inhabitants.’329 Therefore, we can construe Epicurean characteristics 
as being antithetical to messages promoting empirical eschatological comprehension of 
God and religion. 
Bullard refers to the Epicurean characteristics in Burke’s Enquiry as participating 
in an attempt to assimilate aspects of Epicureanism (e.g. ‘its humane materialism’) ‘into 
the Christian realm of intellectual respectability’.330 I believe that the aspects of 
Epicureanism in Burke’s Enquiry are approximate to the ‘secular adaptations […] 
deployed by Anglicans against the Deists’ observed by Hampshire-Monk—inasmuch as 
they are adaptations aligned with thinking that is antithetical to established religion.
331
 
However, I would extend this observation to include adaptations to Deistic thinking and 
non-God-centred thinking—themes conceivably antithetical to the Christian theme that 
have been integrated into the Christian realm as modifications made to weather 
confrontation with modernization. 
Founded in Athens, Epicureanism is an ancient school of philosophy, ‘the 
philosophical system of Epicurus’ [wherein the] ultimate pleasure was held to be freedom 
from anxiety and mental pain, especially that arising from needless fear of death and of 
the gods.
332
 However, as we have seen above, in the human conceptualization of God the 
first and most natural response is fear; it is unavoidable. Bullard’s definition of 
Epicureanism is more applicable to Burke; he outlines its basic precepts: 
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The first, as we have seen, was that we live in a material universe of 
perpetual accumulation and dissolution, made up of randomly moving 
sub-visible atoms, uninformed by intellectual spirits of providential 
design. The second was that the gods, if they exist as anything more than 
images of perfection in human dreams, are extraterrestrial beings that lack 
either the will or the ability to intervene in mundane affairs. The third was 
that human motive is circumscribed by the urge to pursue pleasure and 
avoid pain, and that all doctrines of justice, duty and self-restraint are soon 
reduced to those simple realities.
333
 
I think if we are to understand Burke’s representation of religion, we can further 
articulate these Epicurean precepts in modernity: if we conceptualize a universe that is 
perpetually accumulating new information and identities and simultaneously dissolving 
them, this is Karl Marx’s modernity, an epoch wherein there is ‘uninterrupted disturbance 
of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation […]’.334 Bullard’s 
understanding of Epicureanism entails a universe uninformed by providential design; the 
deities (if they exist) lack the will to engage with human affairs. Burke’s version of the 
sublime is highly subjective, unmitigated by a disinterested object (God), the Godhead is 
viewed as a theoretical example and almost unnecessary. The disinterested deity is also 
key to Barnett’s definition of Deism, discussed above.335 Burke’s sublime resonates with 
the interpretation of the sublime by modernists, such as: Marshall Berman, Terry 
Eagleton, Paul Heelas, Phillip Blond, and John Milbank. Eagleton looks to Anthony 
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Ashley-Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury to discuss the sublime: 
Indeed Nature for Shaftesbury is itself the supreme artefact, brimful with 
all possibilities of being; and to know it is to share in both the creativity 
and the sublime disinterestedness of its Maker. The root of the idea of the 
aesthetic is thus theological: like the work of art, God and his world are 
autonomous, autotelic and utterly self-determining. The aesthetic is a 
suitably secularized version of the Almightly himself, not least in its 
blending of freedom and necessity.
336
 
Eagleton’s assessment of Shaftesbury above helps to understand Burke’s thinking 
surrounding the ‘Maker’: Burke’s offers versions of the sublime wherein the Godhead is 
not needed, removed, or disinterested; Burke’s conceptualization of the sublime that 
depicts ideas antithetical to God-centred Christianity deconstructs to ‘suitably 
secularized’ thinking about divinity. Like Eagleton, Bullard too observes the 
Enlightenment’s turn to subjectivity, in terms of aesthetics.337 We can then observe a turn 
to subjectivity in terms of the Enlightenment mind’s representation of religion and God. 
Consider the way that Berman looks at Baudelaire’s “Loss of a Halo”; it resonates 
with a conceptualization of the sublime wherein the Godhead is unnecessary.
338
 When 
Baudelaire says of the artist that ‘He has been his own king, his own priest, his own 
God’, this resonates with the highly subjective nature of the modern sense of the sublime: 
an experience of the sublime that is subjective, in no need of the object. Heelas writes 
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that the modern subjective sublime is ‘unmediated by objectivity’.339 Blond sees 
modernity as causing theology to lose its object [God]: ‘It can no longer point to anything 
with ostensive certainly and say the word, “God”.’340 Burke receives little more than a 
mention, by Heelas, Blond, and Milbank as to his contribution to aesthetic understanding 
of the sublime.
341
 However, I think Milbank’s thoughts on the modern sublime help to 
understand Burke’s conceptually secularized version of sublimity: 
The second element of theological genealogy for the eventual separation 
of the sublime from the beautiful concerns the idea of the “disinterested” 
love of God. […] if our relation to God has ceased to be in any sense a 
matter of hope—since of course God himself is not in need of hope—then 
has not this relationship become strikingly depersonalized? […] A god 
who offers only a “cold love” is thereby “objectified”, just as if he is the 
object only of our “cold love”, he is rendered abstract and empty.342 
Burke’s religious language abstracts concepts of God; it blends boundaries between the 
sacred and profane. Burke’s softening of religious boundaries, as seen above, is 
characteristic of eighteenth-century diffusive Christianity distinctive to modernity 
described by Jeffrey Cox. Cox compares the apathy about religion in the twentieth 
century to a similar occasion in the eighteenth century: 
But whatever major problems the churches faced, outright unbelief was 
not one of them. Direct evidence is virtually non-existent, but a variety of 
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religious professionals, describing what they were up against, sketched the 
outlines of a “diffusive Christianity” which comprised a general belief in 
God, a conviction that this God was both just and benevolent although 
remote from everyday concerns, a certain confidence that “good people” 
would be taken care of in the life to come, and a belief that the Bible was a 
uniquely worthwhile book and that children in particular should be 
exposed to its teachings.
343
 
The diluting of Christianity described by Cox shows that, in eighteenth-century terms, it 
is not so tenuous to connect or blend differing forms of Christian heterodoxy; as Clark 
suggests above, referring to Deism as disguised atheism: for example, the likes of 
Theologian Richard Bentley regarded all forms of dissent and freethinking as atheism.
344
 
Therefore, from recognizing Deism in Burke’s conceptualizations surrounding religious 
ideas, we can recognize other characteristics antithetical to Christian orthodoxy. 
Observations made by David Berman explain how a diluted, expanded treatment of the 
religious can amount to the irreligious or atheistic manifestations as Israel describes 
above. Berman describes Radicati’s Twelve discourses concerning Religion and 
Government (2
nd
 edn. 1734, Albert Radicati, Count of Passeron): ‘His concept of God is 
so expanded that virtually every account of the world must be deistic or theistic.’345 The 
following is from Radicati’s text: 
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[…] to say that Deists are Atheists is false; for they that are so called by 
the Vulgar, and by those whose interest it is to decry them, admit a first 
cause under the names of God, Nature, Eternal Being, Matter, universal 
Motion or Soul. Such were Democritus, Epicurus, Diogoras, Lucian, 
Socrates, Anaxagoras, Seneca, Hobbes, Blount, Spinosa, Vanini, St 
Evremond, Bayle Collins, and in general all that go under the name of 
Speculative Atheists; and none but fools or madmen can ever deny it. So 
that the word Atheist must signify Deist, if nothing. There being no such 
thing as an Atheist in the world as the Ignorant imagine, and the crafty 
Priests would have believed, when they brand with this odious name such 
as detect their impostures.
346
 
Berman says that Radicati is an atheist because his Philosophical Dissertation upon 
Death (1732) equates God with the material world. So, according to Berman, a 
description of God that is so expanded as to deem him unnecessary, or one that is rooted 
in material or worldly descriptors, is ultimately atheistic: ‘Though it contains denial of 
God’s existence or avowal of atheism, the Philosophical Dissertation [from Radicati] is 
atheistic in all but name.’347 It follows that Burke’s abstracted treatment of God and 
religious boundaries validates the recognition of Deistic, secular, or even atheistic, 
qualities within Burke’s early thinking concerning religion. It is unlikely that Berman is 
suggesting that every single expanded Deistic description of God amounts to atheism; 
however, qualifying God in expanding, boundless, terms (the way Burke does above) 
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conceivably deconstructs and subverts the very concept of God-centred Christian 
orthodoxy. The subversive non-God-centred assimilations in Burke’s language indicate 
the paradoxical ossification and erosion of religious concepts in modernity. 
Eagleton writes about the modern paradox of social order in a way that resonates 
with the undermining paradox evident in Burke’s religious language: ‘The very 
conditions which guarantee social order also paralyses it’.348  It is this sort of paradox that 
I argue is prevalent throughout Burke’s writing—especially within his treatment of 
religion(s). The very language he uses to elevate a God-centred religious establishment 
undermines it. Eagleton suggests a similar paradox about the sublime: 
The sublime is the anti-social condition of all sociality, the infinitely 
unrepresentable which spurs us on to yet finer representations, the lawless 




I argue that Burke’s conceptualization of sublime awe subverts the capacity for social 
order in religion, his obscuring of God invites sects of heterodoxy (e.g. Deism) that 
further obscure the systems of manners and practice promoted by religion. Eagleton 
deconstructs Burke’s sublime into a political paradox of pain versus pleasure, man versus 
woman: ‘The political paradox is plain: only love will truly win us to the law, but this 
love will erode the law to nothing.’350 I observe a religious paradox that increased 
inclusion of differing conceptualizations (or anti-conceptualizations) of God erodes the 
concept of God into empty abstraction. The inclusion of differing conceptualizations of 
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awe and God is abstracted even further in the major publication that follows his 
Vindication and his Enquiry. In his Account of the European Settlements in America 
(1757), Burke further erodes religious boundaries by elevating the sacredness of non-
Christian ideologies. This, I argue, contributes to an interpretation of Burke as a 
progenitor of progressive Enlightenment. 
Account: The expanded representation of God; the legitimization of non-Christian 
religious practice, relative to indigenous culture 
Eagleton writes about Burke’s thinking on law, and the cultural prejudice that 
precedes it; he argues that Burke is ‘resolutely anti-Enlightenment in [the] belief that 
cultural predilection or pre-understanding is the framework of all more formalized 
knowledge.’351 I dispute the interpretation of Burke as an anti-Enlightenment reactionary; 
I believe we can view Burke as progressive by looking at his thinking concerning 
religion. While Burke’s value of religious identity is grounded in a cultural basis, it is less 
about a certain sect being predisposed to a certain framework of feeling, and more about 
the destructiveness in deracinating an established framework of belief. Burke’s thinking 
about religion proves this: if Burke thought that certain cultures were predisposed to 
certain frameworks of law or governance, then he would have supported the concept of 
‘Geographical morality’ argued by the Hastings defence in his impeachment trial.352 
While this thesis includes a discussion of Burke’s engagement with India and the 
Hastings trial in the next chapter, I will mention now that we know that he opposed the 
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idea of prejudiced morality and justice. If we look at Burke’s thinking about religious 
cultural identities, we will see that its cultural base is about freedom and 
enfranchisement, and less about prejudice. 
Frohnen makes too much of the ‘prescriptive’ nature of Burke’s anti-
Enlightenment Conservative conceptualization of law.
353
 However, others have 
interpreted Burke’s thoughts concerning law and legislation more fairly: Bullard shows 
that Burke was alive to culturally aware legislation. He looks at Burke’s speeches on 
America from the 1770s to illustrate that, for Burke, appropriate rhetoric is linked with 
appropriate legislative approach—that it should attend to the character and disposition of 
the colonists.
354
 If we unveil more of the quote Bullard reads, I believe we can see 
another dimension: 
The object is wholly new in the world. It is singular: it is grown up to this 
magnitude and importance within the memory of man; nothing in history 
is parallel to it. All the reasonings about it, that are likely to be at all solid, 
must be drawn from its actual circumstances. In this new system, a 
principle of commerce, of artificial commerce, must predominate. […] 
People must be governed in a manner agreeable to their temper and 
disposition; and men of free character and spirit must be ruled with, at 
least, some condescension to this spirit and this character.
355
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There is scope for understanding the religious context of this culturally aware approach. 
Eagleton writes about an aestheticized morality in the eighteenth century; manners are the 
manifestation of aestheticized morality in social conduct, upon which law depends.
356
 For 
Burke, behaviour is guided from the surface inward through imitation. The Enquiry 
argues that imitation ‘[…] is one of the strongest links of society […] This forms our 
manners, our opinions, our lives […]’357 In other words, manners are agreed-upon 
behaviours, grounded in cultural compliance. When we think of the temperament and 
disposition of a governed people, we are essentially thinking about the shared manners of 
a people; the shared manners manifest in agreed-upon religious practice. Before Burke’s 
days in parliament, however, before the writings and speeches surrounding imperial 
operations in the colonies, we can see Burke’s awareness of the religious culture of non-
Christian sects. 
In Burke’s Account, he describes the commonality between differing sects of 
indigenous Americans—relative to culture: 
The Aborigines of America, throughout the whole extent of the two vast 
continents which they inhabit, and amongst the infinite number of nations 
and tribes into which they are divided, differ very little from each other in 




He goes on to represent a relative cultural legitimacy in the manners and customs of the 
indigenous American natives in terms of their religious practices—non-Christian 
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It must not be denied that they have the use of some specifics of wonderful 
efficacy; the power of which they however attribute to the magical 
ceremonies with which they are constantly administered.
359
 
Burke explains above that the indigenous population of America finds legitimacy for 
their ceremonies in distant antiquity; their beliefs are established in cultural tradition. 
This description lends legitimacy to non-Christian religious sects. Burke also finds 
cultural legitimacy in sects of these indigenous peoples who (according to his thinking) 
do not acknowledge a God; others, acknowledge a generalized supreme deity: 
Some appear to have very little idea of God. Others entertain better 
notions; they hold the existence of a Supreme Being, eternal and 
incorruptible, who has power over all.
360
 
Here, we see that Burke favours a sect that would acknowledge some kind of supreme 
deity, rather than none at all; which resonates with the message in his Vindication—that a 
violent religion is better than none at all. The acknowledgment of an expanded notion of 
God in this passage also rings with the abstracted conceptualization of God in Burke’s 
Enquiry. Burke’s Account emphasises ‘Liberty in its fullest extend is the darling passion 
of the Americans. To this they sacrifice every thing.’361 When he highlights the value of 
liberty for this indigenous population, it resonates with the increase in value placed on 
religious freedom in modernity, observed by Carlson and Owens above. Burke’s 
legitimization of non-Christian sects becomes more pronounced when he engages with 
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Indian affairs; the next chapter of this thesis will show how Burke conveys equal 
legitimization for Christian and non-Christian sects. 
Burke’s Account, also engages with the concept of awe in a way that aligns it with 
the Vindication and his Enquiry. The focus on the awe of God, as well as the awe of 
political figures and nature, is of particular interest to Burke’s thinking about awe as a 
method of thwarting despotism. The language from this definition is similar to the awe 
Burke writes about in his Enquiry, as being sourced from sovereigns.
362
 In his Account, 
Burke recounts the story of Francis Pizarro, an early Spanish explorer of Peru who 
laboured in conquering the native people. Burke describes him as ‘a barbarous prince, 
who was far from being a consummate politician,’ who intended to achieve submission 
through terror.
363
 Pizarro did not know when to quell his thirst for political power, and 
thereby met his demise (through his beheading).
364
 Burke writes of Pizarro’s story that it 
‘is a striking example how necessary it is for a great man to have an awe upon him from 
some opposition that may keep his prudence alive, and teach him to have a watch upon 
his passions’.365 Burke argues that it is important to instil ‘awe upon’ such a ‘great man’ 
that he may remember to ‘watch upon his passions’. 
This observation is very like the example from Montesquieu’s Persian Letters in 
which he explains the powers of religion in restraining despotism. Earlier, this chapter 
included a discussion of Montesquieu’s story of the King of France from his Persian 
Letters, in which he describes religion’s power to instil ‘awe’ the ‘great man’ in the form 
of a ‘powerful magician […] called the Pope,’ who makes him believe that things are not 
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what they seem: (e.g., bread is flesh, and wine is blood).
366
 Montesquieu’s description is 
not only quite brazen in its mockery of Catholic doctrine, but also it illustrates religion’s 
restraining power over a monarch. According to Burke’s view, this sort of restraint used 
against a monarch is ‘necessary’; it is further carried out by bestowing ‘awe upon him’. 
Conclusion to Chapter 1 
If the seventeenth century ossified concepts, such as the Episcopal Polity of the 
established church (in the Act of Uniformity, 1662, and the 1688 revolution), perhaps 
then we can construe certain events in the eighteenth century as contributing to a 
softening of these concepts. From increased measures in tolerance for Christian 
heterodoxy (by way of the Toleration Acts of 1689, 1779), and the age of revolution 
(which entailed the secular upheaval of religious establishment during the French 
Revolution, along with the re-shaping of the laws governing Catholics with the repeal of 
the Test Act(s) of 1673–78, and the 1778 Catholic Relief Act), we can see how Zygmunt 
Bauman observes the solids of ancient development liquefying or ‘coming apart at the 
seams […]’, by the eighteenth century.367 Bauman’s metaphor of liquefying solids is 
aligned with Hume’s eighteenth-century definition of ‘our modern expedient’, inasmuch 
as both ideas amount to ancient practices being laid to waste, at times without regard for 
posterity.
368
 Burke’s representation of established religious culture in his early writings 
operates in this paradigm: the ancient establishment of the Anglican Church under threat 
from the modern expedient of Christian heterodoxy. Returning to Marshall Berman’s 
framework of modernity: in these early writings, it is clear that Burke is ‘frightened by 
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the nihilistic depths to which so many modern adventures lead’ (e.g. the potential danger 
in rational religion and Christian heterodoxy); yet, he is ‘alive to new possibilities’ (e.g., 
Deistic representations of awe and conceptions of awe less dependent on a deity 
altogether).
369
 In Burke’s Vindication and Enquiry, I have shown that his language 
demotes, dilutes, and even removes, the necessity for one’s conceptualization of God; I 
have shown how this resonates with ideologies antithetical to established religion (e.g., 
Freethinking, Deism, and non-God-centred themes). Burke’s Account, like his Enquiry, 
welcomes expanded interpretations of God, and begins to lend relative cultural legitimacy 
to non-Christian sects. I believe that engagement with these ideologies conceptually 
subverts Protestant, Christ-centred, ideology, and demonstrates a certain progressiveness 
or willingness to modify as an act of preservation against the threat of the modern 
expedient—rather than a Christ-centred Conservative resistance to progression. 
By the 1760s, Burke is a politician. In my next chapter, we will see how Burke 
carries over his representation of religious culture (as set down in the literature of the 
1750s) into real practice, when he confronts the events in India and Ireland. 
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Ch. 2: ‘Religious culture struggle in the shifting sands of modernity: The writings 
on India and Ireland’ 
Introduction 
This second chapter of my thesis is an examination of Burke’s writings from the 
1770s and 1780s—his thoughts surrounding India and Ireland. To my mind, scholarship 
of Burke’s writings on India and Ireland is lacking in attention to a global religious 
context. My critical analysis of these writings in this chapter are intended to fill this void. 
First, I will look at Burke’s Indian writings: Madras and Bengal (1774–85) and the 
launching of the Hastings Impeachment (1786–88). I will demonstrate how Burke’s 
conception of religion(s) transcends simple toleration, reaching closer to progressive 
multiculturalism. Second, I show how Burke’s multicultural approach to indigenous 
religious governance in India resonates with his treatment of Catholic emancipation in his 
Irish writings: his Tracts relating to Popery Laws (1765), the Letter to Lord Kenmare 
(1782), his Letter To Sir Hercules Langrishe: The Roman Catholics Of Ireland (1792), 
and the Second letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question, (1795). I argue 
that the writings on Ireland and India both display struggle between the preservation of 
indigenous religious culture, very modern in its placement at the threshold of early 
globalization. 
In my critical interpretation of Burke’s writings on Ireland, I counter 
interpretations of Burke that overemphasise his potential Catholic connections: as we 
shall see from O’Brien, Eamonn O’Flaherty, Luke Gibbons, and Thomas H.D. Mahoney. 
My readings of Burke’s Irish writings, and their connection with his Indian writings, 
differ from conventional readings of Burke’s Irish writings in the following way: instead 
130 
 
of wondering (as the above critics do) about the potential depth of Burke’s Catholic roots, 
I wonder about the stability of cultural roots in the eighteenth century, altogether. 
Consider Marshall Berman’s description of modernity in the 1790s, ‘an age that 
generates explosive upheavals in every dimension of personal, social and political life’.370 
Jonathan Israel also described the severing and demolition of cultural roots in the 
Enlightenment.
371
 It is my position that wondering about the depth of Burke’s suspect 
Catholic roots seems too speculative to stand in the inconstant religious culture of 
eighteenth-century modernity. 
I will then show that Burke’s representation of religious culture in these texts 
reveals some difficulties that resonate with conflicts discussed in more recent theories of 
modernity (including Zygmunt Bauman, Jonathan Israel, and Paul Heelas). For example, 
I believe we can think of the above texts as reflective of Bauman’s and Israel’s use of the 
term kulturkampf (‘culture struggle’) to encompass both religious struggles and struggles 
of the ‘nation-state’.372 
The contemporaneity of Burke’s writings on Ireland and India warrants their 
treatment together. For example, Burke’s response to the Catholic Relief Act of 1782 (in 
his Letter to a Peer of Ireland) falls just before Warren Hastings was arranged in 1788, 
and just after his Enquiry into the Policy of Making conquests for the Mahometans in 
India (1779)
373
 His letter to Scottish Reverend John Erskine, concerning Catholic 
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emancipation, was written in the same year (1779); his letters to Sir Hercules Langrishe, 
also concerning Catholic emancipation, (1792, 1795) fall closely behind the speeches 
given during the Hastings trial in the 1780s–90s.374 In this chapter, I will look closely at 
these texts, among others. 
Beyond the chronological closeness of these writings, there is a thematic 
closeness: scholars now habitually link Ireland and India in Burke’s political thought, in 
terms of colonial rule and imperial practice. Conor Cruise O’Brien set a precedent for 
thematically linking major political endeavours of Burke’s lifetime; he links Burke’s 
political thinking about Ireland and India (along with America and France): ‘The four 
themes were linked in his own mind’.375 Luke Gibbons later suggests a similar linkage in 
Burke’s political thought: ‘If there is any train of thought linking Burke’s indictments of 
colonial rule in Ireland, India, or America, it is the fatal logic whereby colonial regimes 
end up perpetuating the worst traits of the societies they endeavour to civilize […]’.376 
Seamus Deane’s work on Burke’s colonial thinking treats ‘pollutions in Ireland and 
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India’ as veritably synonymous.377 Jennifer G. Pitts follows suit, observing that ‘Burke’s 
writings on Ireland show that he understood a shared logic of exclusion to characterize 
Britain’s colonial relations with its poor, Catholic neighbor as well as with the distant 
peoples of India’.378 Other recent efforts in linking Burke’s political thought about 
Ireland and India, from Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, echoes back to O’Brien’s, 
suggesting that the themes are ‘inextricably interconnected in Burke’s mind […]’.379 
Among others, the scholars above provide comprehensive analysis of the political link 
between these two themes (India and Ireland); none comprehensively analyse Burke’s 
global conceptualization of religion(s) as it links the two themes, and what it reveals of 
the concept of religion in modernity. My analysis in this chapter is intended to remedy 
this inattention. Departing from the scholars above, my intention is not to understand 
historical or political questions; rather, I analyse Burke’s writings on India and Ireland 
(and some on America and Quebec) to understand the way Burke represents his 
conceptualization of religion(s), and further, to understand how his representation of 
global religions in his writings and speeches contributes to modern representation of 
global religions. I suggest that in the rapidly shifting sands of modernity (specifically the 
eighteenth-century globalizing landscape) Burke preserves traditional religious culture(s) 
by diminishing cultural difference; however, the labels of universalism, pluralism or 
liberalism do not wholly encompass this thinking.
380
 
                                                 
377
 Deane, p. 3. 
378
 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 61. 
379
 Brendan Simms, D.J.B. Trimm, Humanitarian Intervention: A History, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p. 100. 
380
 ‘Universalism’ is committed to ‘concern for others without regard to national or other allegiances’, 
Oxford English Dictionary, ‘universalist’, <http://www.oed.com/>, [February 12th, 2012]. The fourth 




I believe that by examining the representation of religion in these writings, we see 
Burke’s inclusive conceptualization of religion(s) perpetuating the progress of 
modernity—not reacting against it. I, therefore, argue against critical interpretations that 
would depict Burke as an anti-modern, reactionary, or over-emphasize the influence of 
his suspected Catholic identity. Deane, for example, when he links Ireland and India, 
conveys Burke as a man who ‘sought and fought for an idea, even an ideal, of traditional 
authority which [he] felt was menaced, if not entirely overcome, by the hostile forces of a 
new world that had emerged as a consequence of the designed and revolutionary 
deformation of the old’.381 I argue against the aspect of Deane’s observation that 
perpetuates the narrow view of Burke as a reactionary, opposed to the deforming progress 
of modernity. We can interpret the softening of boundaries between religious sects, and 
the welcoming of civic freedom for sects diverging from traditional Anglican authority, 
as a sort of ‘deformation of the old’. 
Even the scholars who recognize a less conservative Burke still position him in 
opposition to the progress denoting modernity—to my mind, perpetuating a reactionary 
Burke. For example, while Gibbons notices the ‘counter-currents’ to Burke’s 
Conservatism, he still focuses on Burke’s response to the French Revolution to position 
him against progress and evidences his ‘counter Enlightenment’ leanings.382 I will argue 
that Burke’s open-mindedness and multicultural inclusiveness in his representation of 
global religions, in fact, position him as a progenitor of the progress that denotes 
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modernity. Gibbons, Pitts, Simms and Trim, emphasise Burke’s liberalism, evidenced in 
his Universalist leanings. I analyse these interpretations as well, arguing that enrolling 
Burke in liberalism is as equally restrictive as a limiting reactionary label, when it comes 
to our understanding of Burke. I believe that such exacting labels oversimplify Burke’s 
thought; more dangerously, they set up a system of false alternatives, wherein Burke 
must be fixed with one label or the other. For these reasons, I prefer to think of the 
tension between such categorizations as characteristic of modernity, or what it means to 
be modern; as Marshall Berman explains: ‘To be modern […] is to be both revolutionary 
and conservative […] to be fully modern is to be anti-modern […]’.383 
Like others, Gibbons looks at Burke’s aesthetic theory as manifested in his 
political thought; specifically Gibbons looks at the image of the mutilated body to 
ascertain Burke’s understanding of terror in colonial practice—just as Eagleton does.384 
In his study, Gibbons remarks that Burke’s prioritization of tradition has labelled him a 
‘patron saint’ of Conservatism.385 While Gibbons observes that it may be an 
oversimplification to evidence Burke’s Conservatism in his prioritization of tradition, he 
argues that this prioritization may still support the construal of Burke’s opposition to 
modernity: 
[While Burke may have] laid the basis for a more culturally sensitive 
version of the Enlightenment, at least where native or indigenous people 
were concerned—even if in the metropolitan centre, where tradition stood 
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Gibbons explains Burke’s value of tradition did not indicate an opposition to political 
renovation: ‘Rather, it [tradition] was [to Burke] a highly malleable form of life, 
adaptable to the circumstances of both time and place and answerable to the body and its 
social needs as well as the more cerebral demands of reason’387 Essentially, Gibbons 
recognizes the ‘counter-conservative currents’ to Burke’s political thought; I believe we 
can recognize the same in Burke’s religious thought: his value of religious tradition does 
not mean he was opposed to its renovation or malleability. Gibbons’ observation echoes 
Alfred Cobban, who highlights instances wherein Burke supports the need for political 
renovation: for example, the upheaval of the Warren Hastings administration in India.
388
 
However, Gibbons credits Burke’s malleability as a political thinker, where I wish to 
interpret Burke as a quasi-religious thinker.
389
 Cobban does mention a certain religious 
context behind Burke’s counter-Conservatism, but solely as a medievalist figure 
contributing to a Christ-centred social order of Western Christendom.
390
 I wish to 
demonstrate that we can also evidence Burke’s malleability, his counter-Conservatism, in 
his religious thought; further, these counter-currents are not restricted to Christ-centred 
culture, but transcend boundaries of sect and nation. 
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Like White, Deane and others, Gibbons evidences a ‘counter-Enlightenment’ by looking 
at Burke’s anxiety over the cost of losing tradition to the advances of modernity—
Burke’s ‘refusal to countenance advances in civility and modernity that disavowed the 
cost of progress’.391 While I agree that Burke expressed anxieties over the cost of 
progress (especially concerning the French Revolution, which I address in the next 
chapter), I believe studies of Burke that emphasize his anxiety toward the advances in 
modernity contribute to an image of an anti-modern, reactionary Burke. In this chapter, I 
will counter this image by demonstrating the progressiveness of his representation of 
global religions. To convey Burke’s anxiety toward progress, Gibbons also makes use of 
twentieth century theorists to translate Burke’s thought—his reactionary thought. He 
makes a very brief comparison to the way Burke construes the barbarism of the French 
Revolution and the way Zygmunt Bauman construes the ‘barbarism of the Holocaust’.392 
I wish to offer some analysis that counterbalances Burke’s opposition to progress, as 
evinced through a parallel drawn between Burke and Bauman. Instead, I will draw a 
parallel between Burke and Bauman (and others) to highlight a less reactionary Burke, 
alive to the anthropological sources of religious culture.
393
 I wish to highlight Burke’s 
particular method of preserving indigenous religious identity while highlighting the 
commonality to be found between differing sects. I believe Frederick G. Whelan’s 
analysis of Burke’s engagement with Indian culture applies not only to the way in which 
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Burke represents non-Christian religions, but also non-Anglican Christian religions. 
Whelan refers to Burke’s ‘mixed rhetorical strategy of preserving some of India’s exotic 
quality while at the same time trying to render its essential features familiar’.394 
Ultimately, I will argue that rendering religious cultural difference less distinguishable 
constitutes Burke’s representation of global religions. I wish to show how his 
representation of global religions (to use Burke’s words) ‘softened, blended and 
harmonized the colours of the whole’.395 
Before looking closely at the texts listed above (beginning with his writings on 
India) it is necessary to understand the background of Burke’s involvement with Indian 
struggles, as well as the background to the struggles themselves.  
India—Early globalization; Rendering Religious Features Familiar 
 By 1759, Burke embarks on a political career, as the personal secretary to 
William Gerard Hamilton, (MP for Petersfield, later to become chief secretary to Lord 
Halifax, Lieutenant of Ireland, from 1761, then Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer from 
1763).
396
 In 1765, Burke parted ways with Hamilton after a quarrel about his 
employment; he was later made secretary to Charles, Watson-Wentworth, second 
Marquess of Rockingham, upon the recommendation of Lord Cavendish.
397
 The first 
Rockingham ministry fell a year later. The Rockingham Whig opposition was responsible 
for arguing in favour of conciliation with America, supporting measures for Catholic 
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relief and trade with Ireland, and policing the chartered rights and operations of the East 
India Trading Company; it has often been suggested that Burke was a strong influence in 
shaping Rockingham Whig thinking, especially in terms of limiting the power of the 
monarchy.
398
 Burke continued this thinking when he earned his seat as a Member of 
Parliament for Bristol in 1774: his support of Catholic relief, his conciliatory speeches 
about America, and a lack of funds, lost him his seat in 1780.
399
 By 1782, the 
Rockingham Whigs were back in power, but Rockingham himself died only a few 
months into his second term. The fall of the previous North administration, Britain’s 
defeat in the American Revolution, and Rockingham’s death precipitated an intra-Whig 
divide: Charles James Fox, who was once aligned with Rockingham (and Burke) in the 
conciliatory posture toward America, would later lead a faction of Whigs, and bitterly 
disagree with Burke in their views over the French Revolution.
400
 However, before this 
divide, Burke’s political activity involved a long and laborious engagement with the East 
India Trading Company’s governance: first in 1782 on a committee investigating the 
Company’s activities in Calcutta, then in the seven-year impeachment trial of Warren 
Hastings. Hastings was arraigned in 1788, with twenty ‘High Crimes and 
Misdemeanours’ said to have taken place while he served as Governor General of India 
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(1773—84); impeachment was an uncommon legal practice in the eighteenth century, 
and he was eventually acquitted in 1795.
401
 
A series of events (corruptions and warfare) had seen the British East India 
Company evolve from a commercial endeavour to a vehicle for cultural and financial 
exploitation. In summary, the commercial development of the Company intersected with 
political conflict in the Indian territories: struggles for power in Calcutta and Bengal 
between the French and British Trading Companies sparked the Carnatic Wars. The first 
conflict (1746–48) took place before Hastings arrived in Calcutta (in 1750). However, 
Hastings was involved in the 1757 conflict—the Plassey revolution—which obtained the 
governance of Calcutta for the Company. Hastings volunteered under Major General 
Robert Clive for this coup. Clive’s army thwarted the rebellion lead by Siraj-al-duala; this 
then established the military supremacy of the British Company in Bengal, and placed 
Mir Jaffar on its throne. However, the Company demanded payment from the new 
Nawab for the protection it offered to the province. The need to appoint a British resident 
at Murishbad to enforce payment from the Nawab was filled by Hastings in 1758, and 
still occupied this seat when the British placed yet another Nawab at Bengal in 1760, Mir 
Kasim. This essentially allowed the Company officials financially to exploit the province, 
which led to its bankruptcy and violent measures of revenue collection from free-holders, 
workers, and others involved with the Company. It was Hastings’ alleged participation in, 
or overseeing of, the Company’s embezzlement, financial exploitation, and even the 
collection of revenues that largely made up the list of charges that ultimately led to his 
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impeachment trial. Meanwhile, Mir Kasim and Hastings attempted to reach agreement 
regarding the rights of private trade with British merchants, but ultimately failed when 
violence erupted: Kasim was overthrown in 1764, and Hastings resigned from his post in 
1765. 
 By 1771, the directors of the East India Trading Company were looking to 
appoint a new governor at Bengal. Hastings filled the post in 1772. The above series of 
British successes in overthrowing Indian Nawabs would serve as Hastings’ model of 
sovereign company authority to make ‘further incursions into areas of government 
allocated to the Nawabs’.402 As governor, Hastings made maximizing the Company’s 
revenue through steep taxation of other colonial provinces a priority; but ‘his revenue 
administration was generally regarded as a failure’.403 It is within Hastings’ collection of 
revenue that most of the allegations of corruption rest. The minutes of the trial record 
Burke’s description of the atrocities carried out by one of Hastings’ collectors, Devi Sing: 
The wretched husbandmen were obliged to borrow money […] at six 
hundred per cent to satisfy him! Those who could not raise the money 
were most cruelty tortured: cords were drawn tight round their fingers, till 
the flesh of the four on each hand was actually incorporated, and become 
one solid mass; the fingers were then parted by wedges of iron and wood 
driven in between them.
404
 
Hastings was also accused of the alleged judicial murder of the Indian official 
Nundcomar—or Nanda Kumar—who had previously accused Hastings of 
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 Nundcomar was charged and found guilty of forgery, sentenced to 
death and executed. At the launching of the Hastings impeachment trial, Burke divulges 
this alleged corruption: 
He [Hastings] attempted to accuse Nundcomar of a conspiracy, which was 
a way he then and has ever since used, whenever means were taken to 
detect any of his iniquities. […] A man might be convicted as a 
Conspirator and yet live. He might put the matter into other hands, and go 
on with his Information. Nothing less than stone dead would do the 
business. And here happened an odd concurrence of circumstances. Long 
before Nundcomar preferred his charge, he knew that Mr. Hastings was 
plotting his ruin […] But the law took its course. I have nothing more to 
say than that the man is gone, justly if you please. It did so happen, luckily 
for Mr. Hastings; it so happened that Mr. Hastings’s depositions and the 
justice of that Court, and the resolution never to relax, did all concur just 




Prior to the Hastings trial, Burke is known to have had knowledge of the region. P.J. 
Marshall observes that Burke is thought to have been an avid reader of travel accounts, 
even from early life.
407
 David P. Fidler and Jennifer Welsh also observe that ‘Burke was 
                                                 
405
 Brian Smith, ‘Edmund Burke, the Warren Hasting Trial, and the Moral Dimension of Corruption, Polity, 
40, (2008), 70–95, p. 70. Also Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
<http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/NUM_ORC/NUNCOMAR.html>, [February 28th, 2010]. 
406
 Burke, The Launching of the Hastings Impeachment, ‘Opening of Impeachment’, in Writings, VI, pp. 
390–91. 
407
 Marshall, Writings, VI, p. 20. 
142 
 
not completely ignorant of India when he entered Parliament’.408 Frederick G. Whelan 
makes the same observation—that Burke’s awareness of non-Western, specifically 
Indian, cultures was unique: 
Burke was one of the first major European thinkers, and one of the first 
writers in the traditional canon of Western political theory, to have made a 
serious effort to understand a non-Western civilization and to incorporate 
his findings into his general political thought […] In taking India 
seriously, Burke was at the same time one of the first major Western 




An observation made in a study by Jennifer G. Pitts, nearly ten years later, is indebted to 
Whelan’s identification of Burke as an innovator—appreciating non-Western cultures. 
Pitts writes: Burke ‘was arguably the first political thinker to undertake a comprehensive 
critique of British imperial practice in the name of justice for those who suffered from its 
moral and political exclusions’.410 Some scholars have argued that Burke’s appreciation 
of non-Western nations under Western governance as the incorporation of an enlarged 
liberal awareness was born out of sympathy for colonials (Gibbons, Bullard, Uday Singh 
Mehta).
411
 To suggest that Burke’s engagement with India is the ultimate realization of 
the sympathy he describes in his Enquiry is valid; yet, I am not sure that Burke’s cultural 
inclusiveness is inspired entirely by sympathy. After all, welcoming diversity in the form 
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of non-Western civilizations is far less costly than excluding non-Western portions of the 
empire. To posit sympathy as the chief motivator for Burke’s political positions 
underestimates his political acumen; specifically, to argue—as Conor Cruise O’Brien 
does—that Burke’s position concerning India is motivated by a need to atone for 
abandoning his native Ireland and its religion feels like a fallacious argument to 
probability.
412
 In any case, recognition of Burke’s representation of global religions, as a 
critical imprint, in his literature concerning Ireland and India is missing from the 
conversation about Burke and imperialism (e.g. above, from Whelan and Pitts). Paul 
Heelas explains of modern religion: ‘Religious exclusivism has, in measure, given way to 
religious inclusivism.’413 I believe this articulates Burke’s thinking about religion: 
progressing the empire through modernity means religious exclusivism must give way to 
religious inclusivism. 
Even before the Hastings trial, Burke’s conceptualization of global religions is 
expanded. Before the trial, Burke wrote An Enquiry into the Policy of Making conquests 
for the Mahometans in India by the British Arms; in answer to a Pamphlet, intituled 
“Considerations on the Conquest of Tanjore” (1779)—for William Burke’s campaign as 
London agent for the Raja of Tanjore. This document called for an enquiry of the 
Company’s actions in Tanjore; it argued the sovereignty of the Raja in response to John 
(and James) Macpherson’s Considerations on the conquest of Tanjore and the 
Restoration of the Rajah (1779), which argued that Tanjore should again be under the 
rule of the Nawab. Citing the precedence of the 1762 treaty, which was an attempt to 
guarantee relations between the Raja and the Nawab, Burke refutes the Considerations: 
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‘It will not prove, that he [the Nawab] has the least particle of right to depose the King of 
Tanjore; or that it is either the duty of the interest of the English nation to put that 
kingdom under a Mahometan yoke’.414 
Burke fortifies his argument for the sovereignty of the Hindu Raja by depicting 
distance between the religious cultures of the Hindoos (Hindus) and Mahometans 
(Muslims): 
I cannot help remarking, that this gentleman, (the author of the 
Considerations) and all those who engage in the cause of Mohamed Ali 
[the Nabob], in proposing schemes of government, and supporting rights 
of government in the East, are pleased to confine their attention solely to 
Princes, and to the rights of Princes. The wretched people are no part 
whatsoever of their consideration. Every man who knows any thing of 
India, must know the utter detestation those people entertain (I think with 
very good reason) but whether with good reason or not, they do most 
certainly entertain, of Mahometan government. To say nothing of the 
genius of that government in general, and in particular of the government 
of Mahomed Ali, it will he hardly believed, that all men do not infinitely 
prefer a subjection to Princes of their one blood, manners, and religion, to 
any other; that they will not be more obedient to such Princes; and that 
such Princes will not be reciprocally more tender of them. This natural and 
reciprocal partiality, is a matter of great consideration in all governments; 
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but it is peculiarly so among those nations where there is no settled law or 
constitution, either to fix allegiance, or to restrain power.
415
 
Burke suggests that the wretched people of India would be more inclined to engage the 
sort of reciprocal relationship necessary for balanced governance (in which the governed 
offer obedience in return for provision of protection on behalf of the sovereign) if their 
ruler were of their own blood and religion, and not a Mahometan. This argument follows 
one side of the rhetorical strategy Whelan describes above: Burke preserves the 
individual identities between Hindu and Muslim. The same scheme of separating 
individual religious cultures appears in his 1782 Letter to a Peer of Ireland (Lord 
Kenmare). Discussed later in this chapter, the letter about the Penal Laws against Irish 
Catholics argues: ‘Never were the Members of one religious Sect fit to appoint the 
Pastors to another’.416 The 1779 argument continues: 
If the Company, who under the name of alliance, or under even the name 
of subjectation to a Mogul, are in reality now the actual Sovereigns and 
Lords paramount of India, still choose, as hitherto they have done, and is 
in wisdom perhaps they ought to do, to have a dependant government 
interposed between them and the native people, it is both their interest and 
duty that it should be such as is congenial to the native inhabitants, 
correspondent to their manners, and soothing to their prejudices. The 
native Indians, under their own native government, are, to speak without 
prejudice, a far better people than the Mahometans; or than those who by 
living under Mahometans, become the depressed subjects, or the corrupted 
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instruments of their tyranny; they are of far milder manners, more 
industrious, more tractable, and less enterprising.
417
 
Burke argues the duty of the Company to provide the indigenous people with governance 
correspondent to their manners (i.e., the Company should ensure Indians are governed by 
established Hindu law, not encroaching Muslim law). Burke expands by arguing that 
Hindus governed by Hindus are more docile and less ambitious; it is therefore in the 
Company’s best interest to give them religious freedom. While the ring of anti-Muslim 
sentiment would change later in Burke’s writings on India, here. we see Burke treating 
differing religious cultures as separate and distinct. 
Years later, in the opening speech of the Hastings’ impeachment, we see the full 
mixed strategy that Whelan describes above, when Burke preserves individual religious 
culture, but also renders the cultures familiar to one another. The Hastings defence 
justifies its alleged mismanagement of the Company by contending that ‘the exercise of 
arbitrary power’ was culturally appropriate for India and that the geographical 
circumstance warranted different moral standards. Burke replies: 
[…] we are to let your Lordships know that these Gentlemen have formed 
a plan of Geographical morality, by which the duties of men in public and 
private situations are not to be governed by their relations to the Great 
Governor of the Universe, or by their relations to men, but by climates, 
degrees of longitude and latitude, parallels not of life, but of latitudes. […] 
This geographical morality we do protest against. Mr Hastings shall not 
screen himself under it. And I hope and trust not a great many words will 
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be necessary to satisfy your Lordships. But we think it necessary in 
justification of ourselves to declare that the laws of morality are the same 
everywhere, and that there is no action which would pass for an act of 
extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and of oppression in England, that is 
not an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and oppression in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and all the world over.
418
 
First, referring to a ‘Great Governor of the Universe’ resonates with the same expanded 
conceptualization(s) of God discussed in Chapter 1 (from Burke’s Enquiry, and his 
Account).
419
 In addition, Burke renders the essential features of Christian and non-
Christian religious cultures familiar when he represents a moral law that is the same 
across various nations. Burke continues, arguing later in his speech: 
We are all born into subjection, all born equally, high and low, governors 
and governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law, 
prior to all our devices, and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to our 
very being itself, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame 
of the universe, out of which we cannot stir.
420
 
To suggest that there is a universal frame of law, under which all are born equally, 
proposes a relative commonality between various cultures; it renders the difference 
between religious cultures less distinctive. Even later in his speech, Burke renders the 
features of Asiatic non-Christian cultures familiar to European Christian cultures: 
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But it is not here only that I must do justice to the East. I assert that their 
morality is equal to ours as regards the morality of Governors, father, 
superiors; and I challenge the world to shew, in any modern European 
book, more true morality and wisdom than is to be found in the writings of 
Asiatic men in high trusts, and who have been Counsellors to Princes. This 
is to be set against the geographical morality to which I have referred.
421
 
His long argument against the geographic morality practiced by the Hastings 
administration asserts—especially in the passage directly above—the equal legitimacy of 
European and Asiatic morality, relative to cultural belief. 
Returning to the earlier Policy of Making Conquests speech, we see again that 
Burke preserves the cultural difference between English and Muslim oppression in India. 
The Arabians, and Tartars, and Persians, and their Clans of Mussulmen, 
are full as rapacious, and infinitely more fierce and cruel, than the English 
who are sent to make their fortunes in India in a civil or military capacity. 
The English have neither the same disposition, nor the same degree of 
boldness, nor in many cases, even the same means of oppression. Without 
however disputing which is the more intolerable weight, it is certain, that 
no people can bear two such riders. It was our business to respect 
possession as the only title that can be valid, where a great empire is 
broken up; and the rather, as it is the title on which we ourselves stand. 
[…] one of the last things in the world which we were justified in doing, 
was to encourage arbitrary and boundless pecuniary demands, under the 
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barbarous names of Nazirs, Crores, [ceremonial gifts], &c. &c. […] When 
we did this, then it became not the robbery of another, but our own. 
Extortion, always the endemial distemper of that part of the world, began 
to be aggravated in all its symptoms, when Asiatic avarice was supported 
by European arts and discipline.
422
 
Above, Burke admits that the English are responsible for perpetuating extortion by 
supporting Muslim oppressors, but he argues that the English do not oppress by the same 
violent and rapacious means; which seems to suggest English oppression as the lesser in 
ferocity and cruelty of the ‘two such riders’. However, later, in the beginning of the 
Hastings trial, Burke describes the oppression in India in a way that renders religious 
distinctions between English oppressors and Muslim oppressors less distinctive, or 
familiar to one another—to use Whelan’s expression. Burke’s criticism of Hastings’ 
factious will, operating against eternal law, represents the Company’s failure to reconcile 
established religious culture with the modern avarice of commerce: 
My Lords, I am to mention to you circumstances relative to these people. 
They were the original people of Hindostan, […] The Musselmans are 
nothing like them, They are the old inhabitants of the Country, and still 
more numerous, Whatever fault they may have, God forbid we should go 
to pass judgement upon people who formed their Laws and Institutions 
prior to our insect origins of yesterday. […] Their religion has made no 
Converts; their dominion no conquests; and in proportion as they were 
concentred within and hindered from spreading abroad, they have grown 
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to double the force and have existed against Bigotry, against persecution, 
against all the fury of Foreign Conquests, and almost against the fury and 
avarice of the English Dominion established among them.
423
 
Burke renders less distinctive the difference between the tyrannous ‘Musselmans’ and the 
modern avarice of the English, while retaining the distinctive individuality of the old 
established Hindu inhabitants as separate. The ‘insect origins’ refers to the new 
(inexperienced, by comparison) English laws and institutions, as compared with the 
ancient and established laws and institutions of the Hindus. Stating that the Hindus have 
made no converts or conquests is an aspersion that categorizes the English Protestant 
Dominion alongside the Muslim dominion: dominions that have persecuted the Hindu 
people with their cultural bigotry, land and property conquests, religious conversions, and 
commercial avarice. In the same 1779 speech, Burke sustains that same sort of 
criticism—that it is none of the British government’s affair to undermine a religious 
establishment that fosters social harmony, because of modern commercial greed: 
That form of Religious Institution connected with Government and Policy 
that makes a people happy and a Government flourishing (putting further 
considerations out of the way, which are not now our business), these are 
undoubtedly the test of any government; and I must appeal to the whole 
force of observation that, whatsoever wherever the Hindoo Religion has 
been established, that Country has been flourishing.
424
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Burke’s above concern with the avarice of modern commerce points to triangular culture 
struggle, which is ultimately religious in nature: British dominion over India, supporting 
Muslim governance, encroaches on the Hindu establishment. 
It is my argument that the struggle of religious culture Burke describes above is 
evoked in the term Kulturkampf, recognized in more than one theory of modernity. 
Bauman describes the Kulturkampf of nationalism in a way that is quite familiar to the 
Indian struggle to which Burke attends above: 
The nation-state, after all, owed its success to the suppression of self-
asserting communities; it fought tooth and nail against 'parochialism', local 
customs or 'dialects', promoting a unified language and historical memory 
at the expense of communal traditions; the more determined the state-
initiated and state-supervised Kulturkampf, the fuller the nation-state 
success in the production of a 'natural community'.
425
 
The arbitration of British nationalism in India struggles against a large and ancient force 
like the Hindu community; but tries to suppress religious enfranchisement. Jonathan 
Israel provides context for a Kulturkampf within the parameters of modernity that this 
thesis has been using—a culture struggle in the eighteenth century that is essentially 
religious in nature: a ‘vast Kulturkampf between traditional, theologically sanctioned 
ideas about Man, God, and the universe and secular, mechanistic conceptions which 
stood independently of any theological sanction’.426 I think Burke’s representation of 
global religions above points to a conflict between preserving sacred established 
religions, and rendering their differences less prohibitive to eighteenth-century 
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globalization, which is in the economic interest of the empire. With all of his criticism of 
the Company’s misgovernment in India, Burke still advocated Britain’s presence there.  
 Stephen K. White stresses ‘Burke’s unwillingness to raise broader questions about 
the overall legitimacy of Great Britain’s domination of India.’427 However, Burke clearly 
justifies Britain’s presence in India, in firm providential terms: ‘All these circumstances 
are not, I confess, very favourable to the idea of our attempting to govern India at all. 
However, there we are; there we are placed by the Sovereign Disposer: and we must do 
the best we can in our situation. The situation of man is the preceptor of his duty.’428 
Burke does not question Britain’s duty in India, as it is ordained by God. However, he 
does take issue with the failure to execute Britain’s providential duty according to God’s 
will. Perhaps White misunderstands between patriotism and nationalism. Bauman’s 
observations about the nation-state Kulturkampf of modernity will clarify: 
Nationalism locks the door, pulls out the door-knockers and disables the 
doorbells, declaring that only those who are inside have the right to be 
there and settle there for good. Patriotism is, at least on the face of it, more 




Burke’s justification for Britain’s governance in India is closer to patriotism; if we 
look at his religious thinking, we see that it is inclusive—aligning Christian with non-
Christian religions. The abusive arbitrary power in the Hastings administration is 
exclusive and nationalistic. The following section is a close examination of these texts in 
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which Burke addresses the issue of the empire’s encroachment on Catholicism: his 
correspondence, speeches, and posthumously published work. 
Ireland—Religious Legitimacy, relative to indigenous culture; The Common Bond 
of Humanity 
Eamonn O’Flaherty’s argues that the main interest in Burke’s Irish writings 
should be in his critique of the Penal code, as part of a ‘body of constitutional and 
historical theory […] in the development of British policy towards Ireland within the 
empire’, as opposed to the ‘psychological commitment to the Irish Catholic case’, which 
differs from Conor Cruise O’Brien’s argument about the psychological pull Ireland had 
over Burke.
430
 My interpretation of Burke’s Irish writings leans more toward 
O’Flaherty’s, in the sense that he sees the ‘global significance in Burke’s later thought 
which was parallel to its importance to the wider issues of justice in the Empire […]’.431 
In the following section, I focus on Burke’s Irish texts in terms of their global, imperial 
significance, as opposed to their personal significance. This is not to say Burke’s 
potential emotional ties with Ireland and his interest in its polity are mutually exclusive; 
rather, I wish to take a critical approach that avoids personal speculation. Avoiding 
speculation over Burke’s personal history guards against a fallacious appeal to 
probability, and against the abstraction of Burke’s religious thought; it becomes easy to 
apply ill-fitting labels when speculating about his past, e.g. a secret Catholic, latent 
liberal, reactionary-conservative. However, the global significance of Burke’s thoughts 
on Catholicism is present not only, as O’Flaherty suggests, in Burke’s later thoughts on 
Ireland, but reaches back to his early writings on the subject—for example, his Tracts 
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relating to Popery Laws (1765), and over to Burke’s thoughts in the Quebec Act (1774); 
both examples predate the Hastings trial and the other writings on India discussed above. 
O’Brien makes the claim that Burke was emotionally and psychologically 
attached to Ireland—the land, its people, and its culture within which its religion was 
ingrained.
432
 While O’Flaherty deserves credit for questioning the central importance of 
Burke’s personal connection where his treatment of Catholicism is concerned, like 
O’Brien, he also may depend too much on Burke’s Catholic roots: 
Burke’s thoughts on the Catholic question in his last years were affected 
also by an increasingly religious theme in his discussion of Catholicism, 
part of his general belief in the importance of religion as a counter-
revolutionary force, but also evidence of the depth of his roots in Catholic 
Ireland of the eighteenth century.
433
 
It is true that Burke’s Catholic familial connections provide a personal context 
about which we may ponder any Catholic allegiances: his mother Mary Nagel was 
Catholic; indeed, Burke spent much of his childhood in Ireland living with his mother’s 
Catholic family in the Blackwater valley. His sister, Juliana, was baptised and remained 
Roman Catholic for the duration of her life. His wife Jane Nugent was the daughter of a 
Catholic physician.
434
 It is O’Brien’s observations about Burke’s father, Richard, that are 
the most speculative: thought to have converted from Catholicism to Protestantism for 
professional advancement, O’Brien even goes so far as to suggest the possibility that 
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Richard encouraged his son to do the same.
435
 Edmund’s own son, Richard, came to 
serve as an agent to the Catholic Committee in Dublin in 1792. Burke’s peers in 
Parliament accused him of ‘crypto-Popery’—erroneously suggesting that Burke 
concealed his Catholic allegiance cultivated from an education at the Catholic College of 
St. Omer in France.
436
 Therefore, there is enough room for speculation about Burke’s 
personal Catholic allegiances. Like O’Brien and O’Flaherty, Gibbons relies heavily on 
‘the milieu of Burke’s own upbringing in the Nagle country of Co. Cork’, arguing its 
significance in the formulation of his aesthetic theory.
437
 Gibbons (also like O’Brien and 
others) suspects an emotional divide between Burke’s political persona and his 
‘emotional loyalties in Ireland’.438 
It is my view that lack of documentary evidence makes little possible beyond 
well-informed speculation when it comes to the depth of Burke’s Catholic roots. It is my 
argument that such an assessment restricts the interpretation of Burke’s Irish texts within 
only speculative parameters, rather than expanding it to consider Burke’s global, 
transcultural, conceptualization of religion. Wondering about Burke’s intimate feelings 
about Catholicism is far too speculative to my mind; such speculation reaches beyond the 
scope of this study, and is better left to a biographical enterprise. I disagree with O’Brien, 
O’Flaherty, Gibbons, and others who would suggest that Burke’s support of Catholic 
enfranchisement (and further, his support for the Indian people) is solely motivated by 
familial connection (or latent guilt for abandoning a religion, to which there is little proof 
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beyond guessing to suggest he belonged). O’Brien, for example, suggests that Burke 
‘betrayed India like his father betrayed Ireland’.439 It is a highly speculative argument to 
suggest, as O’Brien does, that Burke’s support of Indian enfranchisement was displaced 
support for Catholic enfranchisement.
440
 I argue that giving so much importance to 
Burke’s potential Catholic roots risks underestimating his knowledge of cultural and 
political prudence. I do not wish to dispute the observations about Burke’s Catholic 
connections in Ireland made by O’Brien, O’Faherty, and Thomas H.D. Mahoney; rather, 
I wish to use them to build an analysis of Burke’s writings on Ireland that focuses on his 
representation of global religious culture—the critical imprint of Burke’s inclusive 
conceptualization of religion. Before looking closely at Burke’s Irish writings, some 
background to the Catholic question must be considered. 
In Great Britain and Ireland, the passing of the first Catholic Relief Act occurred 
in 1778. Also known as the Papists Act, it allowed for Catholic ownership of property 
and land, with the proviso of declaration of loyalty to the Protestant sovereign and an 
abjuration of Stewart claims to the throne. Those taking the oath were free from the 
penalties of the Popery Act of 1698, which threatened practitioners of Catholicism with 
imprisonment.
441
 Burke supported the relief act, and voted in favour of free trade with 
Ireland that same year. His support for the relief of Penal laws resulted in the loss of his 
electoral seat at Bristol in September 1780. In June of that same year, anti-Catholic 
sentiment erupted into the famous Gordon Riots of 1780, during which hundreds were 
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killed. The rioters were angry at the concessions granted to Catholics in the Relief Act of 
1778, legislation introduced by Sir George Savile.
442
 Eagleton summarizes the public fear 
of Catholicism evolving into a tyrannical faction if relieved of restricting legislation: ‘In 
so far as Catholics are already slaves, then, they need to be doubly oppressed, by 
Protestant liberty as well as by Romish rule, in order to prevent them from coming to 
power and behaving as tyrants’.443 For nearly a week, anti-Catholic mobs rampaged 
throughout London, burning and looting known Catholic buildings and residences.
444
 
Burke himself is said to have not only participated in the armed defence of residences, 
but also to have stood against mobs – during an encounter with a mob on St. Martin’s 
street in London Burke was reported to have heroically defended his stance in support of 
the Catholic Relief Act, with a sword.
445
 He wrote to Richard Shackleton on the 13
th
 of 
June that year: ‘During that Week of Havock and Destruction […] I spent part of the next 
day in the street amidst this wild assembly into whose hands I delivered myself informing 
them who I was […].’446 
The Gordon riots were, however, not the first eruptions of violence concerning 
Catholicism that Burke had known: the Whiteboys in Ireland violently defended farmer 
and tenant rights. The first ‘outbreak’, 1761–63, resulted in the arrest of 237 suspects, the 
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execution of seventy-four in total (between 1762–65, and then 1770–76).447 While there 
has been doubt about Burke’s actual connection with these affairs, Joseph and Garret 
Nagle (maternal relations to Burke) were named as informers for the Jacobite cause in 
Munster; Burke’s father Richard (perhaps) acted as an attorney for Jacobite sympathizer 
James Cotter, who was executed in 1720.
448
 While Gibbons sees Burke’s family 
connections with the legal affairs of Cotter as being ‘formative’ to his political thinking, 
F.P. Lock doubts the validity of some of this specifically, Burke’s father acting as 
attorney, which supports my view of the tenuousness of Burke’s Catholic roots.449 
As far as Burke’s writings on the issue, this discussion places Burke’s Tracts 
relating to Popery Laws after some of his later Irish texts, as they were not published in 
his lifetime. While the Tracts were written in the 1760s (possibly earlier), and likely read 
by Lord Kenmare of the Catholic Committee in the 1780s, it stands to reason that Burke’s 
writings on Ireland dated during his engagement with India (the 1770s to the 1790s) hold 
the strongest resemblance to his writings in India.
450
 
In his first letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe of the Irish Privy Council in January of 
1792, Burke expresses concern over the limited scope of the 1782 (and implicitly, the 
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1778) Catholic Relief Acts—and the limited scope of Sir Hercules Langrishe’s support of 
the enterprise at that. At the end of 1791, the Irish Catholic Committee had just 
approached parliament about extending Catholic relief yet further. Langrishe was an 
acquaintance of Burke’s; as a Member of Parliament for Knocktopher, County Kilkenny, 
he was a Protestant supporter of measured Catholic relief. Later, in 1792, he introduces a 
further Catholic relief bill; however, he does not support full enfranchisement for 
Catholics, for fear it would subvert primary Protestant rule.
451
 The letter was likely meant 
for publication; as he later writes to his son Richard in 1792, who was then serving on the 
Catholic Committee: ‘Here, the formless letter I have written to Sir Hercules Langrishe 
has been of a good deal of service. The Catholic’s short apology has been printed by 
Debret and is much liked’.452 While the legislative endeavours toward Catholic relief 
represented the gradual steps that would eventually lead to the uprising of the United 
Irishmen in 1798, in Burke’s time they provided only regulatory measures that 
maintained Catholic subordination within a Protestant empire. Burke’s language in the 
letter evokes the same preservation of individual religious identity found in his Indian 
texts. In his Policy of Making Conquests, 1779, Burke addressed the benefit of governing 
the Indian colonials by their traditional laws and practices, observing ‘[…] all men do not 
infinitely prefer a subjection to Princes of their own blood, manners, and religion, to any 
other […]’.453 Below, from the same letter to Sir Hercules, Burke makes an observation 
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concerning governing a body of Catholics that resonates with his earlier observation 
about governing a body of Hindus: 
[l]et us admit that the body of the Catholics are prone to sedition (of 
which, as I have said, I entertain much doubt), is it possible that any fair 
observer or fair reasoner can think of confining this description to them 
only? I believe it to be possible for men to be mutinous and seditious who 
feel no grievance, but I believe no man will assert seriously, that, when 
people are of a turbulent spirit, the best way to keep them in order is to 
furnish them with something substantial to complain of.
454
 
When Burke writes that no one would argue that the method for keeping a people of a 
turbulent spirit in order is to give those people something to complain about, he is 
suggesting that enfranchising colonials would deprive people of grounds upon which to 
complain. In the quotes above from his letter to Langrishe and his speech about Making 
Conquests, Burke suggests that the way to keep the alleged sedition of colonials at bay is 
to allow indigenous religious freedom. Therefore, it is prudent to allow for cultural 
diversity. A multicultural approach, which allows for cultural diversification, is also 
prudent inasmuch as it widens a government’s foundation. Burke elaborates on the idea 
in the same letter: 
Reduced to a question of discretion, and that discretion exercised solely 
upon what will appear best for the conservation of the state on its present 
basis, I should recommend it to your serious thoughts, whether the 
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Religious exclusion only narrows a government’s resource, in terms of its supply of loyal 
subjects. This applies especially in the case of Catholic relief: for example, when the 
British government needed to widen its resource for the war with America, cultural 
diversification increased its resource of soldiers. Mahoney observes the increased cultural 
sensitivity towards Irish Catholics at this time. In short, they were needed to fight 
alongside the English against the Americans in the Rebellion: 
The anomaly of continuing the harsh repression of the Catholics in their 
country while at the same time they entertained grievances against Britain 
struck many Protestants forcibly. […] Moreover, many were well aware 
that they could hardly hope for the cooperation of their Catholic fellows in 
a cause which would avail the latter nothing in a country they were 
scarcely able to call their own.
456
 
Mahoney explains that Burke recognized the incongruity of hoping for support from Irish 
Catholics in the American rebellion when their Catholic fellows did not have true 
freedom themselves: there was ‘a noticeable growth of spirit of toleration even among the 
members of the Irish parliament’.457 The Catholics were asked to help fight for a country 
in which they were virtual helots, so empowering them with their own freedom would 
have encouraged the patriotism necessary for their participation in the defence against the 
American colonists. During the American Revolution, this sort of utilitarian reprieve in 
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anti-popery sentiment was not uncommon. To enhance the volume of the rank and file, 
even George Washington discouraged anti-popery sentiment: allowing more religious 
sects meant more men who could fight.
458
 
 In the same letter to Sir Hercules, Burke observes that a body of men who feel 
aggrieved over a deprivation of power will not simply submit to disenfranchisement. 
Further, Burke argues that the enfranchisement of people is an ancient, fundamental right: 
The body of disfranchised men will not be perfectly satisfied to remain 
always in that state. If they are not satisfied, you have two millions of 
subjects in your bosom full of uneasiness: not that they cannot overturn 
the Act of Settlement, and put themselves and you under an arbitrary 
master; or that they are not permitted to spawn a hydra of wild republics, 
on principles of a pretended natural equality in man; but because you will 
not suffer them to enjoy the ancient, fundamental, tried advantages of a 
British Constitution—that you will not permit them to profit of the 
protection of a common father or the freedom of common citizens […].459 
Above, Burke admits to the impossibility of overturning the Act of Settlement 
(1701), which secured the Protestant succession to the English throne; however, he also 
conveys the unsatisfactory nature of the legislative efforts for Catholic relief up to that 
point—the relief acts of 1778 and 1782 did not reach far enough.460 An important feature 
of the excerpt above is the humanitarian benefits inherent in the British Constitution: 
protection of a common imperial father, and freedom for common citizens. The ‘ancient 
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and fundamental’ rights that humanity should enjoy in common, under the theoretical 
protection of empire, should be sacrosanct. Insofar as this is a Catholic issue, we can 
understand further that the freedom to exercise established religious practice should also 
be sacrosanct—an idea that is set down in legislation in the American constitution 
(‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof […]’).461 
 When it comes to Burke’s representation of the governance of religion, we can 
look again to Whelan’s analysis: Burke attempts to preserve the separate quality of 
religious identity, but blends distinction between religious cultures (or renders them 
familiar) by suggesting their equal cultural importance. Consider his 1782 Letter to Lord 
Kenmare (21 February). In the letter to Thomas Browne, 4
th
 Viscount Kenmare (1726-
95), Burke responds to a point on the 1778 Catholic Relief Bill. Kenmare, a leading 
Catholic and landowner, had informed Burke that the Catholic clergy would be appointed 
by parliament. Burke replies: 
Never were the Members of one religious Sect fit to appoint the Pastors to 
another. Those who have no regard to their welfare, reputation, or internal 
quiet, will not appoint such as are proper. The Seraglio of Constantinople, 
is as equitable as we are, whether Catholicks or Protestants; and where 
their own Sect is concerned full as religious; but the spot which they make 
of the miserable Dignities of the Greek Church, the little factions of the 
Haram to which they make them subservient, the continual Sale to which 
they expose and re-expose the same dignity, and by which they squeeze all 
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the inferior orders of the Clergy, is, (for I have had particular means of 
being acquainted with it) nearly equal to all the other oppressions together, 
exercised by Mussulmen over the unhappy Members of the Oriental 
church. It is a great deal, to suppose, that even the present Castle would 




Burke attempts to preserve the qualities of different religious sects above, by suggesting 
no member of one religious sect should be able to appoint leaders to another. However, 
he also argues that non-Christian sects are just as equitable and just as religious as 
Christian sects. Thus, he represents relativism between different religious sects, and 
renders their essential features familiar to one another. Below, Returning to the 1792 
letter to Sir Hercules, Burke presents a reverence for differing traditions of established 
religious sects, yet also presents a familiar feature shared among them—‘the common 
bond of mankind’: 
Passing from the extremity of the west, to the extremity almost of the east 
I have been many years (now entering into the twelfth) employed in 
supporting the rights, privileges, laws and immunities of a very remote 
people. I have not as yet been able to finish my task. I have struggled 
through much discouragement and much opposition; much obloquy; much 
calumny, for a people with whom I have no tie, but the common bond of 
mankind. […] I should not know how to show my face, here or in Ireland, 
if I should say that all the Pagans, all the Mussulmen, and even all the 
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Papists (since they must form the highest stage in the climax of evil) are 
worthy of a liberal and honourable condition, except those of one of the 
descriptions, which forms the majority of the inhabitants of the country in 
which you and I were born.
463
 
Burke suggests that it would be ludicrous for him to argue for religious respect for all 
sects, exclusive of only one: Catholicism. His treatment of the religious sects mentioned 
in the passage(s) above is significant because it blends religious boundaries and 
definitions. In the passage from the letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe above, Burke also 
suggests that the only tie uniting him with the people in the east, for whose religious 
enfranchisement he had been fighting so fervently, is ‘the common bond of mankind’. 
Burke conceptually links differing cultures: Catholics and Hindus (further, Protestants 
and Muslims) with the ‘common bond of humanity’. Burke’s language makes a case for 
understanding his support of Hindu enfranchisement as motivated by his cultural 
awareness of the common humanity between sects, and not solely his personal 
connection with Catholic culture. Further, to include not only Muslim sects, but a 
mention of paganism as well, shows how wide Burke is willing to cast his net in terms of 
inclusive religious representation. 
In a 1775 letter to William Burgh, a member of Irish parliament for Athy, Kildare, 
Burke argues in favour of a very wide measure of religious toleration, wider even, he 
argues, than even any dissenter: 
In fact, my opinion in favour of toleration goes far beyond the limits of 
that act, which was no more than a provision for certain sects of men, 
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under certain circumstances, and by no means what is commonly called 
“an act of toleration”. […] I cannot consider our dissenters, of almost any 
kind, as schismatics; whatever some of their leaders might originally have 
been in the eye of Him, who alone knows whether they acted under the 
direction of such a conscience as they had, or at the instigation of pride 
and passion. There are many things among most of them which I rather 
dislike than dare to condemn. My ideas of toleration go far beyond even 
theirs. I would give a full civil protection in which I include an immunity 
from all disturbance of their publick religious worship, and a power of 
teaching in schools, as well as Temples, to Jews, Mahometans and even 
Pagans; especially if they are already possessed of those advantages by 
long and prescriptive usage; which is as sacred in this exercise of Rights, 
as in any other.
464
 
Burke suggests that his view of religious toleration encompasses a wider range of 
tolerance than offered by the Act of Toleration (1689), which awarded rights only to 
certain Protestant nonconformists, but did not extend to Catholics, non-trinitarians, 
Quakers, and certainly not to non-Christians. According to Burke, his ideas of religious 
tolerance extend beyond even those belonging to dissenters—he argues that he is much 
more tolerant than the dissenters who demanded their own civil protection, but would 
have categorically refused the civil protection of Catholics. Burke purports that he would 
give full civil protection to Jews, Mahometans, and even Pagans—all sects are equally 
sacred. 
                                                 
464
 Burke, Letter to William Burgh, in Correspondence, II, p. 18. 
167 
 
While the classification of Burke as a Latitudinarian might easily be concluded 
here (and it is appropriate in many senses), there are complexities inherent in this identity 
that require exploration as it is fitted to Burke. Isabel Rivers notes popular Latitudinarian 
terminology, which we could easily recognize in the above excerpts from the Hastings 
trial: ‘right reason, the law of nature, common notions, the light of nature, are the familiar 
terms of the latitudinarians […]’.465 Rivers is referring to terminology made popular by 
Samuel Clarke’s, A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural 
Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (1706). Knud 
Haakonssen describes a category of Protestants who would ‘see the Church as, in some 
sense, of divine origin and the state as a conventional human institution. At least in its 
general form, this view facilitated a rapprochement between many elements of 
Enlightened dissent and Whig Latitudinarian Anglicanism.’466 We could safely seat 
Burke in this category. However, Rivers acknowledges one possibility in the 
development of freethinking: ‘that freethinking genuinely developed from 
latitudinarianism, and was a logical extension of certain lines of thought pursued within 
strict limits by the latitudinarians themselves.’467 She explains that Freethinkers owe a 
debt to ‘the latitudinarians, Locke, and the classical moralists, especially Cicero’.468 If 
what Rivers tells us about Latitudinarians is true (about the close intersection between 
Freethinkers and Latitudinarians), then the label is problematic for Burke. As we know, 
he was formally an Anglican, and not a Freethinker. F.P. Lock acknowledges a certain 
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Latitudinarian openness to Burke’s faith: ‘Burke thought dogma, church government, and 
liturgical practice less important than the belief in fundamentals and the exercise of 
virtue’.469 However, if we weigh these scholarly definitions against appropriate usage of 
the term, circa 1662-1862, (‘latitudinarian’, meaning ‘One who, though not a sceptic, is 
indifferent as to particular creeds and forms of church government or worship’) the 
Latitudinarian indifference to religious doctrine conveys an opposition toward any 
religious creed to which doctrine was central.
470
 I do not think we see evidence of Burke 
opposing sects to which doctrine holds high importance (e.g. Catholicism). On the 
contrary, I think we can evince Burke’s openness to a variety of religious creeds (with or 
without doctrines). Burke’s multicultural acceptance of different sects is not simple 
toleration, which denotes enduring or allowing something unacceptable. There is no 
reason to question Burke’s genuineness when he makes an argument in the Hastings trial 
(above) for the equal legitimacy of non-Christian sects (relative to their culture)—they 
are ‘as equitable as we are, whether Catholicks or Protestants; and where their own Sect 
is concerned full as religious’.471 There is no reason we should disbelieve the declaration 
of his own mind, when he explains that, for him, his definition of religious toleration 
extends beyond even the definition of toleration in his day (the Toleration Act referenced 
in his Letter to William Burgh above).
472
 Therefore, while it is valid to recognize an 
official classification of Burke as an Anglican Latitudinarian; we can also recognize the 
validity of his own declaration that his conceptualization of religion(s) extends beyond 
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the Anglican toleration of the day. We can even think of the arguments he shapes for the 
state, or the empire, to extend toleration to different sects as a form of tolerance different 
from that in his own mind—toleration, for the state, is based in fear and self-interest. For 
example, in his Letter to Sir Hercules, when he explains the benefit of widening the 
foundation of a building, that is an argument with the interest of the empire in mind.
473
 
The religious toleration described later in the letter is based in fear; he warns that when 
men are disenfranchised, they will rebel against their governors: ‘If they are not satisfied, 
you have two millions of subjects in your bosom full of uneasiness’.474 Part of his 
argument in Policy of Making Conquests to let Hindus govern Hindus is that they will be 
less likely to rebel.
475
 These are proto-Utilitarian arguments for diversity, based in 
conservative political prudence—not sympathy. In any case, it has been explained that 
the objective of this thesis is not a biographical enterprise to decipher the most 
appropriate label for Burke’s religious affiliation, but rather, to analyse the critical 
imprint of his representation of religions. With that in mind, I wish to explore this imprint 
further in his writings about Ireland. 
In 1779, Burke writes to the Scottish Reverend John Erskine, who was an 
opponent of Catholic emancipation. Below, Burke is again discussing the Catholic 
question; he attempts to preserve the quality of differing religious traditions (in this case, 
Christian traditions), while observing the common features of humanity. 
I wish, with you, that we may not be so far Englishmen and Scotchmen, as 
to forget we are men; or, (I am sorry to be obliged to wish without you,) 
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even so far presbyterians, or episcopalians, or catholics, as to forget we are 
Christians, which is our common bond of religion while we are 




Burke and Erskine are bonded under the category of Christianity, and under the wider-
still category of humankind. Burke’s representation of religion above softens the essential 
features between Christian sects. Burke reminds Erskine of the familiar feature shared 
between these sects—that they are men. 
Burke’s language later escalates to veritable blasphemy in the same letter when he 
criticises the audacity of encroaching on the sacredness of established non-Christian 
religions—equally religious (in their culture) as any sect of Christianity. Burke takes 
issue with the audacity of religious zealots and missionaries that encroach on the 
indigenous Jewish and Muslim communities of the world. Writing about the world’s 
religions, he confesses: 
I think they are all with a great deal of human imperfections […]. I think 
so of the whole Christian church; having at the same time, that respect for 
all the other religions, even such as have mere human reason for their 
origin, and which men as wise and good as I, profess,—that I could not 
justify to myself to give to the synagogue, the mosque, or the pagoda, the 
language which your pulpits so liberally bestow upon a great part of the 
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Christian world. […] I do not aspire to the glory of being a zealot for any 
particular national Church [...].
477
 
First, this criticism resonates with his condemnation of religious encroachment in 
India, which Burke delivered in the launching of the Hastings impeachment.
478
 Second, it 
blurs religious definition by suggesting that all religions are equally sacred (in their own 
cultures). Burke’s avowal that he is no representative for any national Church counters 
interpretations of Burke as a ‘Christian Statesman’ (from Cobban above; from Canavan 
and Frohnen, as discussed in the previous chapter; from Harris, as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis). It is my position that the way in which Burke represents 
religion is far more complex than Christ-centred, Conservatism. He is an Anglican 
Latitudinarian; yet, the extent of his open-mindedness toward different religious sects (as 
he explains above) extends beyond measures of mere toleration in his time. He is 
conservative in his wish to preserve the traditional establishments of the empire, but 
progressive in his understanding that the empire must widen and diversify its cultural 
foundation in order to preserve the traditions of the empire for posterity. The complex 
condition of religious cultures that appear in Burke’s works—rendering exotic non-
Anglican communities familiar to Anglican ones—stands on the threshold of what 
twentieth-century theorists of modernity postulate. For example, D.J.B. Trim and Richard 
Bonney encapsulate the paradoxical condition of the way in which religious cultures 
divide and assimilate in their evolution through modernity: ‘The problems of the clash of 
uniformity with diversity, of the relationships between majority and minority, and of the 
contrasting pull of hierarchy and anarchy, are especially evident in the area of 
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religion.’479 A pull between cultural diversity and uniformity is evident in the way Burke 
represents global religions in his writings discussed in this chapter. The texts above show 
religious enfranchisement of non-Anglican cultures pulling against the sovereignty of the 
established Anglican Church. There are additional analyses, from other theorists of 
modernity, that elaborate on the struggle apparent between the preservation of cultural 
identity and the rendering of cultural unity. We will now look at these analyses with the 
objective of further articulating Burke’s representation of religion. Further, we will look 
at his engagement in other imperial affairs that span the globe, and what Burke scholars 
put forward as Burke’s representation of imperial duty to indigenous culture. 
Burke, modern paradox 
The way in which Burke’s representation of global religions softens difference 
between sects forces the conceptual formation of cultural communities—Zygmunt 
Bauman describes such cultural unity as ‘a unity which is an outcome, not an a priori 
given condition, of shared life, a unity put together through negotiation and 
reconciliation, not the denial [or exclusion of], stifling or smothering out of 
differences’.480 As we have seen above, Burke diminishes dogmatic and cultural 
difference by rendering their features familiar. Bauman also explains that once identities 
have been altered by the smothering out of difference, cultural roots are disembedded 
from their foundation: 
Once the beliefs, values and styles have all been privatized—
decontextualized or disembedded, […] identities cannot but look fragile, 
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[…] and devoid of all defences except the skills and determination of the 
agents to hold them tight and protect them from erosion.
481
 
Therein lies the cultural struggle, the modern paradox, evident in Burke’s writing about 
religion: he attempts to protect the individual quality of established religious practice 
from erosion; yet, he erodes religious difference into familiarity by doing so. Burke’s 
idea of empire might have been, as Langford writes, one of ‘communities bound in 
partnership’, but his own erosion of definition, in his representation of religious 
identities, renders religious communities familiar to one another.
482
 
Burke’s representation of global religions suggests that Muslim, Hindu, and 
Christian sects are all united under the community of humanity, ‘all born into subjection, 
all born equally, high and low’.483 Just as Burke suggests that the shared law of 
providence cuts across geographical and cultural boundaries, Marshall Berman writes: 
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of 
geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology; 
in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a 
paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of 
perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of 
ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, 
as Marx said, “all that is solid melts into air”484 
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Berman uses Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’ Communist Manifesto (1848) to interpret 
modernity: Marx and Engels claim that the foundations of our societies are false, and 
contradictory: 
All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is 
holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his 
real condition of life and his relations with his kind.
485
 
The habitual subversion of individual cultural identity, by the cultural familiarity evident 
in Burke’s thinking about religion, makes his writings concerning Ireland and India 
exemplary of this modern condition described by Marx, Engles, and Berman: the erosive 
nature of the modern condition will not allow the embedment of religious roots to endure. 
To view Burke as a progenitor of modernity in this way is ironic when considering what 
Marx actually thought of Burke. In Das Kapital (1867), he offers the following opinion 
of Burke: 
The sycophant—who in the pay of the English oligarchy played the 
romantic laudator temporis acti [praiser of time past] against the French 
Revolution just as, in the pay of the North American colonies at the 
beginning of the American troubles, he had played the liberal against the 
English oligarchy—was an out-and-out vulgar bourgeois.486 
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Marx evaluates Burke’s thought as capriciousness, motivated by materialistic gain. On a 
point of accuracy (or maybe absurdity), Burke was bribed neither by the English 
parliament, nor any of the North American colonies; no doubt, Marx refers to Burke’s 
employment during the time of the American crisis as an agent for the Assembly of New 
York, as well as his seat in the English parliament during the time of the French 
Revolution. In any case, Marx’s assessment of Burke’s position(s) in political matters as 
mercenary misses the commonality between the French and American revolutions, which 
was, indeed, the criticism of oligarchy. Further, Burke’s advocacy for enfranchising the 
people of India and Ireland rather resonates with Marx’s value placed on the 
proletariat.
487
 Perhaps the only sliver of accuracy in Marx’s evaluation is his placement of 
Burke within the context of modernity: ‘Constant revolutionizing of production, 
uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation 
distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier times.’488 Burke is the modern paradox 
manifested: he engages with the constant renovation of religious conceptualization. 
 Berman describes the paradoxical nature of modernity as ‘a world where 
everything is pregnant with its contrary’.489 In his Tracts relating to Popery Laws, Burke 
expresses such a paradox—one in which the British government has worsened the 
condition of the Catholic people in Ireland by improving it. Before this, however, Burke 
first points out the irony that Catholicism was once the established religion of the state; 
the current religion of the state would have been dissent: 
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It is proper to recollect, that this Religion [Catholicism] which is so 
persecuted in its Members, is an old Religion of the Country, and the once 
Established Religion of the State; the very same which had for centuries 
received the countenance and sanction of the Laws, and from which it 
would at one time have been highly penal to have dissented.
490
 
Burke later continues to explain a different irony: that the improvement intended by the 
Protestant Reformation is pregnant with its contrary: 
And was there no civil society at all in these kingdoms before the 
Reformation? To say it was not as well constituted as it ought to be, is 
saying nothing at all to the purpose; for that assertion evidently regards 
improvement, not existence. It certainly did then exist; and it as certainly 
then was at least as much to the advantage of a very great part of society, 
as what we have brought in the place of it; which is indeed a great blessing 
to those who have profited of the change; but to all the rest, as we have 
wrought, that very reverse. We found the people hereticks and idolaters; 
we have, by way of improving their condition, rendered them slaves and 
beggars; they remain in all the misfortune of their old errors, and all the 
superadded misery of their recent punishment. They were happy enough, 
in their opinion at least, before the change: what benefits society then had, 
they partook of them all. They are now excluded from those benefits: and 
so far as civil society comprehends them, as we have managed the matter, 
our persecutions are so far from being necessary to its existence, that out 
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very Reformation is made in a degree noxious. If this be improvement, 
truly I know not what can be called a deprivation of society.
491
 
A reformation that was meant to improve the condition of a people, but in fact harmed 
them by reducing them to helots, is ironic. Social ‘improvements’ that are, in actuality, 
‘deprivations’ (e.g., the Penal Laws) are prime examples of ‘things being pregnant with 
their opposites’, and therefore, exemplary of modern paradox. 
We now understand that Burke not only injected awareness of non-Western 
culture into British political practice, but also injected awareness of non-Western 
religious culture into the British conceptualization of religions. Those scholars who have 
recognized Burke’s representation of imperial duty to indigenous culture identify him as 
a liberal, or Universalist, or pluralist.
492
 However, I believe that such labels may 
underestimate the prudence and interest in empire motivating Burke’s position in 
international affairs. After all, there is a strong undercurrent of political prudence beneath 
Burke’s wide net of tolerance. While Burke criticised the imperialistic actions of the 
Company in India, his objective was to retain the province for the empire. Paul Langford 
explains: 
This is not to say that Burke seriously considered the possibility of 
restoring Indian rule. He had too strong a sense of the forces released by 
Western expansion to suppose that any power could turn the clock back. 
Nor was he naïve enough to suppose that the East India Company was the 
only engine of change.
493
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 Conceivably, the cost of enfranchising a governed people is less than the loss of a 
province altogether. Another example of the political prudence of preserving indigenous 
methods of religious governance is seen in Burke’s approach to the Quebec Act of 1774. 
Burke’s treatment of the Quebec Act is particularly relevant to his Irish texts, as it 
addresses the question of Catholicism. 
In 1763 there was a proclamation issued by King George III that added new North 
American provinces to the British Empire. While the measure never had parliamentary 
approval, these provinces included East Florida, West Florida, Grenada, and Quebec. 
Complications over boundary division and methods of governance delayed the measure 
where Quebec was concerned, in particular. The Privy Council was advising William 
Pitt, Earl of Chatham, on the need for further information about the colonists—Burke was 
among the members who ‘[…] complained that it was impossible to form opinions about 
the Bill without further information’.494 The 1774 Quebec Act finally sanctioned the 
Catholic Church in the French-speaking province of Canada, inasmuch as it recognized 
the establishment of a Catholic clergy in Quebec that was not subject to the penal 
restrictions forced on the Catholics in Britain and Ireland; rather, the act extended the 
benefits of legal security offered by the English constitution. Burke supported the 
establishment of a Catholic clergy in Quebec, but worried about withdrawing the offer of 
providing an English assembly in the province, inasmuch as this would surrender too 
much legislative authority to the King. 
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Critics such as O’Brien and O’Flaherty have interpreted Burke’s approach to the 
bill as evidence of his ‘avoidance’ of the Catholic question, because of Burke’s position 
on the Quebec act focusing on the retention of judicial and government institutions.
495
 
However, there is a clear acknowledgment that the Canadian grievance is grounded in 
political and religious freedom; the parliamentary report of Burke’s speech on 10 June 
1774 states Burke’s argument: 
But the reason the Noblesse did not like the English laws was on account 
of the manner in which they had been represented to them: namely, that 
they were a string of religious and civil persecutions, which would entirely 
hinder them either from exercising their own religion, or from having any 
share in the government of their own country […].496 
Responding to Lord North in the Debate on the Clause Allowing the Exercise of the 
Romish Religion, Burke delivers an outcry for Catholic toleration, at the expense of 
losing Quebec as part of the empire: 
But before I proceed, allow me to state, in a few words, my opinion with 
regard to the principle of toleration, There is but one healing, Catholic 
principle of toleration which ought to find favour in this House. It is 
wanted, not only in our colonies, but here. The thirsty earth of our own 
country is gasping and gaping, and crying out for that healing shower from 
heaven. The noble lord [Lord North] has told you of the right of those 
people by the treaty; but I consider the right of conquest so little, and the 
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right of human nature so much, that the former has very little 
consideration with me. I look upon the people of Canada as coming, by 
the dispensation of God, under the British government. I would have us 




Perhaps, instead of exemplifying Burke’s avoidance of the Catholic issue, the passage 
above demonstrates Burke’s willingness to engage tactfully with an issue in which 
Catholicism is undeniably elemental while prioritizing imperial tenancy in the Canadian 
province. Further, the passage above demonstrates Burke’s readiness to stand for the 
established religious enfranchisement of colonial people.
498
 Burke’s approach to the 
Quebec Act is an example of a religious argument grounded with terms of political 
prudence. Richard Bourke acknowledges an underpinning of prudence in Burke’s 
approach to the Quebec Bill: 
Burke’s contributions to the debates over Quebec were […] consistent 
with a general ambition to reduce the hazards of political oppression, as he 
at least understood this. […] Ascendancy would then be interpreted as 
severe subjection, pitting the few against the many and sowing the seeds 
of dissension. Faction would then resuscitate the spirit of conquest and 
elude every attempt at pacification.
499
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Inflaming the sense of political oppression within a conquered people by depriving them 
of religious protection encourages the splintering of religious factions; allowing a 
conquered populace to retain their methods of religious governance is prudent, inasmuch 
as it pacifies them. A similar measure passed in Ireland that same year. The Irish Oath 
encouraged Catholics to swear allegiance to King George III without renouncing spiritual 
allegiance to the pope. Both the Quebec Act and the Irish Oath of 1774 demonstrate a 
measure of religious tolerance toward Catholics for the sake of political prudence. In 
religious terms, we can construe Burke’s understanding that the cost of expanding 
tolerance to non-Protestant (or even non-Christian) sects is less than losing an element of 
the empire. As Gibbons observes above, Burke does not wish to ignore the cost of 
progress; but I would like to indicate that despite some cost, Burke still welcomes 
progress (enfranchising Catholics, legitimizing Christian alongside non-Christian sects 
relative to indigenous culture): this is conceptual expansion. This is religious 
progressiveness. 
Burke’s response to the American crisis is (conceivably) a non-religious example 
of this sort of weighing of cost: driving the American colonists to rebellion is far more 
costly than what Eagleton calls the ‘more sagacious course of conciliation’.500 Mahoney 
writes that ‘Burke wore his unpopular views on the American revolution like a badge of 
honour […]’.501 In his Speech on Conciliation with America (22 March 1775), Burke 
pleaded, ‘The proposition is Peace […] simple peace’.502 However, prudence motivated 
his support for conciliation. He was encouraging England’s leniency in arguing for the 
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repeal of the Stamp Act, but all with the objective of keeping the American colonies 
through the Declaratory Act (1766)—augmented by the Tea Act and the Boston Tea 
Party of 1773, which attempted to re-assert England’s sovereignty over the colonies. The 
following excerpt from Burke’s Speech on American Taxation (April 1774) clearly 
defines Burke’s motivation grounded in prudence, not colonial sympathy: 
I am not here going into the distinction of rights, not attempting to mark 
their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate 
the very sound of them.
503
 
Burke makes it clear that these were not cultural sympathies about the ‘distinction of 
rights’ or ‘boundaries’ of an oppressed and suffering people; he removes his agenda 
entirely from the realm of the ‘metaphysical.’ His Speech on American Taxation (April 
1774) further clarifies that his interest is for the political and economic welfare of 
England. 
There is no fair dealing in any part of the transaction. If you mean to 
follow your true motive and your public faith, give up your tax on tea for 




Burke’s support of the repeal of the tax on tea was not wholly motivated by cultural 
sympathy, but rather the possibility of revenue. Burke argues that the tax on tea is far less 
lucrative than the possibility of open commerce with the colonies. The cost of losing the 
American colonies as part of the empire, and losing trade with America, is greater than 
                                                 
503
 Edmund Burke, Speech on American Taxation (April 1774), in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund 
Burke, ed. by Paul Langford, 9 vols, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), II, p. 458.  
504
 Burke, Taxation, p. 425. 
183 
 
making concessions. While, of course, it would have been unwise for Burke to take an 
absolute stance supporting American Independence, and thereby supporting England’s 
defeat in the American Rebellion, he was still critical of Britain’s method of robbing one 
part of the empire to fund another: ‘It is through the American trade of Tea that your East 
India conquests are to be prevented from crushing you with their burthen.’505 Eagleton 
writes that Burke’s notion of hegemony ‘comes down to the banal maxim: Keep them 
happy!’ which is a rather unsympathetic maxim.506 It is not simply Burke’s calculated 
prudent preservation of empire that makes the liberal label for Burke seem restrictive. 
Other critical interpretations approaching Burke’s writings to ask historical and 
political questions have attempted to capture Burke’s anti-exclusionary politics. Jennifer 
G. Pitts writes about Burke’s pluralistic and ‘universalist commitments’, as being part of 
a liberal tradition, along with Bentham and J. S. Mill.
507
 However, I would argue that 
placing Burke into a category such as ‘universalist’ or ‘liberal’ oversimplifies Burke’s 
thinking, and (if we are examining Burke’s thinking through the lens of religion in 
modernity), it oversimplifies the state of religious conceptualization in modernity—in 
general. Where Burke’s liberalism is perceived, some scholars have tried to enrol Burke 
into liberal-individualist thinking, such as C.B. Macpherson and Isaac Kramnick.
508
 In 
addition to liberalism’s focus on individualism (a nineteenth-century concept), J.W. 
Burrow’s analysis of Whig versus Liberal helps to understand how inflating Burke’s 
liberalism is not exactly appropriate: Burrow explains that some methods of 
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understanding political philosophy interchange ‘“Whig” in favour of a prospective use of 
“liberal”’.509 Burrows further explains the nineteenth-century re-appropriation of 
eighteenth-century terms, like Whig: ‘Liberalism […] is readily presented as the 
philosophical counterpart to laissez-faire Political Economy. It makes the central political 
issue of liberal thought, and hence by extension of nineteenth-century England, that of 
state intervention in economic life […].’510 In political theory, Burke often is associated 
with laissez-faire politics; therefore, the nineteenth-century division that Burrows 
outlines therefore explains liberal interpretations of Burke.
511
 However, Burrows further 
indicates that this polarization underestimates the closeness (and, at times, interchanging) 
between Whig and Liberal, because working with (not against) the grain of society (i.e. 
laissez-faire politics), would have been viewed as a ‘Burkean and nineteenth-century 
Whig concept’.512 
The nineteenth-century recognition of Burke’s liberal leanings was ushered in by 
Leslie Stephen, who saw Burke’s conceptualization of the nation as a living organism as 
prefiguring nineteenth-century concepts of individualist social evolution.
513
 However, 
figures such as Stephen made Burke acceptable to nineteenth-century Liberals by 
focusing on his ‘Christian earnestness’.514 Ultimately, Burrows makes a case for a 
conservative-reactionary Burke when he discusses Burke’s response to the French 
Revolution: ‘It [Burke’s response] is emphatically not a modern or progressive Whig 
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diagnosis […]’.515 I argue that Burke’s open-mindedness to non-Christian sects counters 
interpretations of Burke as ‘emphatically not’ progressive or modern. While I can 
understand Stephen’s claim about Burke pre-figuring nineteenth century concepts, I do 
not believe Stephen’s method of enrolling Burke into liberalism is appropriate either. He 
sources Burke’s liberalism in Christ-centred earnestness; as I have shown above, Burke’s 
conceptualization of religion is open to non-Christian sects. 
In terms of universalism, Gibbons also writes that Burke ‘possesses the global 
reach of universalist theories’, yet also marks Burke’s rejection of metaphysical 
abstraction, (‘or the insensitivity to time and place, that characterized progress and 
universal reason’) as Burke’s ‘rejection of universalism’ and his ‘departure from 
conventional Enlightenment’.516 Gibbons refers to universalism as ‘the parochial 
emphasis on “sameness”’; in short, Gibbons argues that while Burke possessed the 
concept of universalism, he rejected its characteristics that marked progress.
517
 I would 
counter Gibbons’ argument by pointing to the elements of abstraction (or methods of 
rendering familiar) in Burke’s representation of religion, evidenced in the texts above; I 
argue that religious inclusiveness, in fact, does characterize progress. However, if 
universalism is committed to ‘concern for others without regard to national or other 
allegiances’, and universal tolerance (i.e. ‘the tolerance of violence’), then the 
classification does not quite encompass the complications in Burke’s treatment of other 
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 Welsh and Fidler explain that for scholars of international studies Burke’s liberal 
leanings have more appeal than his conserve leanings because liberalism has ‘universal 
potential’, for a ‘cosmopolitan culture’—meaning, ‘familiar with and at ease with various 
countries’.519 Simms criticises the pitfall of exaggerating Burke’s liberalism, arguing that 
a view of Burke as Universalist or liberal is ‘[…] in thrall to the Westphalian myth, and 
thus tend to exaggerate the novelty of Burke’s interventionism’.520 By interventionism 
(and the ‘Westphalian myth’), he refers to the concept of a sovereign nation-state founded 
upon principles of exclusion through territoriality and non-involvement from external 
agents in domestic affairs.
521
 Welsh and Fidler also address Burke where pluralism is 
concerned; they write of the scholars in international policy who seek more in the way of 
pluralism and political solidarity from Burke that his ‘perspective seems to offer little 
help’: ‘If cultural heterogeneity continues to throw international society back toward 
pluralism, then the moral contribution of the society of states to both international order 
and justices may be undermined’ (The heterogeneity inherent in pluralism will inevitably 
undermine order).
522
 If we think about how Burke’s representation of global religions fits 
into this argument about international politics, (to use the phrasing of Welsh and Fidler) 
we can conceive of how the heterogeneous quality of religious identity is undermined by 
a rendering of differing cultures as familiar, which we can conceive as conceptual 
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homogenizing, to some extent. Gibbons argues, ‘Genuine pluralism or diversity, for 
Burke, transcends the search for sameness, which prevails in abstract cosmopolitanism, 
and is willing to encounter the shock of the strange, without the safety-nets of familiarity 
or civic uniformity.’523 Gibbons is correct in explaining that Burke finds ‘the strange’ in 
all religious sects, in terms of acknowledging their individual quality. However, I also 
believe that Burke does endeavour to find a sameness, in terms of drawing familiarity 
between features in common. For example, he admits that all sects are faulty in his letter 
to Erskine; Burke does find sameness in the shared frailty of the human construction of 
religious sects. Again, upon examining Burke’s thought through a political lens, labels 
such as pluralism, universalism, liberalism all possess an arguable validity; however, the 
objective of my analysis is to examine the complexity of those labels when it comes to 
examining Burke’s thought through a religious lens. 
The shared endeavour between the scholars above is to capture the way Burke 
expands political practice to be inclusive of humanity. Other critics have acknowledged 
Burke’s innovativeness in injecting an awareness of humanity into imperial practice: 
Simms writes that while the Whig interventionist doctrine was not necessarily new, 
Burke carried the concept of intervention further ‘[…] now Burke had brought the much 
broader category of “humanity” into play’.524 Eagleton names Burke as a figurehead of 
‘nationalist humanism’: a nationalism wherein man’s patriotism is defined by his 
relationship to other men, not the state.
525
 I would expand these observations to argue that 
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Burke’s injection of humanity into international politics is innovative in its contribution 
to expanding the eighteenth-century representation of global religions. 
 D.J.B. Trim and Richard Bonney describe a mobility of cultures in modernization 
and globalization: ‘The enhanced mobility of persons and of ideas has transformed 
homogenous societies into heterogeneous ones, so the relationships between individual 
groups and larger wholes have assumed practical importance and become the subject of 
greater critical debate.’526 The forced cultural diversification characteristic of the 
modernity described by Trim and Bonney is seen in Burke’s representation of global 
cultures as distinct, yet familiar. Burke promotes the importance of indigenous culture 
(established institutions and traditions). While this promotion is carried out with the 
health of the empire (prudently) in mind, the anthropological consideration for culture is 
modern.  
Conclusion to Chapter 2 
Talal Asad briefly mentions Burke’s legacy in modernity, as a concept or theory: 
‘Although Burke does not say this, we can see that this submission to the experience of 
horror-and-delight opens the way to a modern understanding of “the sacred” as well as to 
an aesthetics of excess.’527 Asad’s assigns importance to two of Burke’s contributions to 
modern understanding. The latter understanding, of aesthetics, resonates in the aesthetic-
political studies (e.g., from Eagleton, Gibbons, White, Bourke). I believe that my critical 
interpretation resonates with the former: I have argued Burke’s contribution to the 
modern understanding of ‘the sacred’ by demonstrating how he erodes religious 
boundaries into a unifying category of familiar tradition, relative to indigenous culture. 
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Looking at Burke in this way not only depicts him as a progenitor of modernity, but a 
progenitor of a particularly multicultural modernity. Gordon Rupp describes Burke as 
‘[…] one of the profoundest Christian thinkers of his age […]’.528 On the contrary, I 
would argue that my analysis above reveals Burke as much more than a Christ-centred 
thinker. Rather, I believe we are beginning to see Burke as a multicultural thinker, whose 
representation of global cultures transcends boundaries of religious sect and nation. 
Burke’s criticism of tyrannous encroachment did not end with his engagement 
with India. The next chapter will explore how, to Burke, the English youth of the East 
Indian Trading Company ran parallel to the French youth recruited by rebellious 
Jacobites in France in terms of hastily obtained power—both groups being corrupted by 
the spoils of tyranny. Indianism, however, differs from Jacobinism in its gradual cultural 
encroachment, as opposed to Jacobinism’s epochal cultural upheaval. Sunil Agnani 
observes the necessity of observing these forms of malignity and tyranny, relative to 
different cultures: 
[…] what Burke feared is something overlooked by many who read his 
work on Europe or India in isolation: the coevality of the transformations 
taking place in many parts of the colonial world and metropolitan Europe 
that he captured in the couplet Indianism / Jacobinism.
529
 
It is clear from the discussion over Burke’s Indian and Irish texts above that there is a 
coevality of religious tyranny in India and Ireland. Agnani suggests that studying any of 
these texts in isolation would neglect this coevality of political tyranny between India and 
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France. In the next chapter, I engage with Burke’s perception of tyranny in France, but 
not in an argument that places him in opposition to modernity. If modernity describes ‘a 
world where everything is pregnant with its contrary’, then religion is subverted by 
contrary themes (e.g., secularism, atheism, even demonic themes.)
530
 My next chapter is 
an examination of the irony of the way in which Burke’s rhetoric (in a way) complies 
with these themes. 
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Ch. 3: ‘Profaning of the Sacred: Burke’s confrontation with the French Revolution, 
The Reflections’ 
Introduction to Chapter 3 
The chronology of Burke’s writings now brings us to his response to the uprising 
in France. This chapter is focused on Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790), secondarily leaning on his Letter to a Member of the National Assembly (1791) 
and Thoughts on French Affairs (1791).
531
 There is a wealth of scholarship in which 
authors examine Burke’s political thinking, as it figures historically with the political 
rivalries surrounding the French Revolution. However, I believe that scholarly 
interpretations of Burke’s response to the French Revolution are lacking in attention to 
his religious thought and its impression against a background of modernity. My reading 
of the above texts is an effort to remedy this inattention. Chiefly, my interpretation of the 
above texts is an engagement with the idea that, when Burke comes to consider religious 
sacredness in the context of the events in France (and how they appear to the Reverend 
Price, the Revolutionary Society, and the National Assembly), he seems to acknowledge 
that the sacred (inevitably) contains its opposite—the demonic, the sacrilegious. 
I believe that the way in which Burke defends religious sacredness in the above 
texts reveals a provocative dimension to his representation of religion in his writings. 
Through a rhetorical method we shall refer to as ‘libel by irony’, he habitually 
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generalizes all dissenting heterodoxy as demonic. L.G. Mitchell observes this rhetorical 
tactic: 
[…] Burke began to construct a diabolid of ghosts and phantoms that 
menaced the English Constitution. Religious dissent of all kinds acquired 
a demonic character. Those arguing for the repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts were treated as political subversives. The fact that Fox, 
Sheridan, and other leading Whigs continued to support the principle of 
religious toleration therefore distanced them from Burke. Also menacing 




Above, Mitchell describes an aspect of Burke’s rhetoric: constructing a ‘diabolid’. 
From this description, readers conceive of Burke intentionally manufacturing a body ‘of 
or pertaining to the devil’.533 Mitchell’s observation begs expansion. This is the first task 
of this chapter: I will first look at the Reflections to highlight the ways in which Burke 
exalts demonic themes, and renders away differentiating characteristics between sects of 
Christian heterodoxy. My objective is to highlight the centrality of the demonic in the 
text. For this reason, I focus only on the early part of the text, as opposed to offering a 
reading of the entire Reflections. I submit that Burke’s construction of this diabolid is 
more than a rhetorical tactic to convey his political thought; evil and irreligious themes 
have an overbearing presence in Burke’s Reflections alongside themes of holiness and 
sacredness. For this reason (along with others), the second task in this chapter will be to 
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argue against J.C.D. Clark’s interpretation of the Reflections, which discourages reading 
the religious context of the text. Clark suggests that while Burke mentions religion, his 
criticism of the upheaval in France is not a criticism of sacrilege: 
Even Burke’s comments on the desperate plight of the French church in 
the Revolution were not those of a co-religionist, his defence of its 
hierarchy in the Reflections was pragmatic; he said almost nothing about 
the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, a reorganization imposed by the new 
government […]; his outrage at the seizure of the goods of the French 
church was outrage at theft, not sacrilege.
534
 
I do not agree with Clark that Burke’s outrage was solely at ‘theft’; in fact, Burke does 
express outrage over the oppression and exploitation of the clergy. I argue against Clark 
on this point: Burke’s indignation against the revolution in France is outrage at sacrilege; 
I believe the outrage Burke expresses over the encroachment upon religious sacredness is 
central to Burke’s commentary in the Reflections, his Letter to a Member, and his 
Thoughts on French Affairs.
535
 However, I believe his defence of religious sacredness 
reveals that provocative dimension of Burke’s representation of religion—one in which 
‘holiness’ shares equal importance with the ‘profane’.536 The third task in this chapter is 
to unearth the themes of darkness and evil on which Burke’s defence against sacrilege 
depends. I will suggest that Burke’s Reflections and his, Letter to a Member and his 
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Thoughts on French Affairs give a voice to the very evil he is admonishing, which seats 
these texts in eighteenth-century characteristics of rhetoric—as we will learn from John 
Barrell and S.J. Barnett. Then, I attempt to counterbalance interpretations of Burke’s 
Reflections as reactionary. Many scholars interpret the Reflections as evincing Burke’s 
reactionary-Conservatism, in the sense of ‘one who is against radical political or social 
reform, and in favour of a reversion to a former state of affairs’. 537 J.W. Burrow writes, 
‘Burke’s Reflections is emphatically not a modern or progressive Whig diagnosis’. 538 
Russell Kirk, Eagleton, White, Frohnen, Gibbons all position Burke against progress 
when looking at the Reflections. 
539
 I evince Burke’s value of change, which is 
antithetical to a reactionary identity, through the lens of his representation of religion. 
Finally, I demonstrate how this profane dimension in Burke’s representation of 
religion is aptly articulated in twentieth century theories of modernity. Burke’s 
engagement with dark, demonic themes in the defence of the sacred reveals a paradox 
akin to the modern ‘profaning of the sacred’ coined by Karl Marx and applied to 
modernity by Marshall Berman.
540
 I argue against interpretations (such as Burrow’s) that 
suggest Burke’s Reflections is anti-modern by demonstrating that Burke’s representation 
of religion in the text (along with his Letter to a Member and his Thoughts on French 
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Affairs) deconstructs concepts that define religion in a way that resonates with modern 
deconstructionist conceptualizations of religion, as trans-religious, or religion without 
religion (as we shall see from Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault).
541
 
Clark suggests that while Burke defended the established French Church (which 
was the Catholic Church), he did not subscribe to it in his personal beliefs. If we were 
intending to understand more about Burke’s personal religious convictions, then I agree 
with Clark—his comments surrounding the French church do not prove that Burke was 
both an Anglican and a Catholic. He was not a co-religionist in this sense. If, however, 
we are intending to understand Burke’s ‘comments on the desperate plight of the French 
church’ (not whether he personally subscribed to it), then I argue that we can think of 
Burke’s comments as co-religionist—in the sense of advocating the freedom for differing 
religions to co-exist. Indeed, he attacks the National Assembly and the Revolutionary 
Society for their intolerance toward religious co-existence (in the case of the former, the 
intolerance toward the Catholic Church). In fact, I will argue further: Burke’s 
commentary surrounding the French Revolution is not only that of a co-religionist, but 
(more appropriately) that of a trans-religionist, or non-religionist (ideas, as we shall see, 
that appear in twentieth-century deconstructionist theories). 
My critical interpretation of Burke’s writings on France differs from others, 
inasmuch as I treat him in a religious context—beyond his own religious identity. Many 
scholars argue the importance of understanding Burke’s political thinking surrounding 
the French Revolution: Richard Bourke examines Burke’s role in opposing political 
theories at the heart of the French Revolution: ‘A crucial matter in contention among 
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competing political sects was the connection between enlightenment and politics 
itself.’542 James Conniff observes the way in which Burke’s ‘Irish politics interwove in 
curious ways with those of his reflections on France’ and its politics.543 Conniff writes, 
‘Just as he feared the extension of French Jacobin ideas to England, Burke also feared 
their spread to Ireland […]’.544 
The scholarship that does provide a measure of religious context for Burke’s 
thinking is limited; further, such scholarship does not generally focus on his responses to 
the turmoil in France, but rather speculates largely about Burke’s Irish-Catholic 
connections, and his personal religious convictions. For example, F.P. Lock speculates 
about ‘the character of his [Burke’s] Christianity’, and tries to answer the questions: 
‘what was Burke’s personal faith? […] what ideas and concepts informed his faith?’.545 
Lock concludes that we should ‘take him [Burke] seriously as a Christian’ statesman; he 
agrees with Harvey C. Mansfield, that ‘there is no clear reason to deny that Burke 
believes in a personal God’, and is therefore a Christian.546 Lock’s study is biographical, 
and exemplary of numerous studies that are intended to ascertain what ‘was exactly 
Burke’s belief’ (e.g., Latitudinarian Protestantism, Crypto-Catholicism); my study is not 
biographical, and is intended to understand the critical impression of Burke’s 
representation of religion in his texts.
547
 Other scholars who have focused on unearthing 
Burke’s true religious identity include Conor Cruise O’Brien, Ian Crowe, and Christopher 
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Hitchens. Christopher Hitchens speculates on Burke’s true religious identity, arguing 
(like O’Brien) that Burke was ‘probably a Catholic’.548 Ian Crowe (like Lock) mentions 
Burke’s Anglican-latitudinarian leanings, dispelling them as a disguise for Burke’s 
crypto-Catholicism.
549
 While latitudinarian openness to particular religious creeds could 
leave room for speculation about a secret subscription to Catholicism, I agree with 
Crowe—that this is probably not so in Burke’s case. There are studies that carry the 
question of Burke’s Catholic identity into their analysis of the Reflections. J.C.D. Clark’s 
study on Burke’s religion validates the claim made by O’Brien that, through the 
Reflections, Burke is actually a criticising Protestant Ascendancy through criticising Price 
(for celebrating the 1688 revolution).
550
 O’Brien claims that Burke’s Reflections ‘[…] is 
partially liberating—in a permissible way—a suppressed revolutionary part of his 
personality’.551 Clark treats O’Brien’s analysis of Burke as a romantic Jacobite, in 
‘emotional sympathy with the Catholics’ with a measure of plausibility.552 Nevertheless, 
such studies are biographical in nature, not interpretations of Burke’s critical imprint. 
Lock, Crowe, Hitchens, Mansfield, O’Brien, and others, speculate on Burke’s personal 
religious conviction; (as with my interpretation of Burke’s early texts, and his writings on 
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In J.C.D. Clark’s critical edition of the Reflections (as in his other studies of 
Burke), he identifies Burke as ‘latitudinarian’—just as Lock and Crowe do. He briefly 
explains Burke’s Anglican-latitudinarianism in the following historical and political 
context: ‘committed against the view that any one denomination possessed either the sole 
authority to determine doctrine, or the only divinely ordained form of ecclesiastical 
polity’.554 Clark is describing Burke’s opposition to totalitarian authority of one sect over 
others in the Reflections; this resonates with Frederick Dryer’s definition of 
latitudinarianism, discussed in the introduction to this thesis: ‘tolerant and open-minded 
in matters of dogmatic orthodoxy’.555 However, we must be careful in classifying any 
theme of toleration as latitudinarianism—especially when analysing Burke’s Reflections, 
wherein he warns that ‘the greatest of all intolerance’ is achieved ‘through a violence of 
toleration’.556 Later in this chapter, we shall see how Burke explains that forced toleration 
is tyrannical. 
I do not wish to oppose any of these biographical claims about Burke—from 
O’Brien, Crowe, Lock, or Clark. However, in this chapter I do wish to take issue with 
Clark’s critical interpretation of the Reflections, which shapes an argument to discourage 
reading a religious context of the Reflections. Indeed, the fissure that opened between 
Burke and Charles James Fox over the matter of the French Revolution was, by a large 
measure, religious in nature
557
 In Fox’s speeches supporting the repeal of the Corporation 
and Test Acts (March 1790), he laments that he: 
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[…] must be reduced to the necessity of resifting the arguments of that 
Right Honourable Friend (Mr. Burke) whose political sentiments had, 
until lately, so perfectly coincided with his own, that he could never have 
conceived it within the power of events to render them divisible.
558
 
It is the issue of religious toleration that renders Fox and Burke divisible. Burke presents 
his view on the matter in his Reflections when he targets the Revolution Society as one of 
the clubs and societies that advocated the relaxation of legislation, such as the 
Corporation Act of 1661 and Test Act of 1673. These acts imposed the sacraments and 
rites of the Church of England for the holders of public office, and Fox argued in favour 
of their relaxation: 
The origin of religious Toleration was of a recent date, indeed; and 
although it may have been theoretically adverted to, at an earlier period, 
not many years were as yet elapsed subsequently to its having been carried 
into practice. […] If they [the House] adverted to the first ages of 
mankind, when all was sunk in ignorance, barbarism and corruption, 
instead of indiscriminately fixing upon fanciful conclusions, they would 
ascend to first principles; and thence discover that persecution, and not 
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Burke’s departure from Fox on the issue above does not necessarily qualify him as a 
reactionary. Burke opposed the dissection and breaking apart of established tradition, 
viewing it as the tyranny of dissenting sects. We shall see how Burke reveals the religious 
toleration of the dissenting Revolution Society to be (as Fox says above) ‘persecution’. It 
is my view that interpreting Burke’s Reflections as solely a defence of hierarchy (as Clark 
does) is a restrictive interpretation that perpetuates interpretations of Burke as a 
reactionary-conservative; I counter such interpretations by suggesting his commentary 
surrounding the revolution is also a defence of religious cultural diversity and 
(constitutional) change. More broadly, however, the religious nature of the fissure above 
begins to justify how we can interpret Burke’s response to the French Revolution in a 
religious context. 
Exalting the Demonic; Blending Religious Design 
The London Revolution Society was formed in 1788—the same year Burke was 
involved in the launching of the Hastings impeachment trial.
560
 As is well known, it was 
one of many radical societies in Britain in the 1790s.
561
 Mark Philp explains: ‘[…] eight 
societies were formed in and around Sheffield at the end of 1791 and the beginning of 
1792; and societies were also formed in Liverpool, Stockport, Warrington, Leeds, 
Wakefield, Halifax, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Cambridge, Norwich, Great Yarmouth, 
Ipswich, Chester, Derby, Belper, Birmingham, Walsall, Coventry and 
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Wolverhampton.’562 Philp suggests that these groups were worrisome to the government; 
however, John Seed investigates the possibility that Rational Dissenters were ‘no more 
than a noisy metropolitan clique of intellectuals of little influence on, or connection to, 
the wider political culture’.563 Edmund Burke certainly perceived the threat as genuine 
upon one particular occasion: on the 101
st
 anniversary of the Glorious Revolution, the 
Revolutionary Society met to hear a sermon by Dr Richard Price, a dissenting minister at 
the centre of the society. The sermon, entitled A Discourse on the Love of our Country 
was delivered on 4 November 1789, and published by T. Cadell that same year.
564
 Before 
Price’s sermon in 1789, the revolutionary rumblings in France were increasingly 
cataclysmic: the Third Estate turned into the National Assembly on 17 June the Bastille 
was stormed on 14 July; on 2 November, the National Assembly began the auction of 
property from the French Church.
565
 We know Burke read the sermon somewhere 
between his Parliamentary recess at Beaconsfield in the autumn of 1789 and his return to 
London in January of 1790.
566
 By 13 February of 1790, the Assembly withdrew monastic 
authority, and instituted the Civil Constitution for the clergy by 12 July of that year.
567
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The Civil Constitution was intended to motion a more equitable method of taxation by 
levying tax on church property and land; in actuality, it led to the demotion of clergy 
power, and thereby Church power.
568
 By 15 March 1790, The Assembly declared the 
ancien régime abolished; Burke perceived Price’s sermon supporting all of this upheaval; 
his letter responding to Charles-Jean-Francois Depont’s request for his opinion on these 
events also served as his response to Price, and became his Reflections on the Revolution 
in France, published 1 November of that year.
569
 
The demonic characterisation of the ‘ghosts and phantoms that menaced the 
English Constitution’ (e.g., the Revolution Society) occupies a large part of Burke’s 
rhetorical energy in the Reflections. However, Mitchell’s assessment begs elaboration. As 
with Mitchell, Richard Bourke’s recent work on the Reflections is an observation of the 
rhetorical value in Burke’s characterisation of his opponents: 
There can be no doubt that Burke blended the deliberate designs of 
revolutionary leaders, the unintended consequences of legislative action, 
and the objectives of diverse partisans of reform together into a single 
premeditated process that swept France in 1789. It is right to note the 
extent to which blanket judgments of the kind contributed to the process of 
polemical escalation characteristic of the Revolution’s trajectory. But 
Burke’s responsibility in this regard does not provide a justification for 
muddling his political intentions after the fact, nor for confusing his 
commitments with his propagandising methods. Burke’s purpose can best 
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be ascertained by the way he characterised his opponents. His hostility 
towards the philosophes was particularly directed at Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Turgot and Helvétius. Deism, democratic republicanism, physiocracy and 
moral materialism were most prominent among his targets. The diffusion 
of these doctrines not only had bred contempt for the idea of ethical 




While Bourke acknowledges the rhetorical value in Burke’s characterisation of the 
French philosophes, and the doctrines associated with them, his assessment seems to 
underestimate the value in Burke’s hostility specific to the Revolution Society. In fact, 
Burke is quite clear, in the first part of the Reflections, that it is the Revolution Society 
receiving the majority of his criticism: 
Since you have selected the Revolution Society as the great object of your 
national thanks and praises, you will think me excusable in making its late 
conduct the subject of my observations. The National Assembly of France 
has given importance to these gentlemen by adopting them; and they 
return the favour, by acting as a committee in England for extending the 
principles of the National Assembly.
571
 
Below, Burke introduces the Revolution Society contemporaneously with the 
Constitution Society, which, according to Burke: 
[…] intended for the circulation, at the expense of the members, of many 
books, which few others would be at the expense of buying […] Possibly 
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several of them have been exported to France […] What improvements 
they have had in their passage (as it is said some liquors are meliorated by 
crossing the sea) I cannot tell: But I never heard a man of common 
judgment, or the least degree of information, speak a word in praise of the 
greater part of the publications circulated by that society; nor have their 
proceedings been accounted, except by some of themselves, as of any 
serious consequence. […] Until very lately I do not recollect to have heard 
of this club. I am quite sure that it never occupied a moment of my 
thoughts; nor I believe, those of any person out of their own set. I find 
upon enquiry, that on the anniversary of the Revolution in 1688, a club of 
dissenters, but of what denomination I know not, have long had the 
custom of hearing a sermon in one of their churches; and that afterwards 
they spent the day cheerfully, as other clubs do, as the tavern.
572
 
By likening the publications of the club to liquor, and later explaining the regular 
practice of its members to visit the tavern following a sermon, Burke is constructing an 
image of a society that disseminates intoxicating material, and engages in habitual 
drunkenness. Further, by calling into question the denominational foundation of the club, 
Burke leaves room for speculation about its religious foundation and, therefore, political 
agenda: the member of this club could belong to any denomination, or even practice 
witchcraft (having changed the composition of the publications during their crossing of 
the sea). Their sermons are heard in ‘their churches’, which is conceivably opposed to 
what might be ‘our churches’ (i.e., the Church of England). 
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Burke continues to employ language that morally discredits the Revolution 
Society, and undermines any Christian character within. The passage below swells with 
disparaging innuendoes: 
 On the forenoon of the 4
th
 of November last, Doctor Richard Price, a non-
conforming minister of eminence, preached at the dissenting meeting-
house of the Old Jewry, to his club or honest society, a very extraordinary 
miscellaneous sermon, in which there are some good moral and religious 
sentiments, and not ill expressed, mixed up in a sort of porridge of various 
political opinions and reflections: but the revolution in France is the grand 
ingredient in the cauldron. I consider the address transmitted by the 
Revolution Society to the National Assembly, through Earl Stanhope, as 
originating in the principles of the sermon, and as a corollary from them. It 
was moved by the preacher of that discourse. It was passed by those who 
came reeking from the effect of the sermon, without any censure or 
qualification, expressed or implied. If, however any of the gentlemen 
concerned shall wish to separate the sermon from the resolution, they 
know how to acknowledge the one, and to disavow the other. They may 
do it: I cannot. 
For my part, I looked on that sermon as the public declaration of a man 
much connected with literary caballers, and intriguing philosophers; with 
political theologians, and theological politicians, both at home and abroad. 
I know they set him up as a sort of oracle; because, with the best intentions 
206 
 
in the world, he naturally philippizes, and chaunts his prophetic song in 
exact unison with their designs.
573
 
The backhanded compliment, when Burke describes Dr Price’s sermon as 
‘extraordinary miscellaneous’ sets the tone of Burke’s rhetorical approach: to highlight 
the contradiction between the theory and practice of his subject, the Revolution Society. 
Burke goes on to describe Price’s speech as ‘not ill expressed’. This passive language 
delivers a compliment with underpinnings of negativity—after all, he did not describe 
Price’s speech as being well expressed. Second, the reference to cauldron is meant to 
evoke the imagery of witchcraft, implying that dissenting religion is like witchcraft. 
Those who came from the sermon ‘came reeking’ of whatever concoction filled the 
cauldron. The hearers of the sermon were affected by chants and vapours from a potion. 
As witchcraft was a felony punishable by death in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Burke’s implication above could be inferred as quite inflammatory. While the 
eighteenth-century interpretation of witchcraft is less inflammatory, inasmuch as it was 
no longer perceived as a legitimate hazard, it was then perceived as a method of 
defrauding—as per the Witchcraft Act of 1735.574 
Therefore, Burke’s libellous metaphor of the cauldron could implicate Price as a 
swindler, as well as a leader in non-Christian practices. The implication of Price as a 
leader in Witchcraft, or Paganism (or anti-Anglican, or heterodox-Protestant) is further 
emphasized when Burke later refers to Price as an oracle. The metaphor of the cauldron is 
constructed for the purpose of implying a confederacy between the National Assembly, 
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the Revolutionary Society and its chair: Charles Stanhope, Third Earl Stanhope. Stanhope 
was a strong supporter of the French Revolution; his connections with radical dissenters 
(e.g. Joseph Priestley) accounts for his endorsement of Price’s speech (Stanhope would 
later argue that parliament should acknowledge the new French republic, and not involve 
Britain in French affairs).
575
 
The implied subversion of the Established Church is Burke’s link between the 
dissenters of the Revolutionary Society with the French National Assembly: ‘the 
Revolution in France is the grand ingredient in [Price’s] cauldron’. Burke is implying that 
Price has bewitched his followers, and made them drunk with their own interest. In this 
way, he implies they are like the revolutionaries in France. This is the tyranny of the 
individual interest: ‘The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they 
please: We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations, 
which may be soon turned into complaints. Prudence would dictate this in the case of 
separate insulated private men; but liberty, when men act in bodies, is power.’576 
Even closer examination of the long passage above reveals how outrageous 
Burke’s libellous rhetoric becomes. For example, Burke further implies that the effects of 
the sermon left its hearers stinking. However, the most libellous implications lie within 
suggestions of treason. Consider the meaning of ‘cabal’: ‘to combine together for some 
secret of private end (usually in a bad sense)’.577 Above, when Burke refers to the society 
as caballers, he is more specifically trying to compare them to the Cabal Ministry, 
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comprised of Sir Thomas Clifford, Lord Arlington, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord 
Ashley, and Lord Lauderdale, (whose initials spell out ‘cabal’). It was perceived that this 
group attempted to subvert Parliament and monarchy, and describing them as literary 
caballers is meant to refer to the publishing of subversive literature—such as Price’s 
sermon. Essentially, Burke is accusing the members of the Revolution Society of being 
conspirators against the monarchy—traitors. 
Burke’s rhetoric grows even more libellous as the description of Price’s sermon 
continues: 
That sermon is in a strain which I believe has not been heard in this 
kingdom, in any of the pulpits which are tolerated or encouraged in it, 
since the year 1648, when a predecessor of Dr. Price, the Reverend Hugh 
Peters, made the vault of the king’s own chapel at St. James’s ring with 
the honour and privilege of the Saints, who, with the “high praises of God 
in their mouths, and a two-edged sword in their hands, were to execute 
judgment on the heathen, and punishments upon the people; to bind their 
kings with chains, and their nobles with fetters of iron.”578 
Above, is an implication of Price as the Reverend Peters, who was executed for assisting 
in the execution of Charles I—the definitive action of the English revolution of 1649.579 
Burke is depicting Price and his followers as violent regicides, and secret (albeit 
unwitting) republicans; their zeal for revolution may cloud their understanding of its 
realities. The Revolution Society claims to honour the Glorious Revolution of 1688, ‘[…] 
that event in this country to which the name of the Revolution has been given [...]’; 
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above, Burke is accusing them of actually commemorating the English revolution of 
1649.
580
 The accusation is more blatant in the following passage: 
These gentlemen of the Old Jewry, in all their reasonings on the 
Revolution of 1688, have a revolution which happened in England about 
forty years before, and the late French revolution, so much before their 
eyes, and in their hearts, that they are constantly confounding all the three 
together. It is necessary that we should separate what they confound. We 
must recall their erring fancies to the acts of the Revolution which we 
revere, for the discovery of its true principles of the Revolution of 1688 
are any where to be found it is in the statue called the Declaration of 
Right. In that most wise, sober, and considerate declaration, drawn up by 
great lawyers and great statesmen, and not my warm and inexperienced 
enthusiasts [….].581 
By accusing Price and his followers of glorifying the English revolution of 1649, Burke 
is accusing them of treason. This would have been a particularly inflammatory 
suggestion, as treason was still, technically, punishable by death in eighteenth-century 
England—treason being conceived of ‘[w]hen a man doth compass or imagine the death 
of our lord the king, of our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and heir’.582 Further, by 
suggesting that the gentlemen of the Old Jewry confound together the French Revolution, 
the English revolution of 1649, and the revolution of 1688, out of which came a sober 
statute (the Declaration of Right), Burke is not only referring to a solemn and serious 
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statute, but compounding the image of drunkenness introduced earlier in his description 
of this society. 
More libel can be inferred from the long passage above in Burke’s description of 
Price as philippizing. This jab is meant to bolster the inference of Price as a cult leader—
when considered alongside the OED definition: ‘To favour or take the side of Philip of 
Macedon; (hence more generally) to speak or write as one who has been wrongly or 
corruptly inspired or influenced’.583 Philip of Macedon is associated with cult following; 
thus, readers infer Price is a cult leader. Therefore, Burke links any departure from the 
Established Church to treason. Burke means to classify French revolutionaries, and their 
sympathisers (e.g. the Revolution Society) as being non-Christian, and therefore, 
destructive to English polity. 
As Richard Bourke rightly posits (in the quote above), Burke’s main concern is 
with the diffusion of potentially harmful doctrines. Mark Philp validates that concern: 
there was a genuine fear of the extent to which dissenting societies were communicating 
with one another; the corn riots in Ireland (in 1792) later legitimized a fear of 
governmental subversion and domestic civil war.
584
 ‘By the time war broke out with 
France in February 1793, popular politics in Britain had been deeply affected by the 
example of France.’585 Philp further explains that British politics remained affected by 
this example for ten to fifteen years after 1793: 
[…] the mass public meetings of 1795 and the ‘Gagging Acts’ which they 
elicited; the food and crimp riots of 1795-6 and the naval mutinies of 
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1797-8; the revolt in Ireland in 1798; the successive suspensions of 
habeaus corpus after 1794 and the outlawing of the London Corresponding 
Society, the United Englishmen, United Britons, United Irishmen, and 
United Scotsmen in 1799 […etc.].586 
When Price’s sermon encouraged the objection to established faith, it is valid that Burke 
would have interpreted it as the diffusion of the doctrine of dismantling the established 
faith characteristic of French mass politics: ‘Those who dislike that mode of worship 
which is prescribed by public authority ought, if they can find no worship out of the 
church which they approve, to set up a separate worship for themselves […].’587 
Inasmuch as Price’s sermon encouraged departing from established modes of worship, 
the Revolution Society represented the presence of a potentially destructive doctrine (one 
inherent in the ideology of the French philosophes) on English soil: the deposing of 
established religion. In the passage below, Burke interprets Price’s sermon as advocating 
dissent for dissent’s sake: 
This pulpit style, revived after so long a discontinuance, had to me the air 
of novelty, and of a novelty not wholly without danger. […] If the noble 
Seekers should find nothing to satisfy their pious fancies in the old staple 
of the national church, or in all the rich variety to be found in the well-
assorted warehouses of the dissenting congregations, Dr. Price advises 
them to improve upon non-conformity; and to set up, each of them, a 
separate meeting-house upon his own particular principles. It is somewhat 
remarkable that this reverend divine should be so earnest for setting up 
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new churches, and so perfectly indifferent concerning the doctrine which 
may be taught in them. His zeal is of a curious character. It is not for the 
propagation of his own opinions, but of any opinions. It is not for the 
diffusion of truth, but for the spreading of contradiction. Let the noble 
teachers but dissent, it is no matter from whom or from what. This great 
point once secured, it is taken for granted their religion will be rational and 
manly. […] It would certainly be a valuable addition of nondescripts to the 
ample collection of known classes, genera and species, which at present 
beautify the hortus siccus of dissent.
588
 
Burke is accusing Price’s valuing disagreement for the sake of its novelty, 
regardless of truth. What is more, the novelty with which Burke is branding Price is not 
harmless, but dangerous. Above, Burke warns that it is dangerous to encourage men to 
set up new modes of worship if they are displeased with the established ones. Burke also 
makes a hasty generalization that removes all definition of dissenting philosophies (by 
referring to them as ‘nondescripts’), and classifies all types of dissent into one dry garden 
(hortus siccus). Not only does Burke’s figurative language help to convey his message; it 
is also exemplary of Bourke’s point about blending the designs of the French philosophes 
revolutionaries. When Burke calls attention to the overzealousness of Price and his 
followers, he is criticising their ignorance about what they indeed, are reviving: they may 
be ignorant of succeeding Peters, and reviving the zealousness of the levellers of the 
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English Civil War. The fact that Price and the supporters of the French Revolution do not 
understand the extremeness of what they support is what Burke finds worrisome.
589
 
In addition to the blending together of political design, to which Bourke refers, I 
argue that Burke’s Reflections blends religious design. Burke continues to undermine 
Price’s ‘doctrine’: 
His doctrines affect our constitution in its vital parts. He tells the 
Revolution Society, in this political sermon, that his majesty “is almost the 
only lawful king in the world, because the only one who owes his crown 
to the choice of his people.” As to the kings of the world, all of whom 
(except one) this archpontiff of the rights of men, with all the plenitude, 
and with more than the boldness of the papal deposing power in its 
meridian fervour of the twelfth century, puts into one sweeping clause of 
ban and anathema, and proclaims usurpers by circles of longitude and 
latitude, over the whole globe, it behoves them to consider how they admit 
into their territories these apostolic missionaries, who are to tell their 
subjects, they are not lawful kings.
590
 
Above, Burke refers to Price as a ‘reverend divine’, and later refers to him as ‘this 
spiritual doctor of politics’. Obviously, this tactic is meant to devalue Price. He also calls 
him an ‘archpontiff’; ‘arch’, as in pre-eminently papal. In fact, Burke makes further 
reference to the apostolic nature of Price’s proposal. Albeit a Christian comparison, 
presumably, this tactic is meant to contribute to the host of other non-Anglican brandings 
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with which Burke associates Price throughout (e.g., the witchcraft and non-Christian 
brands above). The barrage of non-Anglican implications is representative of the way in 
which Burke implicates his targets in a ‘diabolid’. 
Burke writes: 
I think it very probable, that for some purpose, new members may have 
entered among them; and that some truly Christian politicians, who love to 
dispense benefits, but are careful to conceal the hand which distributes the 
dole, may have made them the instruments of their pious designs.
591
 
The irony in Burke’s rhetoric, of course, is that while he pretends to believe that the 
Revolution Society might contain some true Christians, he then goes on to imply that 
they are actually non-Christian, and therefore, traitors—even though Price and his 
followers would have seen themselves as true Christians, leading the world into a new 
Christian golden age.
592
 Burke conceptually generalizes all agencies that would dissent 
from the Anglican Church in a diabolic force placed in opposition to the functionality of 
English polity. 
This reveals a dimension to Burke’s rhetorical agenda that Mitchell does not 
appreciate: his demonic characterisation of all of the ‘ghosts and phantoms that menaced 
the English Constitution’ exists symbiotically with an emphasis on the godly 
characterisation of English polity. By exalting the godliness of English polity, Burke is 
able to escalate the characterisation of his opponents from questionably non-Anglican, to 
Atheist-sympathizers, to inherently evil and tyrannical. He exalts the sacredness of 
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English Christian polity, by exalting the evil polity of his targets. 
 Burke sets up a clear scenario in which England stands in opposition to France, 
where religious fortitude is concerned. For example, Burke draws a differential between 
the commendable religious conditioning of the youth in England, and the irreligious 
conditioning of the French youth. He explains that the English youth, from infancy into 
manhood, are conditioned to appreciate the religious foundation of their constitution: 
It is on some such principles that the majority of the people of England, 
far from thinking a religious, national establishment unlawful, hardly think 
it lawful to be without one. […] This principle runs through the whole 
system of their polity. They do not consider their church establishment as 
convenient, but as essential to their state […]. They consider it as the 
foundation of their whole constitution, with which, as with every part of 
which, it holds an indissoluble union. Church and state are ideas 
inseparable in their minds […] Our education is so formed as to confirm 
and fix this impression. Our education is a manner wholly in the hands of 
ecclesiastics, and in all stages from infancy to manhood.
593
 
Indeed, it is in the preservation of the constitutional principle of hereditary right that 
prevents the youth of England from becoming susceptible to the sort of corruption that is 
liable to occur from power, hastily procured through the destruction of religious 
establishment (e.g., the curtailing of Church power in the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy). This corruption of youth by hastily procured power is the same to which he 
refers in his writings on India. Referring to the youths in service of the Company, who 
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were installed in positions of power in a corrupt system, Burke writes that such a 
procurement of power for undeveloped moral character is intoxicating: 
But as English youth in India drink the intoxicating draught of authority 
and dominion before their heads are able to bear it, and as they are full 
grown in fortune long before they are ripe in principle, neither nature nor 
reason have any opportunity to exert themselves for remedy of the 
excesses of their premature power.
594
 
The sort of impiousness resultant of procuring wealth or power suddenly, such as that 
procurement that happens with the impetuous upheaval of religious establishment, is 
avoided in England because of the ‘virtues which dispense hereditary wealth’, and 
power.
595
 In the Reflections, Burke largely blames the infusion of destructive thinking 
into French youths on Jean-Jacques Rousseau—his writings, e.g., The Social Contract 
(1766), and Confessions (1782). Burke writes, ‘[t]hey infuse into their youth an 
unfashioned, indelicate, sour, gloomy, ferocious medley of pedantry and lewdness; of 
metaphysical speculations, blended with the coarsest sensuality’.596 
We [the English] are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the 
disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress amongst us. Atheists 
are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers.
597
 
Burke continues to attend equally the religiousness of English culture with the 
irreligiousness of French culture: atheism might be acceptable in France, but it will not be 
tolerated in England. More specifically, above, Burke is not only criticising the hasty 
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perfunctory demotion of the established religion in France, but also referring to 
Rousseau’s proclivity for doing the same: in his Confessions, Rousseau writes of making 
a perfunctory conversion to Catholicism for a woman.
598
 
The above passages also demonstrate Burke’s conceptual blending of religious 
design. The revolutionaries mentioned by Burke in the above passage held differing 
ideologies; yet, Burke blends the designs of Rousseau, Voltaire, and others by uniting 
them underneath a broad label of atheism. Burke would have known that most 
revolutionaries were Deists, not Atheists.
599
 In this way, Burke makes all freethinking, or 
Christian-heterodoxy, synonymous with atheism. We can seat this form of Burke’s 
representation of religions in eighteenth-century rhetorical strategy. J.G.A. Pocock, for 
example, explains this blending as a rhetorical function; he describes a ‘genuine 
offensive’ resulting from the fear of deism that first appeared in the late seventeenth 
century: 
[T]he word [deism] began to be used of heterodox Christianities and near-
Christianities of every kind; it is of course a notable fact of history that so 
many heterodoxies were to be found at this time, as at others. […] the term 
“deism” was used to indicate many kinds of scepticism and became a 
generalised term of abuse; there were more ‘unbelievers’ than there were 
“atheists”, real or fancies […].600 
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The application of the term ‘deist’ to various forms of Christian heterodoxy is one 
example. Another example is the way in which John Locke discouraged the 
indiscriminate application of the term ‘atheist’ to various form of heterodoxy, because of 
the severity of the accusation: 
[A]theism being a crime, which for its madness as well as guilt, ought to 
shut a man out of all sober and civil society, should be very warily 
charged on any one, by deductions and consequences, which he himself 




We can also seat the way Burke represents differing sects of Christian heterodoxy as a 
reduction into atheism in the ancient versus post-feudal parameters defining our 
framework for modernity in this thesis. Pocock explains that William Warburton thought 
of ancient, pre-Reformation, philosophers as atheists in some form: 
[William] Warburton does not think the ancient (perhaps pre-Newtonian) 
philosophers capable of contemplating nature and arriving at the being of 
God. When they were not atheists in the sense that they were sceptics, 
they were atheists in the sense that they were pantheists; in a culture where 
there were gods for everything, it was easy to draw, perhaps hard to 
escape, the conclusion that everything was God and God everything.
602
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We will see in Burke’s late writings (in the next chapter of this thesis) how Burke 
represents the destruction of religious establishment as ‘Atheism by establishment’.603 
Burke viewed the destruction and disenfranchisement of religious establishment as 
atheism in practice; which brings us to Burke’s representation of sacrilege. Referring to 
the methods taken to disenfranchise the Catholic clergy, Burke writes: 
By a cruel and malicious refinement upon tyranny, they have at length 
reduced the clergy to this terrible alternative; wither with a solemn oath to 
ratify the destruction of their church, or to escape from its ruins, 
committing what remains to mercenaries […]. The Constitutional Clergy 
are not the Ministers of any religion; they are the agents and instruments 
of this horrible conspiracy against all morals […].604 
Burke represents the ‘ministers’ of the Constitutional Clergy as ministers of irreligion, 
ministers of a religion without religion. The Civil Constitution was meant to institute a 
more equitable method of taxation, but resulted in the destruction of religious monuments 
and churches.
605
 Radical newspapers such as Le Père Duchesne, The Paris Mercury, and 
The Union Journal of Liberty, published articles in support of such acts, and encouraged 
the scrutiny of religious establishments
606
 We can conceive of this as the 
misappropriation of consecrated properties. Here is where I disagree with Clark, who 
argues that Burke’s concern over the destruction of the French church was not outrage 
over sacrilege, but the fear of theft. Sacrilege is: 
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The crime or sin of stealing or misappropriating what is consecrated to 
God’s service. In the ecclesiastical use, extended to include any kind of 
outrage on consecrated persons or things, and the violation of any 
obligation having a sacramental character, or recognized as under the 
special protection of the Church.
607
 
Surely, the property of the Church is perceived as consecrated to God’s service; 
therefore, the new government’s re-appropriation of it (or the stealing or 
misappropriation of it) is sacrilege. Burke even highlights the confiscation of Church 
property as marking a descent into barbarity, which is directly opposed to the civility 
imbued by the Church: 
They have found their punishment in their success: laws overturned; 
tribunals subverted; industry without vigor; commerce expiring; the 
revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a church pillaged, and a 
state not relieved; civil and military anarchy made the constitution of the 
kingdom; everything human and divine sacrificed to the idol of public 
credit, and national bankruptcy the consequence; and, to crown all, the 
paper securities of new, precarious, tottering power, the discredited paper 
securities of impoverished fraud and beggared rapine, held out as a 
currency for the support of an empire in lieu of the two great recognized 
species that represent the lasting, conventional credit of mankind, which 
disappeared and hid themselves in the earth from whence they came, when 
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Clark is right in thinking that Burke expresses fear about confiscation being set as a 
precedent for the generation of government revenue that would undermine traditional 
practices of order, inheritance, and privilege; further that he fears England’s 
appropriation of such a method: 
It is not the confiscation of our church property from this example in 
France that I dread, though I think this would be no trifling evil. The great 
source of my solicitude is, lest it should ever be considered in England as 
the policy of a sate to seek a resource in confiscations of any kind; or that 
any one description of citizens should be brought to regard any of the 
others as their proper prey.
609
 
Yet, Burke articulates a genuine concern for the epidemic secularization of France, 
calling the seizure of Church property by the state ‘no trifling evil’. What really disproves 
Clark’s observation, however, is that Burke extends his outrage beyond confiscation of 
Church property; Burke extends his outrage to include the misappropriation of public 
faith. The faith of a people is also consecrated, sacred: 
This outrage on all the rights of property was at first covered with what, 
on the system of their conduct, was the most astonishing of all pretexts—a 
regard to national faith. […] It is impossible to avoid some observation on 
the contradictions caused by the extreme rigour and the extreme laxity of 
the new public faith, which influenced in this transaction, and which 
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influenced not according to the nature of the obligation, but to the 
description of the persons to whom it was engaged. No acts of the old 
government of the kings of France are held valid in the National 




Contrary to Clark, I argue that Burke’s outrage is not just at theft; it is also (and I 
would argue, chiefly) at sacrilege. The passage below demonstrates Burke’s fear of 
abolishing Christianity, as it is not only central to British polity, but social stability in 
general. Specifically turning attention to his addressee (Depont), Burke writes: 
In short, Sir, it seems to me that this new ecclesiastical establishment is 
intended only to be temporary, and preparatory to the utter abolition, 
under any of its forms, of the Christian religion, whenever the minds of 
men are prepared for this last stroke against it, by the accomplishment of 
the plan for bringing its ministers into universal contempt.
611
 
In other words, the confiscation of Church property is a step toward the oligarchic 
abolition of the Christian religion. ‘[T]he pillage of the ecclesiastics’, as Burke calls it, is 
not only sacrilege, but tyrannical bigotry.
612
 Essentially, actions like the nationalisation of 
the Catholic Church in France amount to religious persecution disguised as egalitarian 
measures. Below, Burke explains that forced benevolence is, in fact, tyranny, ‘The will of 
the many, and their interest, must very often differ; and great will be the difference when 
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they make an evil choice’.613 Burke goes on to explain that the clergy is not an entity 
without corruption—‘being acquired [in both England and France] by unworthy 
methods’—but argues that the disposal of that entity, which he equates with atheism, 
would only invite evil and mischief in greater proportion to any that already exists within 
the established form of religion: 
I know well enough that the bishopries and cures, under kingly and 
seignoral patronage, as now they are in England, and as they have been 
lately in France, are sometimes acquired by unworthy methods; but the 
other mode of ecclesiastical canvas subjects them infinitely more surely 
and more generally to all the evil arts of low ambition, which operating on 
and through greater numbers, will produce mischief in proportion. Those 
of you who have robbed the clergy, think that they shall easily reconcile 
their conduct to all protestant nations; because the clergy, whom they have 
thus plundered, degraded, and given over to mockery and scorn, are of the 
Roman Catholic, that is, of their own pretended persuasion. I have no 
doubt that some miserable bigots will be found here as well as elsewhere, 
who hate sects and parties different from their own, more than they love 
the substance of religion […] They [France] preferred atheism to a form of 
religion not agreeable to their ideas. They succeeded in destroying that 
form [Catholicism]; and atheism has succeeded in destroying them.
614
 
He focuses on the destruction of religion in France, and declares that any approval of 
such conduct found in his Protestant nation (e.g. the support from the Revolution Society) 
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indicates the hate of a differing religious sect. He insinuates that the Revolution Society 
is comprised of bigots—religious persecutors, as opposed to advocates for religious 
tolerance. He accuses them of being bigoted atheists, intolerant of differing factions of 
Christianity; above, he specifically refers to bigotry against the Roman Catholic faction. 
This contributes to countering claims from critics like O’Brien and O’Flaherty, who 
elsewhere highlight ‘Burkean silence’ surrounding popery and Burke’s ‘avoidance’ of the 
Catholic question; above, Burke publicises advocacy for the toleration of Catholics.
615
 In 
a way, Burke’s argument for the co-existence of differing religions refutes Clark’s claim 
that Burke’s comments surrounding the French Revolution are not that of a co-religionist. 
This progressive thinking renders the relative cultural legitimacy between differing sects 
familiar. 
Burke continues to construct a rhetorical shadow of demonic character, which is 
cast over all who would usurp an established faith. He further accuses the Revolutionary 
Society of conspiring to destroy the Christian religion: 
The literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular 
plan for the destruction of the Christian religion. This object they pursued 
with a degree of zeal which hitherto had been discovered only in the 
propagators of some system of piety. […] Atheistical fathers have a 
bigotry of their own; and they have learnt to talk against monks with the 
spirit of a monk. […] To this system of literary monopoly was joined an 
unremitting industry to blacken and discredit in every way, and by every 
means, all those who did not hold to their faction. To those who have 
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observed the spirit of their conduct, it has long been clear that nothing was 
wanted but the power of carrying the intolerance of the tongue and of the 
pen into a persecution which would strike at property, liberty, and life.
616
 
By colouring the Revolutionary Society as bigots, persecuting any faction different from 
their own, Burke emerges as an advocate for religious freedom. 
As he describes it above, the will of the many inherent in a democracy can also 
harbour democracy’s potential for tyranny. Burke’s rhetoric illustrates this ironic flaw 
inherent within the revolutionary actions of the National Assembly in the following 
passage: 
I do not know under what description to class the present ruling authority 
in France. It affects to be a pure democracy, though I think it in a direct 
train of becoming shortly a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy. But for the 
present I admit it to be a contrivance of the nature and effect of what it 
pretends to. I reprobate no government on abstract principles. […] Until 
now, we have seen no examples of considerable democracies. The 
ancients were better acquainted with them. Not being wholly unread in 
authors, who had seen the most of those constitutions, and who best 
understood them, I cannot help concurring with their opinion, that an 
absolute democracy, no more than absolute monarchy, is to be reckoned 
among the legitimate forms of government. They think it rather the 
corruption and degeneracy, than the sound constitution of a republic. If I 
recollect rightly, Aristotle observes, that a democracy has many striking 
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points of resemblance with a tyranny. Of this I am certain, that in a 
democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most 
cruel oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in 
that kind of polity, as the often must; and that oppression of the minority 
will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much 
greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from a single sceptre.
617
 
Burke writes that the National Assembly is a counterfeit: it purports to be a democracy, 
but is actually an oligarchy. It is an oligarchy inasmuch as it engenders the oppression of 
the minority (e.g., through the nationalisation of the French Church). This is the same sort 
of accusation he lays against the Revolution Society: they purport to be Christians, but 
are actually (perhaps unwittingly) non-Anglican traitors. The unbridled will of the many 
(in ‘an absolute democracy’) is just as dangerous as the potential despotism of an 
‘absolute monarchy’. I argue that here again emerges the progressive Burke, arguing for 
the freedom of what—in revolutionary France—have become marginalized people: 
Catholics. In addition, Burke’s aversion to absolute monarchy above hardly seems like a 
reactionary argument for (as Eagleton thought of Burke’s response to the French 
Revolution) ‘the full-blooded restoration of the ancien régime’.618 Indeed, Burke’s view 
on pure monarchy further contributes to our appreciation of him as progressive (and, 
therefore modern): In his earlier Essay towards an Abridgment of the English History, 
Burke identified ‘the worst imaginable government, a feudal aristocracy’.619 Again, if we 
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measure ‘modernity’ as emerging out of ancient, post-feudalism, then Burke’s aversion to 
a restoration of pure feudalism can be interpreted as promoting modernity. Before we 
further consider Burke’s writings on France in the context of modernity, however, a 
deeper examination of Burke’s use of evil and irreligious themes in his representation of 
religion is needed. 
The Sacredness of the Profane; A Counterbalance to the Reactionary Burke 
According to Burke, the form of tyranny inherent in the National Assembly’s 
version of democracy has made the profane sacred: 
She (France) has sanctified the dark suspicious maxims of tyrannous 
distrust; and taught kings to tremble at (what will hereafter be called) the 
delusive plausibilities, of moral politicians […] Such sanguine 
declarations tend to lull authority asleep; to encourage it rashly to engage 
in perilous adventures of untried policy; to neglect those provisions, 
preparations, and precautions, which distinguished benevolence from 
imbecility; and without which no man can answer for the salutary effect of 
any abstract plan of government or of freedom. For want of these, they 
have seen the medicine of the state corrupted into its poison. They have 
seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch, with more fury 
and outrage, and insult, than ever any people has been known to rise 
against the most illegal usurper, or the most sanguinary tyrant.
620
 
Above, Burke insinuates that the French have sanctified the maxims of tyranny by 
submitting to the tyranny that is the will of a few (the Assembly) over the many. The 
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Assembly has made the holy (the Church) unholy (or, at least rendered it politically and 
economically impotent against the state). Describing the maxims of the rebel force as 
dark and suspicious implies practices that are suspect of a diabolical nature. Submitting to 
this distrust has introduced a tyranny far more furious than that of the most barbarous 
tyrant. 
The upheaval of religious establishment emerges as a conspiracy of irreligion in 
Burke’s Reflections, along with his other writings responding to the French Revolution, 
for example his Thoughts on French Affairs. This was Burke’s appeal to government 
ministers for official support of counter French revolutionaries; the document argued that 
the longer the new government in France prevailed, the more pervasive its proclivity for 
upheaval would become in Europe. In his Thoughts, Burke refers to the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, instituted by the National Constituent Assembly, 26 
August 1789.
621
 Burke warns that the ‘Declaration of a new species of government, on 
new principles’ represents ‘a real crisis in the politicks of Europe’.622 I argue that we can 
also see Burke facing a sacrilegious crisis in Europe. He conveys a paranoiac worry about 
a system of irreligious thinking positioned to undermine religious establishment: 
In the meantime a system of French conspiracy is gaining ground in every 
country. This system happening to be founded on principles the most 
delusive indeed, but the most flattering to the natural propensities of the 
unthinking multitude, and to the speculations of all those who think, 
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without thinking very profoundly, must daily extend its influence. A 
predominant inclination towards it appears in all those who have no 
religion, when otherwise their disposition leads them to be advocates even 
for despotism. Hence Hume, though I cannot say that he does not throw 
out some expressions of disapprobation on the proceedings of the levellers 
in the reign of Richard II., yet affirms that the doctrines of John Ball were 
“conformable to the ideas of primitive equality, which are engraven in the 
hearts of all men”.623 
Quoting from Hume’s History of England (1782), Burke’s refers to John Ball: a figure of 
Christian radicalism, Ball was noteworthy for leading the 1381 peasant revolt; however, 
Burke here would have been referring to Ball as a figure for advocating the overthrow of 
authority—a figure of irreligion masquerading as a figure of religion—like the 
Revolutionary Society and the National Assembly.
624
 Linking Hume with such a figure is 
conceivably gesture toward the question over Hume’s own religious affiliation: he was 
accused of atheism, and enjoyed the company of the French philosophes (e.g., Rousseau 
and Helvétius), although, he later had a falling out with Rousseau, denouncing him as a 
madman.
625
 Burke characterizes Rousseau as the leader of an irreligious cult in his Letter 
to a Member of the National Assembly (much like he characterised Price in Reflections): 
‘Rousseau is their canon of holy writ; in his life he is their canon of Polycletus; he is their 
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standard figure of perfection.’626 
 Earlier in his Thoughts, Burke also displays a paranoia bordering on conspiracy 
theory: 
In this very delicate situation of their political interests, the speculations of 
the French and German Oeconomists, and the cabals, and the secret, as well 
as public doctrines of the Illuminatenordens and Free Masons, have made 
considerable progress in that country; and a turbulent spirit under colour of 
religion, but in reality arising from the French Rights of Man, has already 
shewn itself, and is ready on every occasion to blaze out.
627
 
Darrin M. McMahon toys with the image of Burke as a conspiracy theorist—afraid of the 
French philosophes repeating such plots as the one perpetrated by the Bavarian 
Illuminati, who intended to infiltrate and overthrow the French monarchy and its 
church.
628
 McMahon explains that Burke would have heard the whispers of conspiracies 
such as Adam Weishaupt’s plot to overthrow clerical reign by planning to […] ‘infiltrate 
established Masonic lodges throughout Europe.’629 ‘[T]he Illuminati, or “enlightened 
ones”, hoped to use these organizations as fronts to spread their own republican 
egalitarian, and anticlerical beliefs.’630 We can place Burke’s paranoia about a veritable 
conspiracy to usurp Christianity in Europe in context with other eighteenth-century 
warnings of an irreligious enterprise. East Apthorp’s 1778 Letters on the Prevalence of 
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Christianity, before its Civil Establishment, with Observations on a Late History of the 
Decline of the Roman Empire also worried about an organised effort to eliminate the 
Christian establishment: 
It is a prevailing idea, that an attempt to extirpate, if it were possible, the 
Christian Religion, hath been carried on in this century systematically and in 
concert by a series of writers and their numerous disciples […] This impious 
enterprize, if it did not originate, has principally disclosed itself in France […] 
To carry on this design, all the sciences have been pressed into the service of 
irreligion, in an enormous encyclopaedia, the work of the whole conclave.
631
 
Agnani refers to the ‘paranoiac quality’ of the rhetoric in Burke’s Reflections632 Richard 
Bourke argues that if readers want to understand the extreme rhetoric in Burke’s 
Reflections, ‘We need to restore the sense of exuberance, the feeling of alarm and the 
mounting suspicion entertained by the various British and French spectators of the early 
stages of the Revolution […]’.633 It is Burke’s fear of monopolistic factions unnecessarily 
overthrowing establishments that inspires outrageous rhetoric: 
[W]ith you [France], we have seen an infancy still more feeble, growing 
by moments into a strength to heap mountains upon mountains, and to 
wage a war with Heaven itself. Whenever our neighbour’s house is on fire, 
it cannot be amiss for the engines to play a little on our own. Better to be 
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Burke writes that being too anxious is better than being too complaisant. We can think of 
the war with heaven in reference to the nationalization of the church in France, and the 
confiscation of its land and property, etc. Any force that would wage war against that 
which is sacred, conceivably, must be anti-sacred—or sacrilege. 
An outrageous sense of alarm calls for outrageous rhetoric. In the following 
passage from the Reflections, Burke admits exploiting theatricality in his writing style 
when he expresses his astonishment that Price is not equally concerned about the events 
in France. 
Why do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr. Price, and those of his 
lay flock, who will choose to adopt the sentiments of his discourse?—For 
this plain reason—because it is natural I should; because we are so made 
as to be affected at such spectacles with melancholy sentiments upon the 
unstable condition of mortal prosperity […] We are alarmed into 
reflexion; our minds (as it has long since been observed) are purified by 
terror and pity […] Some tears might be drawn from me, if such a 
spectacle were exhibited on the stage.
635
 
Burke admits that if the spectacle he describes were shown on the stage, it would elicit 
tears from the audience. Burke is referring to his famous description of Marie 
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 In basic theatrical terms, Burke is recollecting the classical drama theory of 
Aristotle: that perfect tragedy should excite pity and fear.
637
 He is also facing the real-life 
manifestation of his theories on terror, which he outlined thirty-four years previously, in 
his Enquiry: Burke argues that his sense of alarm is most natural.
638
 
We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, 
with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to 
nobility. Why ? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it 
is natural to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and 
spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to 
render us unfit for rational liberty; and by teaching us a servile insolence, 
to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us perfectly fit for, and 
justly deserving of, slavery through the whole course of our lives.
639
 
For Burke, to express alarm at the impending terror of the French Revolution is natural. 
Richard Bourke makes a strong argument for this: he proposes that Burke’s extraordinary 
rhetoric (e.g. his approach to the Marie Antoinette scenario) was proportionate to an 
extraordinary sense of urgency.
640
 Burke’s rhetoric was provoked by his perception that 
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the Reverend Price and his nephew George Cadogan Morgan regarded the usurpation of a 
monarch as a shining example of vengeance: 
 Burke’s notoriously indulgent depiction of the treatment of Marie 
Antoinette immediately before her escape to the Tuileries with her 
husband on 6 October should be understood for what it was: an 
extravagant response to what looked like the extraordinary provocation 
offered by figures like Morgan and Price in casting an incident of popular 
outrage as an act of righteous retribution.
641
 
In short, Burke’s outrageous description of Marie-Antoinette’s escape was simply a 
rhetorically appropriate tactic to address what he regarded as the exceptional danger 
inherent in Price’s sermon: the dispensation of destructive thinking. His flamboyant 
language is also probably proportioned to reverse the effects of Price’s sermon. 
Of course, history has proven the accuracy of the prophecies delivered in Burke’s 
Reflections: King Louis the XVI was executed on January 21, 1793 in the Place de la 
Révolution; Marie Antoinette suffered the same fate, in the same place, nine months later 
on October 16. Burke’s description of the executions, as well as his accusations of 
treason against Price above, are interesting when analysed in the context of eighteenth-
century treason laws. John Barrell explains that eighteenth-century law declared, ‘To 
communicate in writing, an intention to kill the king could be alleged as an overt act of 
treason […]’.642 Some looser interpretations of this law extended to spoken intentions of 
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killing the king, which qualified as ‘imagine[d]’ treason.643 Above, while Burke does not 
write of his own intention to kill King Louis the XVI and Marie Antoinette, his 
description is a vivid imagining of the scenario as it would play out; which is, in a way, 
complicit with imagining treason. Barrell describes Burke’s rhetoric as alarmism: 
‘Apparently free himself of all imaginary fears, he deliberately set out to “disturb” or 
“terrify” the imagination of the public at large by inventing fictitious threats to national 
security’.644 While these threats (of regicide) would later prove not to be fictitious, 
Barrell helps us to understand the way in which eighteenth-century alarmists gave a voice 
to the very themes against which they were arguing—in a way, complying with the 
themes antithetical to their message. In his writings on France, Burke’s representation of 
religion, for example, is dependent on themes antithetical to religion; he represents 
atheism, evil, and demonism with enthusiasm equal to his enthusiasm in representing 
religious establishment. Much like when he referred to the Hastings administration 
‘unbaptizing’ themselves when governing abroad, Burke’s representation of religion is 
often shadowed by the themes antithetical to religion; Burke’s responses to the French 




Burke’s response to the events unfolding in France differed from other Whigs, 
who (like Price) perceived a parallel with the Glorious Revolution. Charles James Fox, 
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leader of the Whig opposition, advocated the right to overthrow oppressive authority.
646
 
Reacting to the fall of the Bastille, Fox pronounced, ‘How much the greatest event it is 
that ever happened in the world, & how much the best.’647 L.G. Mitchell writes the 
following about Fox’s reaction: 
Predictably Fox had no sympathy with the arguments put forward in 
Burke's Reflections […]. Burke's belief that the revolution represented a 
profound threat to the ideas of propertied government, organized religion, 
and prescriptive values in politics, bringing with it confusion and violence, 
seemed strangely at odds with what Fox knew of France at first hand. He 
read the book but found it ‘in very bad taste’ and ‘favouring Tory 
principles’.648 
Among the negative criticism responding to Burke’s Reflections was Thomas Paine’s 
Rights of Man (1791), which viewed the style of the Reflections as a ‘dramatic 
performance’.649 Mark Philp observes that Burke’s Reflections sold 30,000 copies in the 
first two years after publication; it elicited over a hundred replies, probably over two 
hundred in support.
650
 Paine’s Rights of Man, however, sold between 100,000 and 
200,000 copies.
651
 Philp goes on to describe the novelty of the pamphlet war that ensued 
after the Reflections: ‘The innovative character of many works in the debate, their 
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rhetorical inventiveness and power, their sheer volume and their mass circulation, 
ensured that the debate, in some for or other, penetrated through British society.’652 
Before Paine, the first bullet fired in the pamphlet war that followed Burke’s Reflections 
was Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790). Responding to 
Burke’s openness about his theatrical style eliciting tears, she writes: ‘Misery, to reach 
your heart, I perceive, must have its cap and bells; your tears are reserved very naturally 
considering your character, for the declamation of the theatre […].’653 Wollstonecraft 
took particular issue with Burke’s depictions of gender, adding that his tears also were 
reserved for ‘[…] the down-fall of queens, whose rank alters the nature of folly, and 
throws a graceful veil over vices that degrade humanity [….]’.654 Wollstonecraft 
criticised Burke’s ‘narrow-minded’ perspective that would so heavily value England’s 
Protestant Ascendancy. Wollstonecraft writes of the narrow-mindedness of strong 
advocacy for the Protestant Right of Ascendancy: 
We should beware of confining all moral excellence to one channel, 
however capacious; or, if we are narrow-minded, we should not forget 
how much we owe to chance that our inheritance was not Mahometism; 
and that the iron hand of destiny, in the shape of deeply rooted authority, 
has not suspended the sword of destruction over our heads.
655
 
What is unfortunate about these early perceptions of Burke as a reactionary servant of 
Protestant Ascendancy in his Reflections (from Fox, Paine, and Wollstonecraft) is the 
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narrow perception of it as a Protestant-centred rail against non-Protestant sects. The 
previous two chapters of this thesis have proven that Burke represented religion in a way 
that transcended boundaries of denomination and nation—indeed, Burke conveys a 
relative cultural legitimacy of Christian and non-Christian religions in his writings on 
India and Ireland: as discussed in the letter to William Burgh, Burke writes that he 
‘would give a full civil protection […] to Jews, Mahometans and even Pagans […]’; also 
discussed in his letter to the Reverend John Erskine, he admits that he thinks all religions 
to be imbued ‘with a great deal of human imperfections[…]. I think so of the whole 
Christian church; having at the same time, that respect for all the other religions, even 
such as have mere human reason for their origin […]’656 Burke’s Reflections presents a 
more developed version of the same sort of argument that was present in his earlier 
writings: the more fragmented sacredness becomes in the pursuit of it (e.g. in the disunity 
of religions, and subversion of churches), the farther away we are from God’s will; his 
argument is about preserving the cultural sacredness, which (as I will now show) Burke 
represents as entwined with its opposite: the profane. 
There is a critical reception of the Reflections that receives little attention, but 
holds interesting implications for this study. Rather than Paine’s or Wollstonecraft’s 
response to the Reflections, I wish to focus on Thomas Spence’s Pig’s Meat (1794). 
Derived from Burke’s reference in the Reflections to ‘a swinish multitude’, the 
publication was critical of Burke’s hasty generalization of the social classes.657 Spence’s 
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publication is particularly relevant to this study, because it recognizes Burke’s deluge of 
libellous rhetoric: 
[…] surely, it is not to be endured, that any private man is to publish a 
creed for a whole nation: to tell us that we are not to think for ourselves—
to impose his own fetters upon the human mind—to dogmatize at 
discretion—and that no man shall sit down to answer him without being 
guilty of a libel!!! I assert, that if it be a libel to mistake our constitution—
to support it by means that tend to destroy it—and to choose the most 
dangerous reason for the interference, Mr. Burke is that libeler […].658 
Spence indicts Burke for the same offences for which Burke indicts the French 
philosophes and the Revolution Society. According to Spence, it is Burke who is guilty of 
interfering in constitutional affairs for dangerous reasons. Moreover, Burke is a libeller. 
This would have been a poignant implication considering that the issue of libel was 
prevalent in parliamentary debate at the time; its prevalence resulted in Charles James 
Fox’s Libel Act of 1792, which empowered juries to return verdicts in libel cases.659 This 
charge also carries special significance coming from Spence, who himself was charged 
for selling libellous propaganda. To Spence, he was the victim of a double standard; his 
defence argued: ‘[…] no one of the opposite party ever offered him the most modest 
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reproach for selling even Mr Burke’s pamphlets’.660 The record of his trial states: ‘Mr. 
Spence told him in his defence, that he might as well commit every one who sold 
Gulliver’s Travels, More’s Utopia, Lock on Government, Pufendorf on the Law of 
Nature, &c. &c. all of which treated the subject of Government in a manner vastly 
opposite to the British system.’661 In short, all of the pamphlets mentioned were 
outrageous in rhetoric and theme. The particular parallel Spence draws between Burke 
and Jonathan Swift holds value for this study, inasmuch as it helps to reveal a provocative 
dimension within Burke’s over-exuberant religious rhetoric. Before looking closer at 
Spence’s response, it is important to explain how one could perceive a genuineness in the 
enthusiasm with which Burke represents themes antithetical to religion—the way in 
which (as Frans De Bruyn explains) a genuineness about Swift’s outrageous proposal to 
eat the children of the poor was once perceived. 
 De Bruyn most capably draws the critical parallel between Burke and Swift. De 
Bruyn observes that Burke’s rhetorical ‘exertions […] were not unlike the efforts of that 
other great Irish writer of the eighteenth century, Jonathan Swift […] who bent his 
formidable literary talents to win ecclesiastical and political preferment […]’.662 De 
Bruyn refers to the fact that both have produced misunderstood satire (e.g., Swift’s A 
Modest Proposal and Burke’s Vindication). Swift’s work was dangerous to publish, 
partly because the zeal of his rhetoric risked a perception of genuineness about the 
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outrageous subject matters of his satire. Clive Probyn writes: ‘Those who printed and 
disseminated his work (Waters, Harding, Barber, Motte, Faulkner) fully recognized the 
incendiary nature of his writing and ran very severe risks: arrest and gaol were the 
common experiences […].’663 Similarly, the ironic criticism of government in Burke’s 
Vindication risked being perceived as genuine. I would further argue that Burke’s zeal in 
constructing his evil diabolid in his Reflections (as well as his Thoughts, and Letter to a 
Member) warrants the perception of genuine enjoyment out of invoking representations 
of evil. Burke seems to take pleasure in resurrecting the diabolical as a method of 
celebrating the sacredness of the established church—e.g. in the above examples of 
characterizing the Revolutionary Society and the National Assembly as demonic. S.J. 
Barnett describes a habit of eighteenth-century alarmists to exaggerate the representation 
of potential threats to Established Religion—for example, atheism or Deism: 
The fears generated by the appearance or reports of atheistic or deistic 
texts in early modern Europe may well at times have been out of 
proportion to their number for very good reasons. […] we may include 
amongst those reasons the scare mongering tactics of apologists, the 
enjoyment of scandal and the titillation of the forbidden, but also the 
undoubted and vexing existence of anticlericalism and religious 
heterodoxy within oral culture.
664
 
Barnett further cites the possibility that alarmists enjoyed describing scandal. It is valid, 
then, to consider Burke in this eighteenth-century context, wherein an opposer of atheism 
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and evil not only (ironically) relies on those very themes, but is also titillated by engaging 
with them. Consider Burke’s description of the restraining power of the ancien régime in 
France as protective: 
Abstractedly speaking, government, as well as liberty, is good; yet could I, 
in common sense, ten years ago, have felicitated France on her enjoyment 
of a government (for she then had a government) without enquiry what the 
nature of that government was, or how it was administered? Can I now 
congratulate the same nation upon its freedom? Is it because liberty in the 
abstract may be classed among the blessings of mankind, that I am 
seriously to felicitate a madman, who has escaped from the protecting 
restraint and wholesome darkness of his cell, on his restoration to the 
enjoyment of light and liberty? Am I to congratulate an highway man and 
murderer, who has broke prison, upon the recovery of his natural rights?
665
 
The first rhetorical device Burke uses in this passage is the aside, which insinuates 
that France at one time had a government, and now has none. Burke constructs a 
metaphor in which the new method of governance in France is like a newly escaped 
madman, or murderer. Further, he juxtaposes the light and liberty associated with the new 
regime in France against the darkness of the old government. The darkness is not 
oppressive; instead, he describes it as ‘wholesome’. I argue that this exemplifies the way 
Burke renders dark, irreligious, profane themes as sacred. 
Spence must have appreciated the diabolical shadow underneath Burke’s rhetoric, 
which supports Barrell’s observation (above) that eighteenth-century alarmists gave a 
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voice to themes antithetical to what they were defending. The caricature of Burke 
depicted by Spence, below, is decidedly dark. The following is a verse from a song 
included in the publication that mocks Burke’s rhetorical style: 
Let Burke, like a bat, from his splendour retire, 
A splendour too strong for his eyes; 
Let pedants, and fools, his effusions admire, 
Intrap in his cobwebs like flies. 
Shall phrenzy and sophistry hope to prevail, 
Where reason opposes her weight; 
When the welfare of millions is hung on the scale, 
And the balance yet trembles with fate?
666
 
The simile of ‘Burke, like a bat’ invokes rather sinister imagery of a creature that dwells 
in dark places. In the Bible, bats are included among the creatures to which the evil idols 
will be cast, in Isaiah 2:20.
667
 This biblical interpretation understands bats as keepers of 
evil (or evil deeds, such as idolatry). Thus, the characterization of Burke as a harbinger of 
evil—according to Pig’s Meat—is apparent. Referring to Burke’s words as effusive 
refers to their extravagant, gushing style. The metaphor of Burke’s words entrapping 
fools, in the way that a web traps a fly, insinuates that his arguments are deceptive. The 
praise of sophistry in the song (while it could be a facetious response to Burke’s 
paranoia) touches on Burke’s very real concern about the frenzy resultant from factions 
who would govern according to sophistry. In fact, Spence specifically mocked Burke’s 
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sense of entitlement with regard to the social criticism of factions: ‘But Mr. Burke 
thought it was reserved for his eloquence to whip these curs of faction to their kennel.’668 
Spence depicts a sanctimonious Burke, self-ordained in a mission to stave off rebellious 
factions (portrayed as dogs), through his rhetorical eloquence. 
The early image of Burke as a reactionary crusader (as seen in Spence, Fox, 
Wollstonecraft, and Paine) is still seen in contemporary criticism of Burke: Eagleton uses 
the saccharine language of Burke’s Marie Antoinette passage in the Reflections to 
interpret a non-progressive, reactionary Burke, and demonstrate how ‘the aesthetic in 
Britain is effectively captured by the political right’.669 This criticism contributes to 
depictions of Burke as a reactionary caricature. However, as we have seen, Bourke argues 
an appreciation for the sense of urgency Burke felt at the time, which justifies the 
enthusiasm of Burke’s rhetoric. Luke Gibbons and Albert Q. Hirshman’s look at the 
Reflections in a tradition of ‘reactionary rhetoric’.670 Hirshman’s study of reactionary 
rhetoric submits a ‘perversity thesis’: Hirshman argues that Burke understood that the 
theoretically ‘good’ intentions of the French revolutionaries would revert (or pervert) to 
‘evil’.671 In other words, Hirshman writes that Burke pointed out the perversity thesis in 
the revolution; Burke understood that ‘grand schemes to advance the cause of progress 
and liberty often relapse into the very barbarism they set out to eliminate’.672 I would 
argue, however, that Burke, in fact, displays this paradoxical function of progress, when 
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he constructs arguments using the very elements he seeks to eliminate; he argues for the 
preservation of the sacred by exalting profane themes, such as the demonic. This, as we 
know from Barrell, is characteristic of eighteenth-century alarmism. 
However, I do not agree with Hirschman in his opinion that Burke’s recognition 
of the perversity thesis represents ‘a radical ideological shift’.673 The issue of Burke’s 
perceived political shift, or lack of consistency, when confronting the issues in France is 
extensively addressed; Eagleton, Francis O’Gorman, Christopher Reid are also among the 
scholars who read a political shift, evidencing a reactionary Burke, in his Reflections.
674
 
No one takes the view that I offer in this chapter, that the Reflections evidences a 
consistency for Burke—in his religious thinking. Much of what fuels the perception of 
this political shift comes from his ‘support’ for the American Revolution versus his 
opposition to the French Revolution. However, as discussed in the last chapter, his 
respective positions of conciliation with America (e.g., repealing the tax on tea) was 
about preserving and fortifying the empire—retaining at least a trading relationship with 
America.
675
 The Reflections also is about preserving the empire from the diffusion of 
destructive thinking. Another source of Burke’s perceived political shift also comes from 
his early response regarding early action in France. In July 1789, Burke writes to the Earl 
of Charlemont: 
As to use here our thoughts of every thing at home are suspended, by our 
astonishment at the wonderful Spectacle which is exhibited in a 
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Neighbouring and rival Country—what Spectators, and what actors! 
England gazing with astonishment at a French struggle for Liberty and not 
knowing whether to blame or applaud!
676
 
I agree with Welsch and Fidler, who observe, ‘Even in these early days, however, we find 
the seeds of worry and doubt about the nature of the political upheaval in France […]’; 
above, Burke does not know yet how to respond to the spectacle.
677
 I do not believe that 
Burke’s Reflections evinces inconsistency. I wish to show (in the excerpts from the 
Reflections to follow) that Burke values change and adaptability, which is antithetical to 
reactionary conservatism, and therefore, offers a counterbalance to such interpretations. 
Further, I believe that Burke’s Reflections demonstrates a consistency by: first, showing 
the same openness to expansion that he showed in his writings on India and Ireland; 
second, by showing that his writing represents religion in a way that engages with themes 
antithetical to it—as he did in his earlier writings (the Vindication and the Enquiry). For 
example, I will show how, in the Reflections, Burke treats the ‘sacred’ along with the 
‘profane’ with equal permanency, which is similar to how he conceptualized the ‘awe’ 
drawn from ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ sources with equal legitimacy in his Enquiry: in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that Burke suggests that awe drawn from a Christian or 
holy text is the same sort of awe drawn from non-Christian (as he writes ‘profane’) texts. 
The sacred and profane are represented in a ‘general sentiment’ of ‘awe’.678 
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In a way, Burke’s Reflections addresses the issue of consistency outright. Burke 
explains the adaptability of human concerns, the variety of changes it undergoes: 
Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and 
concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions 
and reflections that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued 
in the simplicity of their original direction.
679
 
In other words, it would be absurd to hold one’s mind to its original direction; change is 
inevitable, and adaptability is necessary for conservation. Burke’s value of a constitution 
that makes provision for change is the strongest argument against a reactionary 
interpretation of the Reflections: if an opposition to change is reactionary, then Burke’s 
advocacy for a constitutional capacity for change in his Reflections is progressive. 
Further, Burke’s advocacy for this capacity for change is seen in the way he represents 
religion: 
It is far from impossible to reconcile, if we do not suffer ourselves to be 
tangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry, the use of both of a fixed 
rule and an occasional deviation; the sacredness of an hereditary principle 
of succession in our government, with a power of change in its application 
in cases of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity (if we take the 
measure of our rights by our exercise of them at the Revolution) the 
change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which 
produced the necessary deviation; and even then it is to be effected 
without a decomposition of the whole civil political mass, for the purpose 
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of originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society. A state 




Above, Burke explains that even the sacredness of Britain’s hereditary principle of 
Protestant succession is evidence of innovation and change; even the religious principle, 
upon which a state stands, needs the capacity for change, as a means of conservation. He 
contrasts this provision for necessary reform with the unnecessary upheaval he accuses 
the Revolutionary Society of supporting (the overthrowing of Charles I in the revolution 
of 1649): earlier in his argument, Burke explained that the Declaration of Right did not 
make ‘any provision for legalizing the crown on the spurious revolution principles of the 
Old Jewry […].’681 He trumpets the Declaration as ‘[…] the cornerstone of our 
constitution, as reinforced, explained, improved, and in its fundamental principles for 
ever settled’.682 He later continues by defending the Declaration of Right (under William 
III and Mary II in 1689): 
The law by which this royal family is specifically destined to the 




 of King William. The terms of 
this act bind “us and our heirs, and our posterity, to them, their heirs, and 
their posterity,” being Protestants, to the end of time, in the same words as 




I argue that we can extend Burke’s value of change (as a necessity for conservation) to 
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the way in which Burke represents religion in his writings. Moreover, his argument for 
constitutional capacity for change contradicts interpretations of Burke as a reactionary 
against change. 
 Burke views the reckless upheaval of religious establishment as a decline to 
atheism; below, he writes that it is not the English nature to do away with religious tenets, 
should they seem no longer appropriate. 
If our religious tenets should ever want a further elucidation, we shall not 
call on atheism to explain them […]. 
We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a 
religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our 
instincts; and that it cannot prevail long.
684
 
We can understand this excerpt above as contributing to Burke’s conceptualization of 
religion’s capacity for adaptation: if religious tenets are ‘wanting’ elucidation, the 
English do not abandon religiousness altogether (like the French National Assembly), 
they evolve the way in which religious tenets are conceptualized. 
Burke understands that the capacity for change means the need for a system of 
checks and balances (a system that includes the rights of non-gentry people, which can be 
interpreted as progressive). Referring to the seemingly anarchic efforts of the French 
National Assembly, Burke asks: 
Have they never heard of a monarchy directed by laws, controlled and 
balanced by the great hereditary wealth and hereditary dignity of a nation; 
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and both again controlled by a judicious check from the reason and feeling 
of the people at large acting by a suitable permanent organ?
685
 
Burke opposes change enforced without regard to the populace: monarchical right of 
descent checked by civil law, and the aristocracy checked by the reason and feeling of the 
people. The inclusion of such checks as a provision against despotism is not blindly 
traditional. In fact, we can place the recognition of the public at the forefront of 
Enlightenment. S.J. Barnett explains that, while theorists of modernity ignore the fact that 
the recognition of a public sphere was a slow evolution, he concedes that, as a concept, it 
is not wholly invalid to attribute a large part of this evolution to the Enlightenment.
686
  
The post-1715 public sphere in France, like its earlier manifestation in 
England, was brought into being by politico-religious struggle. In both 
countries that sphere quickly broadened, stretching beyond the nascent 
bourgeoisie and its salons to those who read newspapers, frequented 




We can then view Burke’s inclusive thinking about a public sphere as participating in this 
slow evolution of modernity. 
Like Burke, Price praises the constitutional provision for change and (respective) 
religious freedom. Price boasts over the constitutional result of the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688; however, he does so in a manner that celebrates the overthrowing of King 
James: 
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But he was a fool as well as a bigot. He wanted courage as well as 
prudence; and therefore, fled and left us to settle quietly for ourselves that 
constitution of government which is now our boast. We have particular 
reason, as Protestant Dissenters, to rejoice on this occasion. It was at this 
time we were rescued from persecution, and obtained the liberty of 
worshipping God in the manner we think most acceptable to him. It was 
then our meeting houses were opened, our worship was taken under the 
protection of the law, and the principles of toleration gained a triumph.
688
 
For Burke, the overthrowing of established governments carries the potential for a 
rebellious force to evolve into a despotic force; the National Assembly exemplifies this 
particular evolution into tyranny. The seemingly unrestrained power of the National 
Assembly to overthrow established governance exemplifies the greatest moral evil 
conceivable: he differentiates the ‘drop’ of power inherent within the House of Commons 
from the dangerous amount—the ‘ocean’—of power given to the members of the 
National Assembly: ‘They have a power given to them, like that of the evil principle, to 
subvert and destroy, but none to construct, except such machines as may be fitted for 
further subversion and further destruction.’689 Below, Burke views the denial of real 
social circumstances for the sake of abstract, metaphysical, ideals as selfish, and therefore 
oligarchic: 
All these considerations leave no doubt on my mind, that if this monster of 
a constitution can continue, France will be wholly governed by the 
agitators in corporations, by societies in the towns formed of directors of 
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assignats, and trustees for the sale of church lands, attornies, agents, 
money-jobbers, speculators, and adventurers, composing an ignoble 
oligarchy, founded on the destruction of the crown, the church, the 
nobility, and the people.
690
 
Burke takes issue with the composition of the National Assembly, and their confiscation 
procedures as a method of raising funds for the State: a government comprised of 
unqualified persons prepared to destroy the established system—in which monarchy, 
church, and nobility are intertwined—is an ignoble oligarchy. 
 The characterisation of the National Assembly’s composition as evil is an 
escalation of the conceivable libel Burke commits earlier in the Reflections: 
This unforced choice, this fond election of evil, would appear perfectly 
unaccountable, if we did not consider the composition of the National 
Assembly […]. Judge, Sir, of my surprise, when I found that a very great 
proportion of the Assembly (a majority, I believe, of the members who 
attended) was to be composed of practitioners in the law. It was composed 
not of distinguished magistrates, who had given pledges to their country of 
their science, prudence, and integrity; not of leading advocates, the glory 
of the bar; not of renowned professors in universities;—but for the far 
greater part, as it must in such a number, of the inferior unlearned, 
mechanical, merely instrumental members of the profession.
691
 
Most obviously, Burke refers to the method by which the members of the Assembly were 
selected as evil; which helps to construct the diabolid in which the National Assembly is 
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included. Burke expresses surprise at the Assembly’s composition: not being made of 
unbiased judges, but by ‘inferior unlearned’ practitioners of law. He later refers to the 
composition as ‘an handful of country clowns who have seats in that Assembly, some of 
whom are said not to be able to read and write?’692 Burke further refers to the 
composition of the Assembly when he writes: ‘If all the absurd theories of lawyers and 
divines were to vitiate the objects in which they are conversant, we should have no law 
and no religion left in the world.’693 I focus on the latter object under threat of vitiation: 
according to Burke, if governance were left to the likes of the Assembly, there would be 
no religion in the world. Contrary to what Clark argues, the vitiation of established 
religion (sacrilege) is a chief concern for Burke in his Reflections. Burke worries about 
the vitiation of the established religion (the Roman Catholic foundation); yet 
(paradoxically) defends it by engaging with irreligious themes. While we can situate this 
form of Burke’s representation of religion in the eighteenth-century habits described by 
Barnett and Barrell above, I argue that it also is articulated in the conceptualizations 
surrounding religion that are in twentieth-century theories of modernity. 
Burke’s resonance with the irreligiousness of 20th century modernity 
As Marshall Berman outlines, the second phase of modernity includes the French 
Revolution in an age of revolution during the 1790s: ‘an age that generates explosive 
upheavals in every dimension of personal, social and political life’.694 I believe we can 
read an explosive upheaval in the conceptual dimension of religion in Burke’s responses 
to France—the upheaval of boundaries between Protestant and Catholic, Christian and 
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heterodox, and even between holy and profane. I argue that Burke’s exaltation of dark 
and demonic themes resonates with one figure of modernity with which Berman engages. 
Berman looks to Goethe’s Faust to encapsulate the ‘modern man’s’ desire to transform 
and improve himself. He defines the meaning of Faust’s relationship with the devil: 
‘human powers can be developed only through what Marx called, “the powers of the 
underworld”, dark and fearful energies that may erupt with a horrible force beyond all 
human control.’695 In a way, we can conceive of Burke reckoning the sacredness of 
religious establishment by engaging with ‘dark and fearful energies’. I believe Berman is 
referring to the passage in Marx’s and Engels’ Manifesto, which reads: 
Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange 
and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of 
production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to 




The metaphor suggests an advancement of modernity, wherein its inventions become 
uncontrollable. Berman, among others, sees the resonance of this imagery in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein monster: the creation (the monster) becomes uncontrollable.697 
Above, Burke issues a similar warning, that the National Assembly will lose control over 
the monster they have created; the new government eventually does revert to the Reign of 
Terror. This is what Hirschman means by Burke applying the perversity thesis to the 
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 However, I would argue that Burke does not only indicate the 
perversion in the intentions underlying the French Revolution; indeed, Burke himself 
fulfils the perversity thesis, by making his arguments reliant on the very themes he 
opposes (dark and fearful themes); he is, in a way, complicit in the evil he denounces. 
While Burke, in his writings concerning France, positions himself against atheism (for 
example, as discussed above in his opposition to repealing the Test and Corporation 
Acts), he is reliant on atheism to shape his argument(s) (as discussed above, when he 
makes French thinking synonymous with atheism). Like Berman’s description of Faust, 
Burke engages with ‘dark and fearful energies’; he does so in such an enthusiastic way, 




In another sense, I argue that we can construe the division of religious sects as an 
invention (or monster) that—by the revolutionary age—has become out of control. The 
way in which Burke conceptualizes religion above shows us that the fragmentation of 
religions (particular to the French Revolution) is out of control—we have seen how 
Burke admonishes the bigoted robbery between sects (for example, the confiscation of 
the French Church); we have seen Burke point to this problem in groups of dissenters (for 
example, Price and the Revolutionary Society). This does not evince Burke’s opposition 
to embracing differing or reforming sects; I believe it does evince Burke’s worry about 
the disorder brought about by disunity. 
Berman examines the following excerpt from Marx’s and Engels’s Communist 
Manifesto: 
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Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with 
their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his 




Marx’s second clause, which proclaims the destruction of everything holy, 
is more complex and more interesting than the standard nineteenth-century 
materialist assertion that God does not exist. Marx is moving in the 
dimension of time, working to evoke an ongoing historical drama and 
trauma. He is saying that the aura of holiness is suddenly missing, and that 




Zygmunt Bauman also examines this passage when writing about ‘the intention’ of the 
‘modern spirit’: ‘That intention called in turn for the “profaning of the sacred”.’702 
Berman’s analysis of Marx’s passage provides the framework for understanding Burke’s 
representation of religion in his writings about France. Consider the definition of 
‘profane’: ‘Not relating or devoted to what is sacred or biblical’, unconsecrated, secular, 
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lay, civil, as distinguished from ecclesiastical […] Freq. contrasted with sacred’.703 I 
argue that Burke’s responses to the French Revolution to preserve sacredness rely on the 
profane; in a way, he conceptualizes the holy and the profane in relative legitimacy—just 
as he did in his Enquiry, when he explained that awe is sourced from both the holy and 
the profane.
704
 To use Berman’s phrasing, the ‘aura of holiness’ surrounding Burke’s 
representation of religion in the excerpts above is subverted (or rendered ‘missing’) by 
his reliance on the profane. 
 Perhaps also, the way in which Burke represents religious sectarianism as a 
human conception subverts the holiness of religion. Elsewhere, we can see that Burke 
understands the conceptual nature of other forms of social order, for example, legal 
authority. In his Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace (1795), Burke writes ‘we ought to 
know that the spirit of our Laws, or that of our own dispositions, which are stronger than 
Laws are susceptible of all those defensive measures which the occasion may require.’705 
Like Hume, Burke views laws as stemming from conceptual manners, shared in aesthetic 
experience.
706
 In short, Burke understands that the concept of the law is stronger than the 
actual law. Eagleton captures the conceptual source of legal authority for Burke: 
‘Authority, in short, is a kind of fiction we collaboratively sustain; and though […] there 
is a sense for him [Burke] in which all political sovereignty depends on a willing 
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suspension of disbelief.’707 Darren Howard makes a similar observation: for Burke, ‘[t]he 
greatest threat posed by the French Revolution is […] the threat it poses to the necessary 
fictions that uphold society’.708 I argue that we can extend this analysis of Burke’s 
thinking on legal authority to his representation of religion; he also understands the 
sectarianism of religion to be conceptual in nature, as constructed by humans. It follows 
then that Burke represents religion as a ‘kind of fiction’—a fiction, inasmuch as the 
differentiation between religious sects, nation, holy and profane is conceptual, or 
‘something that is invented’.709 
Eagleton elaborates on Burke’s representation of political power as conceptual, 
constructed by humans: 
[T]here is something alarmingly anti-foundational about the notion that 
power rests upon nothing but consent, opinion and affection, as though in 




I argue that this is not just the way Burke thinks about legal authority, or political power, 
but also the way he represents religion: when consented upon qualities that separate 
different sects were rendered familiar, this deconstructs the conceptual foundations of 
religion(s). Twentieth-century theorists of modernity have terminology to describe this 
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kind of representation of religion: deconstructionist interpretations of religion offer ‘a 
version of negative-theology’ akin to the irreligion that Burke conceptualizes 
symbiotically with religion in his writings above.
711
 Jacques Derrida, said: ‘For me, there 
is no such thing as “religion”. Within what one calls religions—Judaism, Christianity, 
Islam, or other religions—there are again tensions, heterogeneity, disruptive volcanoes 
[…]’.712 For Burke, things like revolution disrupt conceptual heterogeneity (to use 
Derrida’s term) between differing sects: tolerant dissenters revert to intolerant bigots; 
religion exists symbiotically with irreligion. Michel Foucault writes: 
It is not that religion is delusional by nature […] But religious delusion is 
a function of the secularization of culture: religion may be the object of 
delusional belief insofar as the culture of a group no longer permits the 




We can conceive of Burke preserving pleasing religious delusions in response to the 
secularization of French culture. If we follow Foucault’s assessment above, we can assert 
that the way Burke represents religion is a function of secularizing modernity. However, 
rather like Derrida’s conceptualization of religion, the division between sects, for Burke, 
is conceptual only, or constructed by humankind only; so, one could conceivably assert 
(as Derrida does above) that there is ‘no such thing as religion’. James W. Bernauer 
writes that Michel ‘Foucault’s negative theology is a subversion of that faith […] which 
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religions call God’.714 Burke subverts God-centred faith by representing profane awe (not 
sourced from a deity); he further subverts the holiness of established Christianity by 
relying upon (and perhaps, even enjoying) themes of evil and themes of irreligion. In this 
way, we can articulate Burke’s representation of religion in his Reflections, his Letter to a 
Member, and Thoughts on French Affairs using terminology from Derrida and 
Foucault—negative theology, or religion without religion. 
Conclusion to Chapter 3 
Writing on Burke’s political thought, Hampshire-Monk observes that scholarship 
ignores the ‘conceptual content of the rhetorical tradition’ within which Burke 
operates.
715
 While I do not seat these writings in their political tradition, I believe I fill a 
need related to the one Hampshire-Monk highlights: to understand the conceptual content 
of Burke’s critical treatment of religion in his writings on France. I believe I have proven 
the value of wondering (like Crowe, Lock, Hitchens) beyond Burke’s own religious 
identity.
716
 By arguing that Burke’s representations of religion transcend boundaries 
between differing sects, I have countered interpretations (from Lock and Clark) that 
argue an isolated interpretation of Burke’s thinking—that we should only appreciate 
Burke as a Christian, not as a co-religionist.
717
 I have shown that Burke’s representation 
of Protestant and non-Protestant sects as legitimate (with relativity to their culture) is the 
commentary of a co-religionist—if we interpret that term in a way that denotes the co-
habitation of different religious sects. 
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I have argued against interpretations of Burke as a ‘reactionary prophet’ (from 
Hitchens, Burrows, O’Brien Eagleton, White, Canavan, Frohnen, and Gibbons,) in the 
following ways: first, by demonstrating how he emerges as an advocate for expanded 
religious freedom; second, by demonstrating that his advocacy for the constitutional 
capacity for change (exemplified in the implementation of Protestant ascendancy) does 
not denote an anti-modern opposition to change.
718
 I have also argued that Burke’s 
representation of religion in his writings on France enjoy a dimension in which 
religiousness, or holiness, shares a relative importance with irreligiousness, or the 
profane. I have demonstrated how Burke’s exaltation of dark, demonic themes resonates 
with the paradoxical conditions in modernity described by Marx, Berman, and 
Bauman.
719
 I have argued that presence of irreligion, or non-religion, in Burke’s writings 
concerning France offers a rather deconstructionist representation of religion, which 
prefigures twentieth-century thinking (from Derrida and Foucault). Ultimately, I believe I 
have presented a critical interpretation of Burke’s writings concerning the French 
Revolution that offsets reactionary, anti-modern analyses, evident in the way religion is 
represented in his literature. I believe I have proven that (just as in his early writings and 
his writings on India and Ireland) religion, in Burke’s writings on France, is thought of as 
a thing that is conceptual, well disposed to change, and receptive to progress. 
In this third chapter of my thesis, as well as the first two, I have demonstrated 
how Burke’s representation of religions blends religious and non-religious design 
(Christian and non-Christian, Protestant and non-Protestant, holy and profane). In the last 
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chapter of my thesis, I will examine Burke’s representation of global religious culture as 
contributing to the modern conceptualization of religion. Further, I will examine how 
Burke’s religious thinking figures with his view of science overall in his late writings. 
263 
 
Ch. 4: ‘Burke and science: His Letter to a Noble Lord and Letters on a Regicide 
Peace’ 
Introduction to Chapter 4 
The fourth and final chapter of my thesis is an examination of the very late 
writings in Burke’s life: his Letter to a Noble Lord (1796) and his Letters on a Regicide 
Peace (1796, 1797). In these texts, I focus on Burke’s encounter with science in the 
Enlightenment age; moreover, I intend to reveal how Burke’s encounter with science 
reflects his representation of religion. In his Letter to a Noble Lord, and also his Letters 
on a Regicide Peace, Burke uses differing branches of science as a metaphor for 
criticizing an advancing movement of experimental thinking, which threatens to vitiate 
ossified religious concepts and institutions.
720
 In Burke’s time, ‘science’ simply referred 
to ‘any department of learning’; his references to departments (or categories) of 
medicine, chemistry, and also astronomy and physiology warrant thinking about his 
treatment of these departments as encounters with ‘science’.721 
Simon Schaffer has expertly analysed some of Burke’s confrontation with science 
in his Letter to a Noble Lord—as part of a wider focus about the theme of ‘genius’ in the 
Enlightenment.
722
 I believe I can complement Schaffer’s work by extending analysis 
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about Burke and science to his Letters on a Regicide Peace, by offering more background 
on the context of Burke’s references to science, and offering insight about what these 
references reveal about the way religion is represented in Burke’s writings. More 
importantly, I believe I can offer an interpretation of these texts that does not emphasise 
Burke as a reactionary servant of the ancien regime. Schaffer writes of Burke’s 
opposition to differing branches of the sciences of natural philosophy as linked with the 
subversive thinking of the French Revolution: 
Burke and his admirers held that there were bands of self-styled 
enlightened philosophers whose sinister associations masked silent plots to 
subvert established order […] Astrology, mesmerism, alchemy, the 




Schaffer’s work is a study with a wider focus on the particular eighteenth-century 
appetite for genius; he interprets Burke’s ‘conservative commentary’ about the French 
Revolution in a list of ‘learned servants of the ancien régime’ (including Goethe and 
Justus Moser) who feared the pursuit of genius as an epidemic.
724
 The ‘conservative 
commentary’ to which Schaffer refers is, indeed, Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord; 
however, I argue that evincing Burke as a ‘servant of the ancien régime’ in this text is a 
very narrow interpretation. Joseph Pappin also offers an interpretation of Burke as a 
Conservative, in his work on Burke and metaphysics: ‘Burke’s convictions about the 
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nature of man and his relation to God conditions his politics, which are, of course, 
conservative.’725 I wish to put forward an interpretation of Burke that emphasises his 
conservatism less by demonstrating how his value of progressive notions, like 
multicultural acceptance, are key to the representation of religion in his writings. 
First, I grapple with the problems inherent in placing Burke in a scientific context. 
Second, I focus on Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord; I delve into the context of Burke’s 
application of various scientific metaphors. I observe how Burke’s references align him 
with classical scientific pathology, against the new sect of experimenters who perpetuate 
thinking that is destructive to religious establishment. 
Then, I argue that the way in which Burke criticizes an emerging culture of 
scientific experimenters (in the same text, as well as his Letters on a Regicide Peace) 
reveals a conception of religion that resonates with twenty-first century theorists of 
modernity. In particular, Mark. C. Taylor interprets religion in modernity through an 
early branch of science: alchemy. Taylor writes that alchemy ‘burns away polluting 
differences and returns the many to the one in which they all originate’.726 Historically, as 
a precursor to the science of chemistry, alchemy is ‘the branch of study and practical craft 
in the medieval and early renaissance period concerned with the nature and 
transformation of physical substances […]’; figuratively, alchemy can mean: ‘to treat, 
produce, or transform by (or as if by) alchemy […]’.727 However, more importantly for 
understanding Burke’s thinking concerning religion when he encounters science, alchemy 
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(like Taylor’s description, which refers to religion in modernity) finds or renders a 
common element from differing elements. I will demonstrate the way in which Burke’s 
representation of religion resonates with such modern theories about religion—for 
example, we will see Burke refer to the strength in an ‘aggregate’ of faiths: ‘At bottom, 
these are all the same’ all ‘derived from the same sources’.728 
I then explain the way in which his Letters on a Regicide Peace do not 
communicate an opposition to science, but rather an opposition to the sort of thinking that 
disavows repercussions in humanity, for the sake of experiment—the misuse of scientific 
thinking. Finally, I demonstrate how we can think of Burke as conceptually contributing 




Most readings of Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord treat Burke strictly as a politician 
or a rhetorician, for example, the interpretations from J.T. Boulton and Stephen H. 
Browne. Browne observes that it is owing to Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord that 
scholarship of Burke is a ‘bifurcation, in which Burke is appropriated as a philosopher of 
politics or as a rhetorician of expedience’.730 Browne, chooses the latter classification of 
Burke when looking at Letter to a Noble Lord, in terms of its importance to the ‘study of 
public address’.731 Boulton treats Burke in the former classification (as a political 
philosopher), observing how Burke’s rhetoric links the Duke of Bedford with wider 
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political ‘ideas of destruction, tyranny, and rapacity; and these ideas are indelibly linked 
with the revolutionaries to whose philosophy he subscribed. Language and imagery 
identify the man [the Duke of Bedford] with the group [the French revolutionaries]’.732 
Rather than follow this bifurcation (appropriating Burke as a rhetorician or a political 
thinker), I wish to interpret Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord along with his Letters on a 
Regicide Peace to examine his confrontation with science in order to appropriate him as a 
quasi-religious thinker. My reading of these texts fills the need to understand Burke 
represents religion in these late texts; further, to understand how his treatment of science 
in these texts is linked with, or revealing of, his thinking surrounding religion. 
I believe that a conversation about Burke and science (and what that reflects about 
his critical representation of religion) should include Burke’s relationship with 
metaphysics: the ‘theoretical philosophy as the ultimate science of being and knowing. 
The study of phenomena beyond the scope of scientific inquiry’.733 Joseph Pappin regards 
metaphysics as an actual science in his work on Burke—‘the science of being as 
being’.734 Although Pappin explains that ‘Burke is not a professional metaphysician’ he 
makes a case for Burke as an unwitting metaphysician: ‘Burke’s political philosophy has 
a metaphysical basis as does his philosophy of God and human nature.’735 While Pappin 
intends is to grasp Burke’s ‘conception of politics’ through metaphysics or natural law; 
my objective in this chapter is to grasp Burke’s conception of religion through sciences 
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closer to ‘positive law’—meaning, theories that are ‘posited’ or ‘instituted or imposed by 
an authority, often as contrasted with natural law’.736 Indeed, I will explain in this chapter 
the sort of experimental metaphysics Burke opposes, and why that undermines 
classifying him as a metaphysician—albeit, an ‘unwitting’ one. First, I believe it is 
necessary to address the potential complications inherent in interpreting Burke’s writings 
in a scientific context (metaphysical science, and otherwise). 
Burke in a scientific context 
Before delving into the scientific metaphors laced through Burke’s Letter to a 
Noble Lord and the Letters on a Regicide Peace, some background on these texts is 
pertinent. The texts were published after Burke’s retirement from parliament in 1794, 
after 28 years in the House of Commons. His retirement, and these publications, came 
after his only son Richard died; Richard’s death, as we will see, figures in his Letter to a 
Noble Lord. In August of 1794, William Pitt proposed to grant Burke a Civil List pension 
of £1,200. He later gave him another grant, bringing the total to £3,700.
737
 Later, in a 
debate in the House of Lords (on the Treason Bill, 13 November 1795), the Duke of 
Bedford criticised this gesture, insinuating that it amounted to Ministerial corruption, 
analogous to the financial extortion seen in the French Revolution: 
It [the French Revolution] was a revolution, the causes of which may be traced in 
the manners of a profligate and abandoned Court, in the conduct of a corrupt and 
despotic ministry, in the lavish expenditure of money, extorted from the penury of 
an oppressed and insulted people, and in a system of finances, brought by the 
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prosecution of an unprofitable war […] We, too have a ministry corrupt […] I say 
that we have a corrupt ministry: their corruption is proved by the places they have 
created for their own accommodation of their friends; by the pensions they have 




Interpretations of Burke’s response to this (for example, from Boulton and Browne) 
explain Letter to a Noble Lord in the following way: Burke defending his pension by 
aligning the Duke of Bedford with the ‘ideas of destruction, tyranny, and rapacity’ 
associated with the French Revolution.
739
 They do not explain that Burke’s Letter to a 
Noble Lord is returning an accusation first made by the Duke of Bedford: each accusing 
the other of being aligned with the same corrupting ideas that gave rise to the French 
Revolution (financial extortion). After Burke’s 1790 attack against that very sort of 
rapacity (his Reflections), such commentary from the Duke of Bedford seems particularly 
injurious, and accounts for the inflammatory nature of the text. The Duke of Bedford was 
accusing Burke of much more than receiving undue remuneration; he was accusing him 
of subscribing to destructive practices, akin to those of the French revolutionaries. The 
publication of Burke’s response to the Duke of Bedford’s commentary (his Letter to a 
Noble Lord) on 24 February of 1796, occurs close to his further meditations on the events 
in France—his Letters on a Regicide Peace. So, we can conceive of the Duke of 
Bedford’s comments as being particularly apposite for Burke—being accused of 
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practicing the very sort of subversive practices against which he was still railing in his 
Letters on a Regicide Peace, six years after the publication of his Reflections. 
As for the publication of these letters, their issuing is a little complicated. The 
only publication of Burke’s Letters on a Regicide Peace that received his authorization 
and was published while he was still living is the document combining his first two 
letters on the subject (On the Overtures of Peace and Genius and Character of the 
French Revolution), published by F. and C. Rivington on 20 October 1796 as Two letters 
on a Regicide Peace. John Owen published an unauthorized version one day before, from 
portions of the two letters; this document is titled Thoughts on the Prospect of a Regicide 
Peace in a Series of Letters.
740
 The third and fourth letters (Proposals for Peace and To 
the Earl Fitzwilliam) were pieced together from proofs that Burke had approved and 
material Burke had collected. The fourth letter actually being the first in the series 
(written in 1795), these documents were published after his death—November 1797 by 
Walker King and French Laurence.
741
 
The publication of Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord and his Letters on a Regicide 
Peace occur in a time of much scientific development; some developments (e.g., as we 
shall see, those made by Joseph Priestley) receive direct mention in these texts. The 
wealth of scientific metaphor applied throughout all of the above documents lends 
credence to scholarship intended to understand further the scientific references within 
them. My critical analysis in this chapter offers some needed insight concerning the way 
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science appears in Burke’s later writings, and what that reveals about his 
conceptualization of religion. 
However, there are some problems when considering Burke’s thinking in a 
scientific context. The main problem is that Burke’s response seats him in a tradition of 
thinking that opposed man’s scientific hubris in attempting to understand the universe 
made by God. This opposition is seated on the ‘ancient’ side of an ‘ancient’ versus 
‘modern’ debate about science; Richard Foster Jones comprehensively describes how 
thinking ‘moved to dethrone Aristotle’ came about in the sixteenth century.742 Jones 
explains, ‘The spirit of curiosity regarding nature and man, a distinctive trait of the 
Renaissance, was too strong to permit an entirely unbroken acquiescence in ancient 
learning.’743 The important distinction between ‘ancient’ scientific thinking and ‘modern’ 
scientific thinking is, as Jones argues, the promotion of experimentation. Ancient 
scientific thinking is exemplified in the theories of bloodletting and humourism advanced 
by Hippocrates and Galen.
744
 Jones identifies Francis Bacon as responsible for the great 
revolt of modern scientific thinking, ‘arguing violently for a purely physical explanation 
of their ideas and emphasized the importance of experimentation and observation of 
nature instead of conformity to the ancients’.745 Jones highlights the Protestant 
Reformation as marking a shift to embrace new science: 
The scientific movement, in England at any rate, is definitely connected 
with religious developments. If Protestantism facilitated the growth of 
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science through its anti-authoritarian bias, the extreme elements among the 
Protestants […] continued to serve the cause by embracing the new 
science largely because of its utilitarian value for the “public good”.746 
Jones’ representation of modern science as succeeding the Reformation agrees with the 
definition of modernity used throughout this thesis; in this way, we can interpret Burke’s 
criticism of a new culture of experimentation (in his Letter to a Noble Lord, and his 
Letters on a Regicide Peace) occurring against a background of ancient versus modern. 
We can further appreciate the notion of attempting to assume God’s power as a modern 
one, invigorated by the rise of the scientific method, if it is set against the background of 
an ancient understanding of God’s cosmic role. Zygmunt Bauman constructs such a 
background. Below, he refers to the Book of Job, seated in ancient Judaism in the time 
before the Hebrew Prophet Jesus. Bauman explains the hubris of humans thinking they 
may direct the actions of God: 
God may strike at will, and if He refrains from striking it is only because 
this is His (good, benign, benevolent, Loving) will. The idea that humans 
may control God’s action by whatever means, including the means which 
God Himself recommended (that is, total and unconditional submission, 
meek and faithful following of His commands and sticking to the letter of 
the Diving Law), is a blasphemy.
747
 
So, thinking it is blasphemous to control the actions of God and Nature is ancient; a 
scenario in which humans are in charge of actions in nature is modern (referring to 
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This culture of experimentation, without regard to human posterity, is manifested 
in the action of the French Revolution, and the experimenters following such thinking in 
England. In the excerpts from these texts to follow, I will show Burke’s aversion to a new 
scientific thinking that conceives of things comprised from small particles, rendered 
easily divisible and disintegrative. I believe, in Burke’s representation of science, we can 
see a general opposition to thinking that promotes division, which is counterintuitive to 
unity. Opposition to this thinking is not unique to Burke. The aspects of Burke’s 
representation science that promote the strength of unity in an aggregate (as we will see) 
resonate with thinking from Burke’s contemporary, Samuel Johnson: 
Long calculations or complex diagrams affright the timorous and 
unexperienced from a second view; but if we have skill sufficient to 
analise them into simple principles, it will be discovered that our fear was 
groundless. “Divide and conquer,” is a principle equally just in science as 
in policy. Complication is a species of confederacy, which, while it 
continues united, bids defiance to the most active and vigorous intellect; 
but of which every member is separately weak, and which may therefore 
be quickly subdued if it can once be broken.
749
 
A thing that is comprised of individual members (or individual atomic particles) is weak 
and easily broken. The ‘complication’ of a confederacy ensures continuation through 
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unity. Widening a (religious) foundation strengthens it; not (as Burke put it in his Letter 
to Sir Hercules) narrowing it: ‘I should recommend it to your serious thoughts, whether 
the narrowing of the foundation is always the best way to secure the building?
750
 I will 
show how Burke’s representation of world religions is aligned with ancient (non-atomic) 
thinking, inasmuch as he is opposed to conceiving of things comprised of divisible atoms, 
warning against dissection and splitting. Yet, his representation of religion is nonetheless 
progressive, inasmuch as it is accepting of differing elements in what he will refer to as 
an ‘aggregate’ of faiths, ‘[a]t bottom, these are all the same’ all ‘derived from the same 
sources’.751 In this way, Burke’s representation of world religions resonates with the 
same notion expressed by Johnson above: there is strength in oneness and confederacy. I 
believe this resonates with the way critical theorists apply alchemy as a metaphor for the 
evolution of religious culture in modernity, in terms of finding a common element among 
differing elements—or (to use Johnson’s words above) to render the conception of things 
‘into a simple principle’. 
If we think about metaphysics as a ‘science’, as Pappin does above (‘the science 
of being as being’), then we encounter another problem with treating Burke in a scientific 
context.
752
 Pappin writes ‘Burke’s metaphysics reflects the reality and consistency of 
change within the context of a stable, hierarchically structured universe as created and 
sustained by God.’753 However, if we reach back to some of Burke’s early writings, we 
can see a potential problem in suggesting that Burke’s metaphysics reflects something 
about God, and the universe created by God. In the Vindication, Burke argued that 
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rational thinking is unavailing ‘when we must seek in a profound Subject, not only for 
Arguments, but for new Materials of Argument, their Measures and their Method of 
Arrangement; when we must go out of the Sphere of our ordinary Ideas […]’.754 In other 
words, some concepts, like the nature of the ‘universe as created and sustained by God’ 
cannot (or should not) be explained away by science. Burke continues in the Vindication: 
‘what would become of the World if the Practice of all moral Duties, and the Foundations 
of Society, rested upon having their Reasons made clear and demonstrative to every 
Individual?’.755 If metaphysics is, as Pappin writes, ‘the science of being as being’, or if it 
is ‘[t]he study of phenomena beyond the scope of scientific inquiry’, then there is a 
problem in viewing it as a key to unlocking some of Burke’s thinking about things ‘out of 
the Sphere of our ordinary Ideas’ (like a universe as created by God). The application of 
the ‘science of being as being’ does not quite seem to fit. While Burke does offer 
metaphysical conceptions, he is careful about the shortcomings of his human capacity for 
doing so; in the Enquiry, he expressed his hesitation of even using the concept of God as 
an example, because it is too great a concept for us to fathom: ‘I purposely avoided when 
I first considered this subject, to introduce the idea of that great and tremendous being, as 
an example in an argument so light as this […]’.756 So, a branch of ‘science’ that would 
claim to reduce a tremendous being to a formula, based on speculation (i.e. metaphysics), 
is a science of speculation—much like the government of speculation against which he 
rails in his Reflections (i.e. the French National Assembly, operating on abstract 
metaphysical theories, divorced from reality and circumstance). I do not mean to disavow 
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what Paul Langford said of Burke’s ‘commitment’ to ‘intense and all-pervading spiritual 
reality’ of a deity, or to argue that Burke rejects metaphysics entirely; I only outline the 
sort of metaphysics Burke warns against—‘barbarous metaphysics’ of the French 
revolutionaries, experimental metaphysics by which ‘The calculators [of the National 
Assembly] compute them out of their senses’.757 
Schaffer explains Burke’s opposition to experimental metaphysics, or (to use 
Burke’s words) ‘barbarous metaphysics’. Schaffer shows how Burke stood against the 
conflating ‘attempt to connect the work of philosophical genius, natural power and 
popular right’; Burke viewed conflating natural or scientific thinking with philosophical 
thinking as a dangerous muddling of ethics and reason.
758
 ‘Their revolution followed 
from a false natural philosophy. […] The Jacobin theatre of politics was a world of 
illusion and crude spectacle. Their philosophical supporters were no better than wizards 
[…]’.759 There was a correlation between the disintegrative doctrinal claims of a new sect 
of scientific thinkers and the ‘barborous metaphysics’ of the French Revolution. We will 
see that Burke identifies Priestley among the sect of ‘analytical legislators and 
constitution-venders [who] are quite as busy in their trade of decomposing organization 
[…]’.760 Priestley followed the atomic theories of Roger Boscovich. In Boscovich’s De 
Viribus Vivis (1745), he purported that atoms existed in a state more akin to elasticity—
constantly dissolving and recombining.
761
 Priestley, in his Disquisitions relating to 
Matter and Spirit (1777), thought this conception of atoms indicated that all matter in the 
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world and spirit were comprised of the same substance, that there was no division 
between mind and body (and, therefore, the soul); by extension, we cannot only think of 
God in terms of his material composition, but we can think of humans as being comprised 
of the same matter. In his Disquisitions, Priestley explains: 
‘[…] the strict metaphysical notion of immateriality is really a modern 
thing, being unkown to all the wise ancients, whether heathens of 
christians; and therefore, that the rejection of it ought not to give any 
alarm to the serious christian’.762 
Even though Priestley explains that conceiving of God in the material is not a new thing, 
but actually, a thing conceived of by the ancients, the hubris of his metaphysical 
interpretation of matter earned him much criticism, including criticism from Burke.
763
 
Similar to Jones above, Bruno Latour explains how the Protestant Reformation and the 
Glorious Revolution mark a dynamic wherein the laws of nature and God could be 
defined in a laboratory—or, to borrow Bauman’s phrasing again, a dynamic wherein 
humans are more in charge. Latour refers to Robert Boyle’s seventeenth-century 
experiments, to which we shall return later in this chapter: 
Boyle’s air pump, for example, might seem to be a rather frightening 
chimera, since it produces a laboratory vacuum artificially, a vacuum that 
simultaneously permits the definition of the Laws of Nature, the action of 
God, and the settlement of disputes in England at the time of the Glorious 
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Part of constructing the myth of modernity (as Latour implies) is being fearful of the 
encroachment of such modern scientific developments upon ancient territories once 
occupied by the actions of God. Latour suggests the possibility of a different 
construction, wherein the rise of the scientific method could have been interpreted 
differently where political mobilization was concerned, as a chance to understand the 
laws of nature and God in partnership with modern science—not as a threat to traditions 
of theology and royalty: 
From now on the English seventeenth century will go on to construct 
Royalty, Nature and theology with the scientific community and the 
laboratory. The air’s spring will join the actors that inhabit England. Yet 
this recruitment of a new ally poses no problem, since there is no chimera, 
since nothing monstrous has been produced, since nothing more has been 
done than to discover the Laws of Nature. The scope of mobilization is 
directly proportional to the impossibility of directly conceptualizing its 
relations with the social order. The less the moderns think they are 
blended, the more they blend. The more science is absolutely pure, the 
more it is intimately bound of with the fabric of society.
765
 
So, as Latour suggests, scientific developments (like Boyle’s air pump) can be perceived 
as fierce mobilizations of a movement to subvert traditional social order. However, the 
fear of such scientific developments as a monstrous delusion (not an ally) is only a 
constructed concept; traditions of theology and royalty actually can exist in the context of 
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scientific enquiry. In this way, the efforts of Enlightenment minds to separate ancient 
from modern (the way Hume, for example, separated ancient practices from our ‘modern 
expedient’) are typical of the myth of modernity. Burke engages in this same separation: 
we shall see how he perceives an experimental political mobilization, producing 
monstrous delusions—in fact referring to Rousseau and Voltaire as ‘monsters’.766 In his 
Letter to a Noble Lord, we will see how Burke attempts not to blend with modern 
experimental metaphysics, the hubris of sharing in God’s spirit. In this attempt to 
denounce the sort of experimental metaphysical thinking that would promote division, he 
blends religious culture. If we consider all of this, the image of him as a metaphysician 
becomes less stable. In other words, Burke consistently argues that trying to conceive of 
things such as government in scientific, mathematical, or metaphysical terms is 
dangerous. As Burke writes in his Reflections: 
The legislators who framed the antient republics knew that their business 
was too arduous to be accomplished with no better apparatus than 




Therefore, if we are to think of metaphysics as a science, it may be problematic when 
trying to unlock Burke’s thinking, inasmuch as scientific or ‘mathematic’ thinking does 
not articulate the in-exactitude of the things that exist ‘out of the Sphere of our ordinary 
Ideas’. 
However, defining the sort of experimental metaphysics that Burke opposes may 
create another problem. It may be that the work from Schaffer (as discussed above) along 
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with P.J. Stanlis’ position (discussed below) contribute to an interpretation of Burke that 
seats him in opposition to the progress of mathematical scientific thought, as a whole.
768
 
Just as Burke does not reject metaphysics in toto, I also do not believe he is a firm 
opposer of scientific thinking. Stanlis explains Burke’s opposition to forcing abstract 
concepts into frameworks of scientific or mathematical thinking. Pappin’s work is 
indebted to Stanlis’ writing about Burke and natural law; before Pappin writes about the 
metaphysics of Aristotle as being distinct from Aquinas’, Stanlis writes of the same 
distinction and how it explains Burke’s ‘principle of prudence’: 
According to this distinction, natural science and mathematics utilize 
speculative reason, while ethics, law, and politics employ practical reason. 
Speculative reason does not involve man’s free will but is concerned with 
things fixed in the physical order of the universe and connected closely to 
this order by its universal principles and its logically derived conclusions. 
Practical reason involves the nature and actions of men, which are under 
general laws of moral necessity […] For Burke, political theory could 
never be an exact mathematical science because matter requiring moral 




Stanlis and Pappin effectively write the same thing: that Burke opposed a priori, or 
speculative, reasoning in abstract matters. However, Stanlis and Pappin come to different 
conclusions: where Burke’s political theories are concerned, Pappin believes it can be 
understood through the science of metaphysics, and Stanlis believes that political theory 
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and scientific thinking do not, for Burke, correlate. However, we should be careful not to 
narrowly classify Burke as a reactionary against scientific thought altogether. In the same 
vein as Stanlis, I argue that the same in-exactitude applies to Burke’s representation of 
religion—that it cannot be viewed in exact mathematical scientific terms. A passage in 
Burke’s An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), written in response to 
accusations of apostasy following his Reflections, explains that morality is not defined by 
absolute lines, like in mathematical reasoning; further, that the peripheries defining 
morality require modification, which mathematical reasoning cannot facilitate. 
Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral or political 
subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters. 
The lines of morality are not like ideal lines of mathematics. They are 
broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand 
modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the 
process of logic, but by the rules of prudence.
770
 
I argue that this is how Burke’s representation of religion manifests itself: scientific 
boundaries do not apply; lines between differing sects are blended; modification is 
necessary for conservation. Again, while I am unsure about branding Burke as an 
unwitting metaphysician or seeing metaphysics as a solution to understanding his 
thinking, I do find what Pappin suggests (above) about Burke’s apprehension of the 
‘reality and consistency of change’ useful for understanding his conceptualization of 
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 However, I will argue that Burke’s understanding of the necessity of change 
is not concurrent with Pappin and Schaffer’s interpretation of Burke as a Conservative 
‘servant of the ancien régime’.772 We know that Burke argued in his Reflections: It 
[‘occasional deviation’, or change] is far from impossible to reconcile, if we do not suffer 
ourselves to be tangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry […] A state without the 
means of some change is without the means of its conservation’.773 The change necessary 
for the conservation of a state is not achieved through metaphysics, or a scientific, 
mathematical approach. Joseph Priestley responds to this idea from Burke in his Letters 
to Edmund Burke Occasioned by His Reflections (1791), he writes: 
One of the most curious paradoxes in this work is that the rights of men 
[…] are all extremes, and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, 
they are morally and politically false. Now by metaphysically true can 
only be meant strictly and properly true, and how this can be in any sense 
false, is to me incomprehensible.
774
 
Perhaps Priestley is observing what Pappin later does: that Burke engages with 
metaphysics while admonishing them. More importantly, above Priestley legitimizes 
metaphysics by arguing that if something is metaphysically true, it is ‘strictly and 
properly true’. Priestley, as we shall see, figures in Burke’s references to science. 
Priestley, of course, was prolific in his publishing of scientific pamphlets concerning 
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electricity and air (his theories on phlogiston, and his discovery of seven gases).
775
 
Above, Priestley’s legitimization of ‘the science of being as being’ (metaphysics) 
corresponds with the emerging legitimization of the scientific appropriation of matters 
social, ethical, and moral (i.e. the modern emergence of social sciences); indeed, Priestley 
contributed to the emerging scientific mathematical conception of abstract concepts, his 
‘Maxims of political arithmetic’ (1798) conceived of politics in mathematical terms.776 
Alan Wolfe writes about Burke’s opposition to the emerging social sciences: ‘his 
castigation of the dominance of rational social and political analysis continues to 
reverberate in Western thought.’777 However, Stanlis elaborates more on Burke’s scruples 
about formulating abstract ideas of nature in scientific, or mathematical, terms. Stanlis’ 
work engages with Burke and Natural Law, which, arguably, may come closest to 
discussing Burke and religious thinking. The scope of this thesis cannot allow for 
interaction with the various theories of ‘natural law’ (which range from the classical 
theories that suggest an orderly universe, ruled by a system of law that is purported by 
nature, or ‘implanted by nature in the human mind […]’, e.g., from Plato’s Gorgias and 
his Republic, and Cicero’s De Legibus to later theories that refer to a law of nature as ‘a 
precept, or a general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that 
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which is destructive of his life […]’ (e.g. Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan, 1651).778 
However, it is worth noting that many scholars connect Burke’s thinking on natural law 
to his political theory: Stephen K. White, Peter Stanlis, Francis P. Canavan, B.T. Wilkins, 
and Joseph L. Pappin, all see a version of natural law (or, respectively, the law of nature) 
as the key to cohering Burke’s political thinking.779 I wish to complement their work by 
understanding Burke’s religious thinking, though not necessarily by metaphysics. Stanlis 
explains that one of the effects of this emerging scientific conception of things beyond 
the scope of ordinary ideas is the relegation of a theistic conception of things: 
There is a direct connection between the abandonment of the theistic 
conception of Natural Law and the supremacy of mathematical logic and 
self-sufficiency of private reason in natural rights. […] Grotius was the 
first modern to say for illustrative purposes, that Natural Law would be 
valid even if God did not exist.
780
 
However, I am not sure I agree with his placement of Burke in opposition to Grotius. 
While Stanlis (like Pappin and others above) is concerned with Burke and political 
theory, I believe the way Burke represents religion resonates with Grotius. Hugo Grotius 
famously was arrested for defending the rights of civil authority over religious 
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 Grotius’ conceptualization of religious toleration, for example, is very 
similar to Burke’s. Grotius argued that generalized belief in God should be prioritized 
over doctrinal difference; that the invention of religious sectarianism was altogether 
different from the concept of God: ‘That Authority about sacred things belongs to the 
highest powers […] That this authority and the sacred function are distinct […]’.782 In 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that, for Burke, sacredness transcends the power of any 
particular Church, even if that entails slighting a Deity, for sacredness can be experienced 
with or without God.
783
 Grotius was at one with this vision. He also deplored sectarian 
divisions between Christian states, and the trouble arising from trifling differences 
between religious sects: 
I saw in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even 
barbarous nations might blush. Wars were begun on trifling pretexts or 




In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I showed how Burke shared this outlook, and outlined his 
expanded conceptualisation of religious sacredness.
785
 I would argue, as Grotius 
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conceptualized a natural law possible without the necessity of God, Burke perceived a 
general sacredness without the necessity of God, or religious feeling without religious 
sectarian identification. However, I do agree with Stanlis’ view, ‘For Burke, political 
theory could never be an exact mathematical science’; moreover, I would add that, for 
Burke, religious conception could never be made into a mathematical science.
786
 Where 
Burke’s conceptualization of religion is concerned, fixed lines of definition (exact 
mathematical terms) do not apply; to use Stanlis’ words, ‘They are broad and deep as 
well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions 
and modifications are not made by the process of logic […]’.787 This makes his extensive 
use of scientific and medical metaphor in his Letter to a Noble Lord and his Letters on a 
Regicide Peace seem, at first, ironic. I argue that once we understand the nature of his 
scientific references (which are almost always linked with religion), we can see that 
scientific metaphor helps Burke to offer a representation of religion that blends sectarian 
difference. To understand this representation, we now need to look closely at Burke’s use 
of metaphors of medical science, in his earlier writings, as well as his Letter to a Noble 
Lord. 
Context of Medical and Scientific metaphor; disintegrative science vitiating 
religious establishment 
We can see various representations of science appearing throughout Burke’s 
writings, used as metaphors for criticising Jacobinism, French philosophes, the National 
Assembly, and general destructiveness of unrestrained reason. In Burke’s A Letter to a 
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Member of the National Assembly, he addresses Francois-Louis Thibault de Menonville, 
deputy to the Estates General from Mirecourt in Lorraine: 
Your state doctors do not so much as pretend that any good whatsoever 
has hitherto been derived from their operations, or that the public has 
prospered in any one instance, under their management. The nation is sick, 
very sick, by their medicines. But the charlatans tell them that what is past 
cannot be helped;—they have taken draught, and they must wait its 
operation with patience;—that the first effects indeed are unpleasant, but 
that the very sickness is inevitable in all constitutional revolutions;—that 
the body must pass through pain to ease;—that the prescriber is not an 
empirick who proceeds by vulgar experience, but one who grounds his 
practice on the sure rules of art, which cannot possibly fail.
788
 
Burke characterises the malady of Jacobinism, illustrating France as an infirm patient—
made ill by the medicine proscribed by doctors, who assure the patient that illness is part 
of the healing process (or revolutionary process). The doctors (the prescribers) are, of 
course, the National Assembly, forcing an intoxicating, yet harmful draught on the state. 
Burke further criticises the National Assembly through medical metaphor: 
The Assembly recommends to its youth a study of the bold experimenters 
in morality. Every body knows that there is a great dispute amongst their 
leaders, which of them is the best resemblance to Rousseau. In truth, they 
all resemble him. His blood they transfuse into their minds and into their 
manners. Him [Rousseau] they study; him they meditate; him they turn 
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over in all the time they can spare from the laborious mischief of the day, 
or the debauches of the night. Rousseau is their canon of holy writ; in his 




The Assembly are doctors, prescribers, experimenters, who engage in operation transfuse 
the thinking of Rousseau into their minds, which alludes to a blood transfusion. Of 
course, Burke is referring to Rousseau’s pervasive conceptual influence.790 Burke’s use 
of medical science as a metaphor for the permeation of Rousseau’s thought is potentially 
revealing: the idea of blood transfusion had been thought about since the fifteenth 
century, but the first successful blood transfusion into a human (from a sheep, 
incidentally) was achieved by Dr Jean-Baptiste Denis on 15 June 1667, physician to King 
Louis XIV of France.
791
 This, of course, comes long before the deposed Louis XVI, but, 
nevertheless, is worth noting, as if Burke were associating some kind of cultural history 
of involuntary infusion (blood transfusion) with the infusion of subversive thinking, or 
the infusion of animalistic (and therefore barbarous) thinking. Further, he links the 
conceptual transfusion with holiness; rather, he suggests that Rousseau transfuses his 
unholy doctrine into the youth of France. Here, we begin to see how the use of medical 
scientific metaphor communicates Burke’s worry about disintegrative thinking 
concerning religious establishment. 
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 Burke continues to use medical science metaphors to illustrate the religiously 
disintegrating qualities of Jacobinism in his Second letter to Hercules. Below, he refers to 
the disintegrating thought associated with Jacobinism as being comprised of ill humours: 
Whatever ill-humours are afloat in the State, they will be sure to discharge 
themselves in a mingled torrent in the Cloaca Maxima of Jacobinism. 
Therefore people ought well to look about them. First, the physicians are 
to take care that they do nothing to irritate this epidemical distemper. It is 
a foolish thing to have the better of the patient in a dispute. The complaint 
or its cause ought to be removed, and wise and lenient arts ought to 
precede the measures of vigour.
792
 
A further, and quite repulsive, medical science metaphor is seen above in his description 
of the ill humours of the patient (the state) being discharged into a giant sewer (Cloaca 
Maxima). Geraldine Lee-Treweek writes, ‘In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
notion of the four humours [bile, black bile, blood and phlegm] was very much “in 
fashion” in medical circles.’793 Bloodletting, ‘emetics (to bring on vomiting) and 
purgatives (to bring on bowel movements) were prescribed’ in medicine.794 The notion of 
humours was not new or experimental; it serves Burke’s literary purpose to describe, 
what he perceives as, the veritable sewer of subversive thinking that is the new state in 
France. It also illustrates an alignment with classical thinking about medical pathology. 
                                                 
792
 Burke, Second Letter To Sir Hercules, Writings, IX, p. 667–68. 
793
 Geraldine Lee-Treweek, ‘Knowledge, Names, Fraud and Trust’, in Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine: Structures and Safeguards, ed. by, Geraldine Lee-Treweek, Tom Heller, Hilary MacQueen, Julie 
Stone and Sue Spurr, (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p. 13. 
794
 Lee-Treweek, p. 13. 
290 
 
 The texts above begin to reveal Burke’s general engagement with medical 
science, in terms of literary usage. However, I do not believe it is as simple as Schaffer 
and Stanlis suggest—that this engagement reveals Burke’s opposition to scientific 
thinking as a whole, and thus, his serving the ancien régime.
795
 Indeed, I argue that his 
use of scientific metaphors in Letter to a Noble Lord reveals something more 
complicated: Burke is opposing new, experimental, scientific thinking. He communicates 
this in his unfavourable description of transfusion above and by seating his rhetoric in 
classical theories of pathology (e.g. the humours). He reaches beyond medicine and into 
other branches of science: astronomy, geography, and physiology. I argue that the most 
revealing of the branches with which he engages are early chemistry and atomism. 
 In his Letter to a Noble Lord, Burke suggests that the Duke of Bedford’s criticism 
of his pension follows in the same vein as others who have criticised him (e.g., Thomas 
Paine in his Rights of Man, 1791 and Joseph Priestley in his Letters to Edmund Burke 
Occasioned by His Reflections, 1791): 
To be ill spoken of, in whatever language they speak, by the zealots of the 
new sect in philosophy and politicks, of which these noble persons think 
so charitably, and of which others think so justly, to me, is no matter of 
uneasiness or surprise. […] I have to thank the Bedfords and the 
Lauderdales for having so faithfully and so fully acquitted towards me 




                                                 
795
 Schaffer, ‘Genius’, p. 82; Stanlis, pp. 114–15. 
796
 Burke, Letter to a Noble, Writings, vol. ix, p. 146. 
291 
 
Burke lists the Duke of Bedford along with Priestley and Paine as comprising a new sect 
of thinkers of experimentation and disintegration. He writes of these men as speaking in 
the zealous language of a new sect; below, he elaborates on that new sect, when he 
complains that critics will not leave him alone, even in his advanced years, and grief over 
the death of his son: 
Why will they not let me remain in obscurity and inaction? Are they 
apprehensive, that if an atom of me remains, the sect has something to 
fear? […] In my wretched condition, though hardly to be classed with the 
living, I am not safe from them. They have tigers to fall upon animated 
strength. They have hyenas to prey upon carcasses. The national 
menagerie is collected by the first physiologists of the time; and it is 
defective in no description of savage nature. They pursue, even such as 
me, into the obscurest retreats, and haul them before their revolutionary 
tribunals. Neither sex, nor-age—not the sanctuary of the tomb is sacred to 
them. They have so determined a hatred to all privileged orders, that they 
deny even to the departed, the sad immunities of the grave.
797
 
Burke mocks the scientific thinking of the new sect, which does not make a distinction 
between the atoms comprising human life and other life. Burke also is criticising new 
thinking that disintegrates things into particles, or atoms—when he refers to their fear of 
‘an atom’ of his being remaining (after his death, or after the critical attacks he has 
endured from the Duke of Bedford, and Priestley and Paine). The theory of ‘atomism’ 
(‘the doctrine or theory that all things are formed of tiny indivisible particles’) was 
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asserted by Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE), but then dismissed by Aristotle, and 
disregarded for 1,500 years.
798
 Atomism was widely rejected through the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in favour of a nonatomic understanding of matter. William 
Newman explains: 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, only a generation before the 
birth of Isaac Newton, atomism was not widely upheld in Europe. Indeed, 
precisely the opposite was accepted by most of the learned community as 
an article of faith. Material change was generally explained not by the 
associate and dissociation of microscopic particles but rather by the 
imposition and removal of immaterial forms.
799
 
Newman writes that ‘natural philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries […] 
explicitly upheld the absolute homogeneity of mixtures (and therefore the nonatomic), 
impermanent character of their constituents’.800 This nonatomic understanding of matter, 
as Newman explains, was interlinked with faith. While, historically, Robert Boyle is 
credited with reviving atomism in England, in his treatise Of Anatomical Philosophy (c. 
1652–54), the legacy of atomism in the Newtonian sense shares a feature with the 
atomism of the early seventeenth-century.
801
 Brian Young explains a ‘Newtonian 
physico-theology’ studied by the Cambridge circle of Lockean divines: ‘Study of 
Newton’s philosophy revealed a natural religious apologetic, a physico-theology 
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traditionally understood as complementing the truths of revelation.’802 Adam Sedgwick (a 
Woodwardian Professor, then chair, of Geology from 1818 to 1873), wrote A Discourse 
on the Studies of The University (Cambridge, 1834) wherein he describes this physico-
theology: 
A study of the Newtonian philosophy, as affecting our moral powers and 
capacities (the subject I am now pressing on your thoughts), does not 
terminate mere negations. It teaches us to see the finger of God in all 
things animate and inanimate, and gives us an exalted conception of his 
attributes, placing before us the clearest proof of their reality; and so 
prepares, or ought to prepare, the mind for that reception of the higher 




If we think of the myth of modernity constructed by Enlightenment minds, described by 
Latour above—wherein modern scientific enquiry threatens traditional faith and 
theology—we can perhaps see more of a harmonious blending between scientific enquiry 
and religious faith in Newton’s nineteenth-century legacy. However, for certain 
Enlightenment minds in the eighteenth century (I am referring to Burke’s references to 
physiologists and atoms above) the fear of a sect that construes things as divisible, or as 
comprised from atoms and particles, which may be disintegrated, is still present. Burke 
uses the idea of the atom to mock this experimental and scientific way of thinking, to 
illustrate its absurdity—much like the way he illustrated the absurdity of Bolingbroke’s 
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criticism of Established Religion in his Vindication by using ‘the same Engines which 
were employed for the Destruction of Religion […].’804 
Burke goes on to refer to other branches of science in his Letter to a Noble Lord. 
For example, below he writes of the influence of revolutionary thinking (the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and possibly Paine’s Rights of Man) in reference 
to contemporary developments in astronomy: 
Astronomers have supposed that if a certain comets whose path 
intercepted the ecliptic had met the earth in some (I forget what) sign, it 
would have whirled us along with it, in its eccentric course, into God 
knows what regions of heat and cold. Had the portentous comet of the 
Rights of Man (which “from its horrid hair shakes pestilence and war,” 
and “with fear of change perplexes monarchs”), had that comet crossed 
upon us in that internal state of England, nothing human could have 
prevented our being irresistibly hurried out of the highway of heaven into 
all the vices, crimes, horrors, and miseries of the French Revolution.
805
 
First, Burke is engaging in the same device that he does in the previous passage from his 
Letter to a Noble Lord: he is engaging with the terminology of the thinking, which he 
wishes to criticise in order to mock it. He does this when he writes that this comet was 
thought to hit the earth under some ‘sign’, by which he alludes to astrology, which (since 
the seventeenth century) had been distinguished from astronomy, closer to divination 
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 In this way, he undermines the new scientific thinking by suggesting it as 
pseudo-sorcery—as something set in opposition to religious tradition. The Langford 
edition of the text suggests that Burke may be referring to Joseph-Jérome-Lefrancais De 
La Lande (1732-1807), specifically his Réflexions sur les comètes qui peuvent approcher 
de la terre, (1773—literally Reflections on the Comets which can approach Earth), which 
predicted that a comet would destroy Earth.
807
 Burke refers to Jacobin thinking as a 
comet (destructive and disintegrative) by which England was advantageously untouched, 
and therefore, kept on the ‘highway of heaven’. Conceptually, from the last two passages, 
we can understand that experimental thinking that would disintegrate or divide is 
antithetical to the sacred, and therefore, diverted away from righteousness, and the 
‘highway of heaven’. While his reference to astronomy continues to communicate his 
worry about disintegrative thinking, it is references to the new chemistry of atoms and 
elements that most powerfully deliver Burke’s criticism of the Duke of Bedford and this 
new sect of experimenters—like the French philosophes, both would sacrifice humanity 
for fanatical experiments: 
He is made for them in every part of their double character. As robbers, to 
them he is a noble booty; as speculatists, he is a glorious subject for their 
experimental philosophy. He affords matter for an extensive analysis in all 
the branches of their science, geometrical physical, civil, and political. 
These philosophers are fanatics; independent of any interest, which if it 
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operated alone would make them much more tractable, they are carried 
with such an head-long rage towards every desperate trial that they would 
sacrifice the whole human race to the slightest of their experiments. […] 
Naturally men so formed and finished are the first gifts of Providence to 
the world. But when they have once thrown off the fear of God, which was 
in all ages too often the case, and the fear of man, which is now the case, 
and when in that state they come to understand one another and to act in 
corps, a more dreadful calamity cannot arise out of hell to scourge 
mankind. Nothing can be conceived more hard than the heart of a 
thoroughbred metaphysician. It comes nearer to the cold malignity of a 
wicked spirit than to the frailty and passion of a man. It is like that of the 
principle of evil himself, incorporeal, pure, unmixed, dephlegmated, 
defecated evil. It is no easy operation to eradicate humanity from the 
human breast. […] It is remarkable that they never see any way to their 
projected good but by the road of some evil. Their imagination is not 
fatigued with the contemplation of human suffering through the wild 
waste of centuries added to centuries of misery and desolation. Their 
humanity is at their horizon—and, like the horizon, it always flies before 
them. The geometricians and the chemists bring, the one from the dry 
bones of their diagrams, and the other from the soot of their furnaces, 
dispositions that make them worse than indifferent about those feelings 
and habitudes which are the supports of the moral world. Ambition is 
come upon them suddenly; they are intoxicated with it, and it has rendered 
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them fearless of the danger which may from thence arise to others or to 
themselves. These philosophers consider men, in their experiments, no 
more than they do mice in an air pump, or in a recipient of mephitic gas.
808
 
Here, Burke seems to be using terminology from scientific theories about air, which are 
(mostly) contemporary to him. Newly discovered gases were called airs: Boyle had 
experimented with an air pump and theorized about the weight of air in his New 
Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects (1660); 
Priestley also experimented with an air pump, and published on his experiments with 
‘fixed air’ in Observations on Different Kinds of Air (1772, 1774, 1775, 1777).809 Kristen 
Olsen describes such a pump, and elaborates on the evolution of the theories surrounding 
air, specifically, that it was eventually understood as a mixed compound: 
Air, for example, was discovered to be composed of several different 
kinds of gases (which were still often called “airs”). In 1727, Stephen 
Hales discovered that solids, when heated, released “fixed air”. He 
collected the released gas by feeding it into an upside-down vessel filled 
with water. The gas ran into the vessel, displacing the heavier water, and 
rising to the top of the vessel. This technique was later refined by William 
Brownrigg, who devised a simple “pneumatic trough” that allowed gases 
to be moved from one flask to another, by Cavendish, who displaced 
mercury instead of water, to solve the problem of some gases being water 
soluble; and by French chemist Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, who 
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constructed his own highly accurate gasometer. […] Lavoiser became 
skeptical of the phlogiston theory, He concluded that the heat and light 
released came from the oxygen in the air, not the phlogiston in the metal. 
In 1785 he launched an all-out attack on phlogiston itself […] Within 
about ten years most prominent British scientists had rejected the 
phlogiston theory. Chief among the diehard phlogistonists was Priestley, 
who would hold to the discredited theory all his life.
810
 
Early seventeenth-century chemists such as Joseph Black believed that air was just one 
substance; Priestley later criticised the work of his predecessors, understanding that air 
was ‘procured from various substances’.811 There was a rise in scientific efforts to try to 
understand how and why matter transformed (e.g. liquids into gas). Michael T. Walton 
describes ‘growing popularity of atomism’.812 Part of the attempts to understand the 
nature and function of atoms was to wonder how or whether they transformed; Robert 
Boyle re-interpreted J.B. Helmont’s theories, which suggested that plants transformed 
water into ethereal ferments, to include the notion of atoms: 
He [Boyle] believed that the seminal principles, a concept not unrelated to 
the ferments of Helmont, in plants drew atoms from water and recombined 
them to form the substance of plants. Boyle felt that the process of 
drawing atoms from fluid media like water and from the air not only 
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Therefore, the understanding of airs, vapours, gases, ethereal ferments was beginning to 
include the notion of atoms, or small particles. Maurice Crosland writes, ‘The only 
known poisons [in the eighteenth century] were solids or liquids, so they explained the 
deaths [deaths of unknown causes, e.g., from breathing air in mines] by postulating the 
existence of tiny arsenical particles in the atmosphere’.814 In other words, the eighteenth 
century also saw the beginnings of understanding poisonous air, or mephitic gas. 
Walton also mentions that early theories on harmful air understood ‘fixed’, or 
‘phlegmatic’ air as different from ‘changeable’ or ‘dephlegmatic’ air.815 Priestley’s 
experiments on the transformation of air are particularly relevant to Burke’s references; 
some of his experiments on the notion of separating atoms in air (e.g., ‘Considering 
inflammable air as air united to phlogiston’) concerned his theory of phlogiston—a 
theory about harmful gases released upon the separation of atoms of air, or the 
combustion of air.
816
 Priestley experimented on the use of the ‘spirit of nitre’, and the 
production of ‘nitrous air’—nitre being a form of potassium nitrate, or producing a 
sulphuric, noxious gas, ‘the catalytic mixture of nitrates or nitrogen oxides used or 
produced during the manufacture of sulphuric acid’.817 He dissolved vegetable and 
animal matter into nitre, among other experiments, to postulate on the process by which 
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mephitic air is produced: ‘the more phlogiston there is in the substances moistened with 
the spirit of nitre, the more certain it is that the produce will be nitrous air […]’.818 
We will see in the next passage from Burke his references to nitre, but this 
historical framework of atoms and air helps to interpret the potency of what Burke is 
actually writing in the passage above. Burke suggests that intoxicating vapour of the 
metaphysician is evil and just as harmful as the mephitic gas emitted from the air pump 
of his contemporary chemists (e.g., Priestley). His use of the term ‘thoroughbred 
metaphysician’ is appropriate to describe the sort of scientific thinking he opposes—the 
sort of experimentation that is not wholly understood to be flawless, or universally 
sanctioned by other thinkers. Burke describes the ‘gas’ of the metaphysician as evil: it is 
changed, or dephlegmaticated into a toxic substance, ‘defecated evil’. In the context of 
Priestley’s transformation of air into a harmful or combustible substance, we can 
understand Burke’s reference as being conceptually critical of thinking that would 
promote division and disintegration, rather than unity: 
They consider mortar as a very anti-revolutionary invention in its present 
state, but, properly employed, an admirable material for overturning all 
establishments. They have calculated what quantity of matter convertible 
into niter is to be found in Bedford House, in Woburn Abbey, and in what 
his Grace and his trustees have still suffered to stand of that foolish 
royalist Inigo Jones, in Covent Garden. Churches, playhouses, 
coffeehouses, all alike are destined to be add mingled and equalized and 
blended into one common rubbish; and well-sifted and lixiviated to 
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Burke goes on to list Priestley among the chemists who seek to conceptually extract the 
atom of humanity from the human breast, and transform solid established matter into 
explosive, destructive matter: 
While these experiments are going on upon the Duke of Bedford's houses 
by the Morveaux and Priestleys, the Sieyès and the rest of the analytical 
legislators and constitution-venders are quite as busy in their trade of 
decomposing organization, in forming his Grace's vassals into primary 
assemblies, national guards, first, second and third requisitioners, 
committees of research, conductors of the travelling guillotine, judges of 
revolutionary tribunals, legislative hangmen, supervisors of domiciliary 
visitation, exactors of forced loans, and assessors of the maximum.
820
 
These constitutional chemists, according to Burke, seek to lixiviate, or disintegrate 
establishments. The notion of lixiviation is an early chemistry term: ‘the action or process 
of separating a soluble substance from one that is insoluble’.821 Historically, we now 
understand eighteenth-century developments in the scientific apprehension of matter: that 
it was comprised of separate atoms, that scientists such as Boyle and Priestley were 
understanding how these atoms could be lixiviated (or separated, or disintegrated) to 
result in explosive (or mephitic, or phlogistic, or poisonous) gases. Through chemical 
science metaphors above, Burke rails against practices that would (like new chemistry) 
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separate and disintegrate. I argue that within Burke’s reproach, above, to this new 
disintegrative sect, is a conceptual argument in favour of cohesion, mixing, keeping 
together, which I believe we will be able to understand further through theories of 
modernity, which apply alchemy as a metaphor for understanding the evolution of global 
religious cultures in modernization. The first way in which I suggest we can see a 
resonance with alchemic theories of modernity is in Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord, 
through his reference above to an ‘atom of’ himself.822 
An ‘Atom of me’: How Burke’s use of scientific metaphor resonates with modern 
theories on religion 
In his Letter to a Noble Lord, Burke offers some forgiveness to the Duke of 
Bedford for attacking him and his pension: ‘In one thing I can excuse the Duke of 
Bedford for this attack upon me and my mortuary pension, he cannot readily comprehend 
the transaction he condemns’.823 Burke explains the possibility that the Duke of Bedford 
did not appreciate the pension as a reward for a servant of the public, and as a measure of 
comfort to his posterity. However, Burke is sure to clarify that the servant of the public 
(himself) is a helpless old man, also that his would-be posterity (his son) is now dead. 
Therefore, the forgiveness below is rather more condemning than pardoning—
highlighting the fact that the Duke of Bedford is attacking an old man, who has lost his 
son: 
Had it pleased God to continue to me the hopes of succession, I should 
have been, according to my mediocrity and the mediocrity of the age I live 
in, a sort of founder of a family: I should have left a son, who, in all the 
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points in which personal merit can be viewed, in science, in erudition, in 
genius, in taste, in honour, in generosity, in humanity, in every liberal 
sentiment, and every liberal accomplishment, would not have shown 
himself inferior to the Duke of Bedford, or to any of those whom he traces 
in his line. His Grace very soon would have wanted all plausibility in his 
attack upon that provision which belonged more to mine than to me. He 
would soon have supplied every deficiency, and symmetrized every 
disproportion. It would not have been for that successor to resort to any 
stagnant wasting reservoir of merit in me, or in any ancestry. He had in 
himself a salient, living spring of generous and manly action. Every day he 
lived he would have repurchased the bounty of the Crown, and ten times 
more, if ten times more he had received. He was made a public creature; 
and had no enjoyment whatever but in the performance of some duty. At 
this exigent moment, the loss of a finished man is not easily supplied.
824
 
Burke explains that his duly proportioned, and not extravagant, pension would 
really have been for his progeny—his son. We could take the description of his son as a 
‘finished man’ to mean, the loss of a ‘finished’ man (as in ‘dead’ man, or a life cut short), 
or the loss of a ‘finished’ (as in a ‘polished’ or ‘perfect’ man). Perhaps, we can construe 
Burke’s description of his son as a perfect man, who would have served the monarchy, 
and whose life (if left to finish) would have been judged meritorious, even as ‘viewed, in 
science’. In the above passage, we perceive a faint image of Burke as a parent, lamenting 
the premature death of his progeny. I argue that this image of Burke as a parent is the first 
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way in which we see how his thinking resonates with theories of modernity, which use 
alchemy to describe religion. Mark C. Taylor uses alchemy to describe the vicissitude of 
religions in modernization; he describes alchemy through the concept of procreation or 
parenthood: 
Alchemy is, of course, the magico-religious practice intended to transform 
base metals into gold. Closely related to different strands of medieval 
Jewish and Christian mysticism and extremely important for the rise of 
modern science, alchemy originates in ancient rituals associated with 
mining and metallurgy. […] Minerals are believed to be embryos that 
grow within the womb of Mother Earth. Gestation is a process of 
purification in which all minerals, given enough time, will eventually turn 
into gold. […] the process of transformation that the metallurgist seeks to 
speed up presupposes that all substances are variations of an original Ur-
substance. Fire burns away polluting differences and returns the many to 
the one in which they all originate.
825
 
In this way, we can understand procreation, or parenthood as a kind of alchemy—
generating newness of life, originated from a common element. However, of course, we 
cannot conceive of Burke as a maternal figure (gestating an embryo, as Taylor describes 
above). Yet, beyond Taylor’s description of alchemy in procreative terms, we can apply 
his metaphor to the way in which Burke represents global religious culture: rendering 
away differences between religious conceptions, and promoting the commonality shared 
among them. We can conceive of his arguments against separation of matter to create 
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something explosive or destructive (like Priestley’s experiments and the figurative 
chemists of the French Revolution), as arguments in favour of a unifying alloy.
826
 I argue 
that Burke’s conceptions in the above passage, as well as in his Letters on a Regicide 
Peace (as we shall see), resonate with Taylor’s use of alchemy to conceptualize religion. 
We find further resonance with Taylor’s conceptualization in an earlier speech, given 
before his Letter to a Noble Lord—his Speech on the Reform of the Representation of the 
Commons in Parliament, (May 7, 1782). In the speech, he intermingles metaphors that 
resonate with alchemy and parent and child connection: 
I look with filial reverence on the Constitution of my country, and never 
will cut it in pieces, and put it into the kettle of any magician, in order to 
boil it, with the puddle of their compounds, into youth and vigour. On the 
contrary, I will drive away such pretenders; I will nurse its venerable age, 
and with lenient arts extend a parent’s breath.827 
In his Reflections, Burke also writes about the disregard for constitutional establishment, 
insinuating that the manner in which the National Assembly disassembled and liquidated 
established church property was like ‘children of their country who are prompt rashly to 
hack that aged parents in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by 
their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal 
constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.828 The constitutional matter of his country is 
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not to be separated and converted into something destructive (like the matter in 
Priestley’s experiments). While the behaviour of a child may be rash and destructive, the 
breath of a parent is nurturing and cohering. I believe that this resonates with Burke’s 
lamenting defence of his pension above: he can no longer extend a parent’s breath to his 
own progeny (his son), but he can still nurse a veritable constitutional progeny. In his 
Speech on Representation Burke vows to nurse the perpetuity of the constitution (which, 
as we know from earlier writings, and as mentioned above, is fostered by a capacity for 
change): ‘A state without the means of some change is without the means of its 
conservation’.829 
This procreative, or parent, theme can reveal yet more about the importance 
Burke places on change and transformation. When Boulton interprets Burke’s Letter to a 
Noble Lord, he argues: ‘At the heart of the clearest vindications of hereditary nobility, 
then, lay a manifesto of the “Novus Homo”; paradoxically appropriate to an age of 
revolution […]’.830 In other words, there is an argument for newness at the heart of 
Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord, which is appropriate to revolution and antithetical to 
reactionary conservatism. I agree with Boulton’s observation, but wish to expand on the 
term he uses: novus homo. Boulton, Elizabeth Lambert, Ian Crowe, Paddy Bullard, have 
all applied the novus homo phrase to Burke (borrowed from Cicero) as referring to his 
affinity for the industry of a self-made man.
831
 Boulton finds that affinity in Burke’s 
defence of his pension. The phrase is lifted from an incident involving Burke: William 
Bagot had called Burke ‘a Black Jesuit, educated at St. Omer’s’; Burke ‘took to himself 
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the appellation of a Novus Homo. He knew the envy attending that character. Novorum 
Hominum Industriam odisti; but as he knew the envy, he knew the duty of the Novus 
Homo.’832 Boulton, and other scholars, link the phrase to Burke’s understanding that 
people have a hatred for the industry of self-made men (which is captured in the phrase, 
Novorum Hominum Industriam odist). However, I would like to think of the Novus Homo 
phrase as not denoting a self-made man, but in a sense that is closer to the literal 
translation: a ‘new man’. In that sense, the passage above concerning Burke’s son, from 
his Letter to a Noble Lord, can be read differently. We can interpret the concept of 
parenthood, or procreation, as an act in rendering a novus homo: in one sense, procreation 
is the atom(s) of a man transformed into a new person (a child). Above, when Burke 
refers to his critics being apprehensive of ‘an atom’ of him remaining, he is (as explained 
above) criticising the new scientific sect, who thinks of things in terms of atoms; 
however, I argue that he could also be referring to his son: some transformed version of 
his self (‘an atom of me’) would have survived with his son.833 
Burke’s religious conception that is most resonant with Taylor’s alchemistic 
description of modern world religions is in his First Letter on a Regicide Peace. The 
Letters on a Regicide Peace are heavily concerned with what Burke considers a war 
between religion and irreligion. In his First Letter, Burke writes that the cause for times 
of peace that occur between times of war must be a transcultural religious toleration: 
The cause must be sought in the similitude throughout Europe of religion, 
laws, and manners. At the bottom, these are all the same. The writers in 
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public law have often called this aggregate of nations a Commonwealth. 
They had reason. It is virtually one great state having the same basis of 
general law; with some diversity of provincial customs and local 
establishments. The nations of Europe have had the very same Christian 
religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the 
ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and 
oeconomy of every country in Europe has been derived from the same 
sources. […] From all those sources arose a system of manners and of 
education which was nearly similar in all this quarter of the globe; and 
which softened, blended and harmonized the colours of the whole.
834
 
Being, of course, interested in the events in France, the above passage is restricted to the 
representation of European (and therefore, Christ-centred) religions. A peaceful and 
strong commonwealth is owing to an ‘aggregate’ of customs and manners, including 
religions—an ‘aggregate’ being ‘a complex whole, mass, or body formed by the union of 
numerous units or particles’.835 We can interpret Burke describing religions as unified 
particles, like the operations of alchemy (as opposed to the dividing, disintegrating, 
exploding, operations of chemists such as the French philosophes and Priestley). 
Moreover, Burke explains that these differing manners and religions are elementally the 
same, conceivably drawn from the same source of sacredness. This is very like Taylor’s 
use of alchemy (above) to describe religion in modernity: alchemy ‘returns the many to 
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the one in which they all originate’.836 The commonwealth ends up being a compound of 
aggregated religious practices, an alloy of sacredness. I argue that this is the way in 
which Burke’s representation of religion(s) resonates with alchemy: differing colours of 
religious sects blend; above, blending Christian sects, but in previous writings, blending 
Christian and non-Christian sects.
837
 
When we consider Burke’s confrontation with science in relation to how he 
conceptualizes religion, I argue against Schaffer and Stanlis—that Burke is not simply a 
‘servant of the ancien régime’, opposed to change and science.838 I argue that a closer 
look at his Letters on a Regicide Peace will show that they do not communicate a 
reactionary, ancien régime, opposition to science, but rather an opposition to the misuse 
of science, or the misuse of scientific reason. 
Burke’s Letters on a Regicide Peace; opposition to the hubris of experimental 
thinking 
While there is not the substantial use of chemistry metaphor in the Letters, Burke 
does continue to argue the subversiveness of the French philosophes through medical 
metaphors. Especially in the Fourth Letter (really the first, chronologically), Burke writes 
of the destruction of the Church and religion in France as if it were the misuse of medical 
science. Therefore, I do not think that we should see this as an opposition to science as a 
whole; but rather an adherence to classical pathology in his admonition against the 
misuse of new science, and unbridled scientific reason. In the Fourth Letter (the first one, 
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to Fitzwilliam), Burke speculates on the growth of the Jacobin faction in England, he 
refers to it as a school of atheism doling out its own medicine: 
What fills the measure of horror is, that schools of Atheism are set up at 
the publick charge in every part of the country. That some English parents 
will be wicked enough to send their children to such schools there is no 
doubt. Better this Island should be sunk to the bottom of the sea, than that 




In the same letter, Burke later continues the description of this dissemination of Atheism 
through the use of medical science metaphor: 
Among other miserable remedies that have been found in the materia 
medica [medicine] of the old college, a change of Ministry will be 
proposed […].840 
The same concept (schools of atheism poisoning humankind with blasphemous medicine) 
is seen in the First Letter on a Regicide Peace: 
[…W]hen schools and seminaries are erected to public expence to poison 
mankind from generation to generation, with the horrible maxims of this 
impiety;—when wearied out with incessant martyrdom, and the cries of a 
people hungering and thirsting for religion, they permit it, only as a 
tolerated evil—I call this Atheism by establishment.841 
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He refers to Rousseau and Voltaire as ‘monsters’, and to the National Assembly as ‘the 
Synagogue of Anti-Christ’.842 Burke’s attack on atheism in his Second Letter on a 
Regicide Peace renders away the qualitied between Christian and non-Christian sects, 
and then religious and non-religious thinking—arguing that the real destructive issue is 
fanatical zeal (not necessarily having to do with religion): 
They had rather domineer in a parish of Atheists, than rule over a 
Christian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly subservient to their 
proselytising spirit, in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himself. 
They who have made but superficial studies in the Natural History of the 
human mind, have been taught to look on religious opinions as the only 
cause of enthusiastick zeal, and sectarian propagation. But there is no 




Burke means to admonish the French for vitiating their Christian Church. The atheists 
who perpetrated this vitiation proselytised with enthusiastic zeal equal to ‘Mahomet 
himself’—the Muslim prophet. Then, argues that every doctrine is capable of that same 
zealous proselytisation; this erodes doctrinal difference, arguing that all men (regardless 
of religious sect) are capable of this atheistic zeal. I think Burke’s argument is against 
unbridled reason, more than science (or even atheism) itself. The calculators of 
government over-reasoned their way right out of reason, as Burke writes, ‘The calculators 
compute them out of their senses’.844 Joseph Milner, a central figure in the English 
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Evangelical movement, similarly described ‘the spirit of the age’ as one of ‘reasoning to 
excess’.845 
Translating Burke’s religious representation through theories of modernity 
Welsh and Fidler argue that Burke’s thinking on culture displays an opposition to 
transnational, or transcultural thinking—evincing this in his doubts about unifying 
nations through economic methods (e.g., commoditization and consumerism): 
Will globalization lay the groundwork for the deep, transcultural 
solidarism that states and governmental organizations had found so 
difficult to create? Burke’s thinking on culture suggests a negative answer 
to this question. Although Burke stressed the social context of economic 
activity, his sensitivity to cultural differences in connection with economic 
intercourse suggests that he saw limits to the “community building” 
potential of commerce. To produce “obligations written on the heart” on a 




While I understand what Welsh and Fidler explain (that simply turning on non-Western 
peoples to Western style consumerism will not achieve the transcultural solidarism), I 
argue against their assessment of Burke: that his thinking surrounding religion evinces a 
positive answer (not a negative answer, but a certain hope) for transcultural solidarism. In 
his First Letter, we saw how Burke described a Commonwealth community that 
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transcended nations and manners, achieved through an aggregate of religion.
847
 
Therefore, in terms of imagining transnational communities, while there may be (as 
Welsh and Fidler suggest) economic limitations in Burke’s thinking, I believe that 
Burke’s representation of religious cultures indicates that transnational, transreligious, 
community is possible. I argue that we can articulate Burke’s expanded, transnational 
representation of religious culture through twentieth and twenty-first century theorists of 
religion. For example, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph argues that the conservation and 
expansion of religion across nations and cultural extinction is, indeed, owing to 
modernity: 
Modern social science did not warn us that this would happen. Instead it 
asserted that religion would fade, then disappear, with the triumph of 
science and rationalism, But religion has expanded explosively, stimulated 
as much by secular global processes—migration, multinational capital, 
[…] as by proselytizing activity. Contrary to expectations, its expansion 
has been an answer to and driven by modernity. In response to the 
deracination and threats of cultural extinction associated with 




In the excerpts from his Letter to a Noble Lord and his Letters on a Regicide Peace 
above, we see Burke’s fear that the ‘scientific’ practices of the new sect of thinking—the 
kind of scientific thinking resulting in explosive harmful gases (literally, from Priestley’s 
experiments, and otherwise from the National Assembly) would deracinate religion(s). 
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I argue that Burke’s representation of global religions in his writings and speeches 
transcends boundaries between nations and sects, and is, therefore, modern—like 
Berman’s modernity, it transcends ‘all boundaries of geography, ethnicity, of class and 
nationality’.849 Daniéle Hervieu-Léger captures the modern transnational 
conceptualization of religion: ‘“Transnational religion” refers to any religious system 
whose organization transcends frontiers and weaves over and above national political and 
cultural specificities […]’.850 In Burke’s First Letter, above, we can construe his 
representation of religions as transcending cultural specificities—claiming they are all the 
same ‘at the bottom’, and come from ‘the same source’. 
Taylor, Hoeber Rudolph, and Hervieu-Léger essentially describe the same thing: 
that the transformative nature of religion is the method by which it is conserved. I believe 
this describes some of the ways in which religion is represented in Burke’s literature. 
Taylor describes the way in which alchemy lives on through the perpetual 
reconceptualization of religion, as it transforms throughout modernity. For example, 
when different religions consider the apocalypse, and must keep deferring ‘the end’ when 
it does not come, it is a reconceptualization of faith (the creation of a new faith, in the 
way alchemy is the creation of a new metal): ‘The ancient dream of the alchemist is far 
from over. […] Far from destroying faith, infinite deferral [of the apocalypse] creates the 
distance that creates the time and space for faithful vision.’851 Expanding the 
representation of religions to include an aggregate of differing sects conceptually is 
creating a new alloy of faith(s). 
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 The capacity for transformative thinking about religion is key for its conservation 
through modernization. For example, Berman writes of the transformation of God into 
commoditization in modernity, arguing that modern nihilism sees science (along with the 
rise of rationalism and an obsoleted God) as responsible for transforming of the old forms 
of honour and dignity: 
Old modes of honor and dignity do not die; instead, they get incorporated 
into the market, take on price tags, gain new life as commodities. Thus, 
any imaginable mode of human conduct becomes morally permissible the 
moment it becomes economically possible, becomes “valuable”; anything 
goes if it pays. This is what modern nihilism is all about, Dostoevsky, 
Nietzsche and their twentieth-century successors will ascribe this 
predicament to science, rationalism, the death of God.
852
 
In this sense, we can understand that religion is not necessarily vitiated by science (as 
Hoeber Rudolph suggests), God is not necessarily dead; modernity simply transforms 
these concepts into a new substance—for example, God transforms into something like a 
commodity. The rise of rationalistic, scientific thought did not ‘vitiate’ religion as Burke 
feared in his First Letter on a Regicide Peace, or ‘lixiviate’ it into an harmful ‘niter’ as he 
feared in his Letter to a Noble Lord; the rise in this new sect of thinking only forced the 
transformation of old modes of religion into new ones—closer to an aggregate of faiths. 
In this way, Burke’s late writings prefigure Berman’s description above. Reaching back 
to his Enquiry, we see Burke removing the necessity of God from the perception of the 
sublime sacred: Burke’s version of the sublime is highly subjective, unmitigated by a 
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disinterested object (God), the Godhead is viewed as a theoretical example, and almost 
unnecessary.
853
 This prefigures the evolution of religion through modernity that Paul 
Heelas describes: 
Even though God might remain the ultimate author, when religion is 
functioning beyond the church and chapel the authority of God—as 
exercised through the institutionalized—is obviously diminished. […] But 
the more that people come to treat religion as a consumer item, the less 
likely they are to be attracted to the “real” thing.854 
The expansion of economic and political communities to transcend boundaries between 
nations, forces the expansion of the conceptual representation of religions. Hoeber 
Rudolph explains that the result of eighteenth-century imperial modernization is an 
intellectual and cultural aggregate: ‘an aggregative intellectual and social process of 
ecumenization, reaching across civilizational and state borders and engaging the full 
diversity of world religions.’855 Hoeber Rudolph continues: 
In the age of imperialism, western religions migrated with the flag in ways 
that seems to herald the universalization of Christian hegemony in the 
parts of Africa and Asia that were annexed to empires […].856 
Burke’s description of a religious European aggregate above in his First Letter prefigures 
Hoeber Rudolph’s assessment above. 
Conclusion to Chapter 4 
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I believe that the above critical analysis has made a much-needed contribution to 
a conversation about Burke’s confrontation with science. Beyond considering the 
rhetorical or political facets of his Letter to a Noble Lord and his Letters on a Regicide 
Peace, (as Boulton and Browne do) I have filled a need to consider the scientific and 
religious contexts of those texts. While I have acknowledged the problems inherent in 
interpreting Burke in a scientific context, I believe I have demonstrated the value in 
examining Burke’s confrontation with science: science does not need to be completely 
incompatible with Burke’s thinking (as Stanlis suggests regarding Burke’s political 
thinking), nor is it captured entirely by metaphysics (as Pappin suggests of Burke’s 
political thinking). However, using theories of modernity, particularly Mark C. Taylor, 
reveals a dimension of his religious thought wherein the boundaries between religious 
sects are rendered familiar. 
I have explained some of the scientific context behind the references in his Letter 
to a Noble Lord, and have further demonstrated how Burke’s application of scientific 
terms allowed him to communicate his worry about the vitiation of religious 
establishment. I further argued the way these characteristics, especially in his First Letter 
on a Regicide Peace, revealed his progressive, transcendent representation of global 
religion(s). I then argued that his Letters do not communicate an opposition to science, 
but rather an opposition to the misuse of science, or the use of disintegrative thinking. I 
believe I have demonstrated the ways in which Burke’s representation of global religions 
prefigures twentieth and twenty-first century conceptualizations of religion: Burke’s 
representation of religious culture observed a transcendence of boundaries between 
nation, culture, and sect, before Hoeber Rudolph, Hervieu-Léger, and Berman. Like 
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Grotius, Burke conceived of a Godless sacredness before theorists of modernity, like 
Heelas. I believe that the inclusion of Burke in modern transnational thinking (from 
Welsh and Fidler) evidences what no one has yet claimed: Burke influenced 
contemporary transnational thinking about religion. I ultimately argue that we can qualify 
Burke’s representation of religion(s) in his writings and speeches as expanded, 
transcendent, progressive, and modern—not simply conservative-reactionary, or (as 




I believe that my thesis has proven the critical value in interpreting Edmund 
Burke’s religious thinking in terms of its analytical footprint left behind, beyond his own 
religious identity. The way that Roland Barthes and Stanley E. Fish think about texts, and 
their value, further justifies my theoretical approach. Barthes writes: 
Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips 
away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity 
of the body writing. […] As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a 
view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally 
outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol 
itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters 
into his own death, writing begins.
857
 
The function, the value, of a text lies within the text itself. The identity of the author is, in 
some sense, lost in the operation of this function. 
In Burke’s case (while we must not dismiss his identity entirely) focusing too 
much on solving his true identity (religious, or otherwise), perhaps yields more problems 
than it solves. This points to what Stanley E. Fish writes about disputes over the poems of 
John Milton; he makes a case for reader response theory: 
In short, these are problems that apparently cannot be solved, at least not 
by the methods traditionally brought to bear on them. What I would like to 
argue is that they are not meant to be solved but to be experienced (they 
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signify), and that consequently any procedure that attempts to determine 
which of a number of readings is correct will necessarily fail.
858
 
To try to determine which interpretation of Burke is all encompassing and correct (e.g., 
Anglican, Latitudinarian, Metaphysician, Catholic) is counterintuitive to the signifying 
experience of his texts. For a historian or a biographer, perhaps an ultimate determination 
would be valuable; however, for a literary interpretation (like mine), I agree with Fish—
that deciding which of a number of Burke interpretations is correct distracts from the 
experience of the texts, as it is impressed upon a reader. Of course, Fish’s case for the 
reader response approach presents a problem: 
[…] analyses generated by the assumption that meaning is embedded in 
the artefact—will always point in as many directions as there are 




However, I believe that the many directions to be yielded from Burke’s work are what (to 
use Stephen K. White’s phrase) makes it ‘perennially attractive’.860 I believe that the 
impression of the artefact (the text) on the reader is appropriate for Burke, who favours 
empirical aesthetic experience, as we discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Barthes refers 
to linguistics to approximate the function of a text once it is impressed upon a reader: 
Leaving aside literature itself (such distinctions really becoming invalid), 
linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a 
valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an 
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empty functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled 
with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never 
more than the instance writing […].861 
The conceptual destruction (or death) of an author conveys a low level of relevance with 
regard to the actual experience of the text. So, like Conor Cruise O’Brien did, we can 
speculate about how Burke received Catholic last rites while on his deathbed, but I 
believe that I have proven that it is more important to understand another part of 
O’Brien’s observation: that Burke ‘believed in those large parts of Christianity that were 
common to Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism, and did not concern himself with those 
doctrinal parts which divided them.’862 I believe I have expanded on this observation by 
showing that the imprint of Burke’s representation of religion left behind in his literature 
shows a conception of religion that not only (as O’Brien suggests) transcends doctrinal 
difference between Anglicanism and Catholicism, but also blends difference between 
Christian, non-Christian religions, Christian heterodoxy, non-god-centred thinking, and 
even the holy and the profane. 
I have attempted to honour the work of those who skilfully identify Burke’s 
Anglican Latitudinarianism (Frederick Dryer, J.C.D. Clark, Brian Young, Elizabeth 
Lambert, F.P. Lock and others) by highlighting the ways in which his representation of 
various religious doctrines reaches beyond the Latitudinarian toleration measures of his 
day: his oeuvre of literatures offers a multicultural representation of global religious 
doctrines as legitimate (relative to indigenous culture). By interpreting Burke as a quasi-
religious thinker, the observations presented in the previous chapters have complemented 
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scholarship that strongly analyses Burke as a politician, a rhetorician, and an aesthetician 
(Richard Bourke, Terry Eagleton, Paddy Bullard, Stephen K. White, etc.). By analysing 
Burke beyond the speculative scope of his own religious cultural identity, I have 
complemented the work of those who have offered expert interpretations of Burke’s own 
religious subscription (e.g., Conor Cruise O’Brien, Thomas H.D. Mahoney, Eamonn 
O’Flaherty, Dreyer, Crowe, and Lock). 
 I introduced my thesis by seating Burke’s writings and speeches in the context of 
eighteenth-century modernity, and the understanding of ancient versus modern from 
Enlightenment minds (such as David Hume) described by J.G.A. Pocock—a ‘post-feudal 
and post-ecclesiastical modernity’.863 I introduced a framework of eighteenth-century 
Anglican culture, through the work of Knud Haakonssen and Brian Young, further 
fortifying my analysis of eighteenth-century modernity.
864
 Bruno Latour and S.J. Barnett 
also describe a modernity emerging out of the Reformation, marked by a rise in scientific 
enquiry and freethinking, reinvigorated in the eighteenth century; I further seated my 
analysis in their scholarship.
865
 I explained my objective to enrich our understanding of 
Burke in the context of modernity by demonstrating how theories of recent modernity 
function within parameters and themes comparable to the eighteenth-century condition 
described by Pocock, Latour, and Barnett. 
In Chapter 1, I showed how Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry Into Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and his A Vindication of Natural Society (1756–57) engage 
with themes subversive to Established Christianity: Christian heterodoxy, Deism, non-
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god-centred thinking, and even themes not associated with holiness (i.e. the profane). I 
demonstrated how the vocabulary of theorists of modernity articulate such paradoxical 
complexity. Theorists including Marshall Berman, Terry Eagleton, Paul Heelas, Phillip 
Blond, and John Milbank explain such paradoxical complexity, wherein the rhetoric of 
arguments in support of religion may be dependent on themes antithetical to religion, and 
the rise in Christian-heterodox thinking encourages expanding the notion of the sublime, 
until the deity-object is obsolete. By placing these early texts in this context of modernity, 
I demonstrated how Burke’s representation of religion(s) began to render religious 
doctrine and determinacy less distinct. This, I believe, shaped an interpretation of Burke 
as an originator of modern religious understanding, which also contributed to arguing 
against interpretations of Burke as a reactionary. 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the way in which, in Burke’s writings concerning 
India and Ireland (from the 1770s and 1780s), his representation of religion became even 
more expanded—to use Frederick G. Whelan’s phrasing again, ‘rendering essential 
features familiar’ while retaining cultural quality. His anti-exclusionary representation of 
indigenous religions treated Hindu, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, and even Pagan religions 
with a legitimacy relative to their culture. Referencing the work of Isabel Rivers, I 
highlighted this inclusive religious conception as multicultural, more modern than the 
measure of toleration for his day.
866
 I demonstrated the way in which Burke’s 
representation of global religions prefigured theories of modernity from Bauman (again), 
Johnathan Israel and Paul Heelas. Importantly, in my interpretation of these texts, I 
shaped an argument that showed how Burke’s openness to religious instinct over 
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particular dogma undermines interpretations that overestimate his Catholic roots, his 
liberalism, or insist on categorizing him by any restricting monikers. 
In my interpretation of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), 
his Letter to a Member of the National Assembly (1791) and Thoughts on French Affairs 
(1791), I proved the value in considering the religious context of those texts—
specifically, how his argument(s) to preserve the sacred gives sanctuary to its opposite 
(the demonic, the sacrilegious). I provided some needed expansion on the observation 
made by the editors of the Langford edition to the text, that Burke constructed a 
‘diabolid’.867 I showed how his representations of religious sacredness, in his writings 
surrounding the French Revolution, present a scenario wherein holiness and the profane 
(good and evil) are interdependent. In the Reflections, along with his Letter to a Member 
and his Thoughts on French Affairs, I outlined the theme of evil underlying Burke’s 
alarmist rhetoric—as it is aligned with the eighteenth-century rhetorical practice of taking 
veritable delight in the demonizing description of one’s enemy, described by S.J. Barnett 
and John Barrell.
868
 I showed how the way in which ideas surrounding religion are 
represented in these texts resonates with twentieth century theories of modernity—for 
example, Burke’s reliance on the profane to defend the sacred resonates with the modern 
‘profaning of the sacred’, originated by Karl Marx and applied to modernism by Zygmunt 
Bauman.
869
 Further, I argued that the impression of religious conception in these texts 
prefigured deconstructionist conceptualizations of religion as trans-religious, or religion 
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without religion (from Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault).
870
 I also highlighted 
Burke’s openness to malleability and change in his religious though as evidence 
antithetical to reactionary-conservatism. 
My analysis of Burke’s late writings, Letter to a Noble Lord (1796) and his 
Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796, 97), filled a need to understand more about the 
scientific references in those texts, and what they reveal about Burke’s representation of 
religions. I demonstrated how Burke’s application of scientific terms allowed him to 
communicate his worry about the vitiation of religious cultural establishment. I used the 
work of modernity theorists, particularly Mark C. Taylor, to reveal a dimension of 
Burke’s religious thought wherein the boundaries between religious sects are fluid, and 
conceptually made up of the same basic element. I further argued the way in which Burke 
represents religions (especially in his First Letter on a Regicide Peace) transcends 
boundaries of nation, culture, and sect, which prefigures twentieth and twenty-first 
century representations of religion from: Susan Hoeber Rudolph and Daniéle Hervieu-
Léger, and (again) Berman. I proposed that Burke conceived of a Godless sacredness 
before theorists of modernity, such as Paul Heelas. I believe that the inclusion of Burke in 
studies focused in transnational thinking (from David P. Fidler and Jennifer Welsh) 
evidences a classification of Burke that I have not seen elsewhere: that Burke influenced 
contemporary conceptions about religion. 
Ultimately, my interpretation of his late writings follows the direction I laid out in 
my interpretation of his early writings, his writings on Ireland and India, and his writings 
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on the French Revolution: that Burke’s representations of religious identities and themes 
is multicultural, and therefore modern—not simply conservative-reactionary, or in 
service of the ancien régime.  
The impression of Burke’s religious conception prefigures Hoeber Rudolph’s 
representation of contemporary global religions, which emphasises the transcendence 
between cultures. Hoeber Rudolph describes non-religious-oriented communities that 
value an arena of belief over sectarian division: 
Religious formations have joined issue—and interest-oriented 
transnational epistemes and communities—human rights associations, 
environmentalists, public health professionals, multinationals—to 
constitute a transnational civil society that carries on a world politics. This 
society creates an arena of belief, commitment, and practice alternative to 
the state, draining affect and action from it without replacing it.
871
 
The obligation of civil society to embrace human rights (the right to autochthonous 
religious culture) creates formations of multinational, transnational, broadly expanded 
belief. I believe this transcendent conception is comprehensively present in Burke’s 
representations of religion(s) throughout his writing, which validates him as a contributor 
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